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Chapter 1
Introduction
Once launched, spacecraft are, with few exceptions, not readily accessible for rescue,
repair, re-supply, or refurbishment. The idea of using robots for on-orbit servicing has
been around since the beginning of space flight. Since then, a variety of assessments
of the technical and economic feasibility of on-orbit servicing have been conducted.
While a number of these studies have been insightful, they have suffered from various
limitations, such as a lack of detailed spacecraft information and reliance on decision
models based on uncontrollable, unknowable, or unpredictable parameters such as the
discount rate. A more comprehensive, systematic approach with extensive spacecraft
information is needed to provide a uniform basis for the assessment of proposed
servicing scenarios. It is the goal of this thesis to identify an improved servicing
decision method and then to utilize this method to characterize the various satellite
servicing markets based on a comprehensive real world data set.
1.1 Motivations
There are a number of compelling reasons for examining the viability of telerobotic
on-orbit servicing. Factors on the demand side include the economic opportunity
provided by the continuing occurrence of significant on-orbit failures, the possibility
of extending the useful life of high value spacecraft, and other servicing opportuni-
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ties. Supply side considerations include the increasing capabilities of developmental
space robots, the decreasing size and mass requirements for these robots, and new,
potentially cheaper, alternatives for access to space.
1.1.1 On-Orbit Failures
To illustrate the economic opportunity of one type of on-orbit failure, consider the
Orion 3 geostationary commercial communications satellite. On May 4th, 1999, the
satellite was placed in an incorrect orbit due to a Delta III upper stage anomaly [11].
The second burn of the second stage (Centaur RL10B-2) was prematurely terminated
after only 3 seconds of an intended 3 minutes of firing. This left the spacecraft very
low in a 153 km by 1,380 km orbit versus an intended geosynchronous transfer orbit
of 185 km by 25,956 km. Other than the low orbit, the spacecraft appears to have
been operating nominally. In order to keep salvage options open, onboard fuel was
used to place it into a 421 km by 1,294 km parking orbit.
The reported costs included the $150M Hughes HS-601HP spacecraft and the
$80M Delta III launch. The satellite was declared a total loss with an eventual
insurance payout of $265M [13]. Orion 3 had 10 C-band and 33 Ku-band transponders
and was intended to provide voice, data and internet service to Hawaii and the Asia-
Pacific region. The spacecraft had a design life of 15 years and an estimated revenue
per transponder of $1M per year [33] (some sources go as high as $2M per year).
These characteristics imply that Orion 3 could have been generating $43M or more
per year. By abandoning the satellite, a potential revenue stream of $645M over 15
years was also forgone. Clearly, providing a framework for evaluation of this type of
scenario is of high interest.
Analyses of previous launches show that high value, wrong orbit type failures
have occurred on average about once per year over the last 20 years. A summary of
these failures is presented in Section 7.3. Other types of failures have different rates
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of occurrence and are shown in the same section. Analysis of on-orbit failures and
their occurrence rates will provide a basis for estimating the size of the market for
servicing on-orbit failures.
1.1.2 Spacecraft Life Extension
The vast majority of costs involved in the geostationary telecommunications satellite
business occur up front. After paying for satellite manufacture and launch costs, the
ongoing operations costs are orders of magnitude lower. Given that most geosyn-
chronous spacecraft reach the end of their station-keeping fuel before other major
systems start to fail [57], a method for continuing the revenue stream of such a high
value asset seems desirable.
An illustrative metric is the value of a kilogram of hydrazine in geosynchronous
orbit. For instance, Superbird 4, a HS-601HP geosynchronous telecommunications
spacecraft launched in February of 2000, cost an estimated $150M to manufacture
and $100M to launch on an Ariane 44LP [14]. Its mass at the start of on-orbit
operations was 2,460 kg. Its dry mass was reported at 1,657 kg, implying it had 803
kg of lifetime fuel. With a design life of 13 years that would result in about 62 kg of
station-keeping fuel required per year. These calculations ignore the retirement burn,
but that will be examined in detail in Section 7.4.1.3.
The satellite has 29 transponders (6 Ka-band and 23 Ku-band). These transpon-
ders can generate between $1M and $2M per year [33], therefore, a conservative es-
timate for its revenue stream is $29 million per year. Dividing the annual revenue
by the annual fuel requirement yields a value of $468,000 per kilogram of fuel. From
calculations in Appendix F, we find a typical delivery cost of about $40,000 per kilo-
gram to geosynchronous orbit. This in turn yields a value to cost ratio of over 10.
Given a cost of only tens of dollars per kilogram [103] for hydrazine on the ground,
there is clearly a rationale to further explore the market for on-orbit refueling or other
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methods of extending the life of high value geostationary spacecraft.
1.1.3 Other Servicing Opportunities
In addition to mitigation of on-orbit failures and lifetime extension, other potential
servicing scenarios include inspection, component upgrades, on-orbit assembly, and
debris clearing. These opportunities are addressed in Chapter 7.
1.1.4 Advancing Robotic Capabilities
A number of organizations are continuing to advance the capabilities of space rat-
able dexterous robots. A review of servicing related robotic projects is included in
Chapter 2. Of particular note are the efforts of the University of Maryland Space Sys-
tems Laboratory (SSL) and the NASA JSC Automation, Robotics, and Simulation
Division.
The SSL Ranger Telerobotic Shuttle Experiment (RTSX) cleared the NASA
Level 2 Shuttle Flight Safety Review and progressed to the point of assembling flight
hardware before the program was terminated in June 2002. The Ranger prototype
continues to make progress with demonstrations of servicing tasks. RTSX has the
same reach envelope as an astronaut in an EVA suit [81]. It can exert the same
force and torques as an astronaut as well. The RTSX dexterity approach is to use
highly capable arms in combination with a number of interchangeable end effectors
(some task specific, others suitable to a variety of operations). It is equipped with two
dexterous 8 DOF arms with interchangeable end effector mechanism wrists. A grapple
arm provides firm connection to a work target and a video arm provides situational
awareness and other essential views during operations. In laboratory and neutral
buoyancy simulation, RTSX and other SSL prototype arms have demonstrated key
dexterous tasks needed for on-orbit servicing activities. A smaller, lighter, modular,
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and reconfigurable version of the RTSX technology is currently under development.
Another advanced dexterous effort is the JSC Robonaut anthropomorphic
robot [42]. Using mechatronic hands, it can utilize the same tools as EVA astro-
nauts. It has been under development for a number of years, and has also success-
fully demonstrated servicing related dexterous capabilities. While its arms currently
operate at lower tip speeds than RTSX, its anthropomorphic design enables intuitive
teleoperation.
Both of these projects are in the process of demonstrating robots capable of
fulfilling the dexterous requirements of many satellite servicing scenarios. Figure
1.1 shows how Robonaut is able to utilize any human compatible tool or interface.
Ranger, on the other hand, is able to interact with any EVA or EVR interface.
Because it has time delay mitigation built in, Ranger is also controllable via all major
control approaches. These advancing dexterous robotic capabilities will enable the
completion of complex on-orbit satellite servicing tasks.
5
Figure 1.1: Space Robot Matrix [41]
1.1.5 New Launch Alternatives
A number of new launchers are coming on line in the near term. Lower launch
costs will influence any servicing mission decisions. Upcoming small launchers include
RASCAL [37] and FALCON [32]. These two launchers are of interest for LEO satellite
servicing scenarios. Both are aiming for lower cost per kg to orbit, and RASCAL also
will be able to plan and launch a mission much more rapidly than any current launch
vehicle. This capability will enable a rapid response to a troubled LEO satellite that
would otherwise re-enter before a rescue mission could be mounted by a conventional
launch system.
Other new launch opportunities include auxiliary payload locations on new
heavy launchers such as the Atlas V [24] and possibly the Delta IV [21]. In the case
of a servicing vehicle with a much lower mass than a typical satellite, the option
to launch to GEO at a fraction ($6M to $10M) of the cost of a typical ($50M to
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$80M) GEO payload launch would be a substantial benefit. See Appendix F for more
information on current launch costs.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
Previous efforts to determine the criteria for deciding when on-orbit servicing is ap-
propriate have been limited by simplifying assumptions, lack of detailed satellite
information including costs and benefits, and failure to address operational uncer-
tainties. The aim of this research is to devise an improved method for evaluating the
feasibility of telerobotic on-orbit satellite servicing scenarios. In order to reach this
aim, a number of steps have been taken.
 Chapter 2 is a review of background material on satellites, space robots, and
on-orbit servicing.
 Chapter 3 is an analysis of previous economic studies. The limitations and
strengths of these studies are identified.
 Based on the limitations of the previous studies, a new, expected-value based
methodology is developed in Chapter 4.
 Chapter 5 describes the development of the detailed spacecraft and on-orbit
failure databases at the core of this analysis.
 Based on these databases, Chapter 6 presents trends over time for key space-
craft characteristics.
 Chapter 7 includes identification and analysis of on-orbit servicing opportuni-
ties derived from the databases.
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 Based on analysis of these opportunities, Chapter 8 utilizes the new servicing
feasibility evaluation method to characterize the markets for various servicing
missions.
 Chapter 9 demonstrates an example satellite servicing feasibility assessment
based on the market characterizations. A small, light dexterous servicer is
evaluated against the geosynchronous retirement mission.
 Finally, the conclusion in Chapter 10 includes discussion of results and rec-
ommendations for further research.
1.3 Contributions
The original contributions of this work include a consistent method for evaluating
the feasibility of satellite servicing, a detailed catalog of on-orbit satellite failures,
and a survey of lifetime extension opportunities for currently active satellites. A new
method of evaluating servicing feasibility is developed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 8,
and it is demonstrated in Chapter 9. The analysis of the catalog of on-orbit failures is
shown in Chapter 7. Catalog information includes event data, spacecraft health, and
prospects for servicing. Event analysis includes frequency of events by type and costs
incurred. Such information and analysis is not available in any other open source
form. The survey of lifetime extension opportunities is also shown in Chapter 7. It
includes a range of options to extend the life of current spacecraft based on historical
lifetime information.
A key feature of this analysis is that it is not predicated on the redesign of
spacecraft. It identifies servicing opportunities against existing, operational space-
craft rather than making a case, as seen in a number of previous studies in Chapter
3, to modify the design of future spacecraft.
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By incorporating the best aspects of previous models, addressing unaccounted
for operational uncertainties, and including actual, detailed spacecraft data, this new
servicing feasibility method enables better understanding of future servicing applica-
tions, requirements for on-orbit servicing operations, effects of servicing on spacecraft
mission assurance, and the overall question of the economic viability of on-orbit ser-
vicing.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides background information on satellite servicing, previous satellite
servicing efforts, and upcoming satellite servicing technology demonstrations.
2.1 The Satellite Servicing Problem
The phrase “satellite servicing” means many things to many people. For this study, it
is used in a broad sense. Servicing is defined as being any service provided on-orbit by
one spacecraft to another. An example would be for one spacecraft to refuel another
spacecraft. The intervention of human crew to provide such services has been amply
demonstrated in vehicles such as Skylab, Shuttle, Mir, and ISS. Because of the high
cost of human spaceflight activities, hazard to crew during EVA, and current limit
of crew to LEO operations, this study will focus on investigating robotic approaches
instead.
The continuing advances in robotic capabilities suggest that servicing systems
are becoming viable candidates when responding to on-orbit spacecraft needs. As
seen in Figure 2.1, the concept of robotic satellite servicing has been around since
the beginnings of space flight. The ground prototype shown in Figure 2.2 and other
robotic systems have demonstrated that key satellite servicing capabilities are achiev-
able today.
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Spacecraft services can range from a simple inspection mission to a complex
dexterous servicing task, such as refueling a spacecraft not designed for robotic access.
All types of servicing missions are made up of a number of phases. These phases
are shown below and are essentially chronological. For our purposes, the spacecraft
providing services is called the servicer and the spacecraft receiving services is called
the target.
 Launch - The first step is to get the servicer into orbit.
 Rendezvous - From some initial orbit, the servicer needs to maneuver to the
target spacecraft.
 Inspection - An initial inspection is usually required. For some missions,
inspection is the only service required.
 Docking - For any repair or refueling mission, the servicer must connect to
the target to begin operations.
 Relocation - In some cases the servicer will relocate the target to a new orbital
location.
 Dexterous - For a number of servicing scenarios, the servicer must perform
dexterous operations to repair or resupply the target.
 Departure - At the conclusion of servicing, the servicer will undock and
depart from the area of the target spacecraft. This phase could also include
final inspection.
While a variety of spacecraft services can be envisioned, they can all be identi-
fied as belonging to one of three general categories, which include failure mitigation,
lifetime extension, and other services. Each of these services are described in the
following sections.
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Figure 2.1: On-Orbit Servicing Robot Concept From 1969 [65]
Figure 2.2: On-Orbit Servicing Robot Ground Demonstration, 2004 (RTSX) [34]
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2.1.1 Servicing Failures
A primary motivator for this analysis is the regular occurrence of on-orbit failures. A
variety of anomalies can occur during a satellite’s journey from the launch pad to its
on-orbit operational location. During the launch phase, catastrophic launch vehicle
failure or premature launch vehicle engine shutdown both result in launch vehicle loss
with no chance of satellite rescue.
Even after a successful launch, other hazards await. Once on-orbit, the satellite
can be placed in an incorrect orbit, fail to separate correctly from an upper stage, fail
to correctly deploy stowed appendages (such as solar arrays or antennas), or suffer
some other malfunction that prevents initial operations.
During its subsequent operational lifetime, the satellite may prematurely de-
plete its fuel supply. Components may fail completely or suffer degraded capabilities
due to the space environment. There are a number of other problems that can degrade
or terminate operations as well. The historic occurrence of on-orbit failures and op-
portunities to mediate them are examined in Chapter 7. On-orbit failure mitigation
services include:
 Orbit correction - Relocation of the target spacecraft from an incorrect initial
launch delivery location.
 Deployment assistance - Assistance with deployment of solar arrays, anten-
nas, or other deployable appendages.
 Component repair - Repair or replacement of failed components.
 Consumables resupply - Resupply of fuel, coolant, or other depleted con-
sumables.
 Removal - Transfer of the failed target spacecraft from a working orbit (such
as geostationary) to a retirement location. Retirement can be either relocation
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to a “graveyard” orbit or de-orbit into the atmosphere.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the many possible paths for a satellite from launch to end
of life, any number of which lead to mission failure or degrade operational capability.
In response, Figure 2.4 shows the many opportunities for servicing intervention to
mediate failures or extend the life of operational satellites.
Figure 2.3: The Life Paths Of An Unserviced Satellite
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Figure 2.4: Satellite Servicing Opportunities
2.1.2 Spacecraft Lifetime Extension
A number of mostly healthy spacecraft are retired because of some limiting factor.
For instance, the lifetime of commercial geostationary communications spacecraft are
often constrained by their lifetime fuel supply [57]. Spacecraft lifetime extension
services include:
 Relocation - Transfer of the target spacecraft to a new operating orbit. This
could even include initial orbit delivery, converting that maneuvering fuel into
lifetime fuel.
 Consumables resupply - Resupply of fuel, coolant, or other depleted con-
sumables.
 Component replacement - Replacement of degraded components. Also
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upgrade, where addition of more capable components increase the satellite’s
utility.
 Removal - Transfer of the target spacecraft from a working orbit (such as
geostationary) to a retirement location. In this case the relocation by a servicer
allows the target to expend its retirement maneuver fuel as lifetime station-
keeping fuel thus extending it non-refueled duration.
Examples of lifetime extension scenarios are explored in detail in Chapter 7.
2.1.3 Other Services
Beyond servicing failures or providing lifetime extension, other services are also con-
ceivable, including:
 Inspection - Close inspection of a target spacecraft for deployment assurance,
health monitoring, insurance claim verification, or other purposes.
 Removal - Transfer of debris (typically upper stage components or inactive,
tumbling satellites) from a working orbit (such as geostationary) to a disposal
location. This would be an indirect service that reduces the collision hazard to
operational spacecraft.
 Assembly - A servicer could be used to construct spacecraft requiring multiple
launches.
 Scavenging - Functional components retrieved from a retiring spacecraft could
be used to repair degraded spacecraft.
Examples of other services are explored in detail in Chapter 7.
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2.2 A Brief History Of On-Orbit Servicing
A number of the services described in the preceding sections have already occurred
on orbit. The following sections describe various satellite servicing missions and
technology demonstrations that have been accomplished. While there have been
some robotic servicing demonstrations on-orbit, most of the actual servicing missions
have been Shuttle based missions. The exception is satellite self-rescues which are
also described.
2.2.1 Space Shuttle Based Satellite Servicing Missions
There have been a number of Space Shuttle based satellite servicing missions, which
are shown below in Table 2.1. During the early missions, target spacecraft were
retrieved by EVA astronauts. In this case, after the Shuttle maneuvered to a point
near the satellite, a free-flying EVA astronaut on Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
used a specially designed capture mechanism to take control of the satellite. For the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST), the Shuttle’s Remote Manipulator System (RMS)
was used to directly grasped a grapple fixture and placed HST into a work fixture.
Repair work was then performed by EVA astronauts in the payload bay of the orbiter.
Not all of these spacecraft listed were serviced on-orbit. On the STS-51A mission, two
satellites were retrieved and returned to the earth for refurbishment and relaunch.
Images of these servicing missions are shown in Table 2.2.
HST and Solar Max are NASA LEO science platforms. All of the other space-
craft are commercial geostationary telecommunications spacecraft.
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Cap- Capability
Year Flight Mission ture Demonstrated
1984 STS-41C Solar Maximum Repair EVA Component replacement
1984 STS-51A Palapa B2 & Westar 6 EVA Spacecraft return
to Earth
1985 STS-51I Leasat 3 EVA Spacecraft repair
1992 STS-49 Intelsat 603 Repair EVA Upper Stage replacement
1993 STS-61 Hubble Space Telescope RMS Spacecraft upgrade
1997 STS-82 Hubble Space Telescope RMS Spacecraft upgrade
1999 STS-103 Hubble Space Telescope RMS Spacecraft upgrade
2002 STS-109 Hubble Space Telescope RMS Spacecraft upgrade
Table 2.1: Shuttle Based Satellite Servicing Missions
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Solar Max Retrieval [31] Westar 6 Retrieval [31]
Stowing Palapa B2[31] Leasat 3 Repair [31]
Intelsat 603 Rescue [31] HST Servicing [31]
Table 2.2: Shuttle Based EVA Satellite Servicing Missions
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2.2.2 Satellite Self Rescues
As shown in Table 2.3, a number of satellites that were delivered to incorrect initial
orbits utilized onboard lifetime fuel to achieve proper orbit. These events are explored
in more detail in Section 7.3. Notably, Asiasat 3, now named HGS-1, recovered from
an incorrect orbital insertion by performing 2 lunar flybys to achieve geosynchronous
orbit. Information for this table is from the Satellite Information Database. Its
sources are identified in Section 5.1.2.
Method To Value
# Year Satellite Reach GEO ($M) Basis
1 1988 GStar 3 Used onboard fuel 65 Insurance Claim
2 1993 UFO 1 Used onboard fuel 188 Insurance Claim
3 1995 Koreasat 1 Used onboard fuel 64 Insurance Claim
4 1997 Agila 2 Used onboard fuel 290 Spacecraft Value
5 1997 HGS-1 Used lunar flyby 215 Insurance Claim
6 2001 GSAT 1 Used onboard fuel Unpublished
7 2001 Artemis Used onboard fuel 75 Insurance Claim
Table 2.3: GEO Spacecraft Which Utilized Onboard Fuel To Overcome Launch
Anomalies
2.2.3 Space Shuttle Based Servicing Technology Demonstra-
tions
A number of servicing technology demonstrations have occurred on Shuttle and Sta-
tion missions. As mentioned previously, satellite capture has been made by both EVA
and RMS. The basic capability to change out ORUs has been shown on numerous oc-
casions by EVA astronauts, particularly on HST servicing missions. An on-orbit fuel
transfer demonstration on a Landsat type of fuel port was successfully accomplished
on STS-51G by EVA in the Orbital Refueling System (ORS) experiment.
Robot capabilities have been demonstrated as well. The SRMS and SSRMS
have performed ably as cranes. ROTEX on STS-55 was an enclosed dexterous robotic
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experiment. A larger dexterous demonstration was performed by the Japanese MFD
experiment on STS-85. This hardware is a precursor to JAXA’s Small Fine Arm
(SFA) for external ISS robotic operations. Among the tasks demonstrated was robotic
ORU change out and opening and closing a door. Free flying robotic inspection
capability was achieved on STS-87 with the flight of AERCam. Images of these
demonstrations are shown in Table 2.4.
AERCam [23] MFD [23]
ROTEX [22]
Table 2.4: Shuttle Based Robotic Servicing Demonstrations
21
2.2.4 Other On-Orbit Servicing Technology Demonstrations
A number of non-Shuttle-based servicing technology demonstration missions have also
occurred. These included Inspector, ETS-VII, and XSS-10. Images of these vehicles
are shown in Table 2.5.
ETS-VII [38] Mir-Inspector [66]
XSS-10 [16]
Table 2.5: On-Orbit Robotic Servicing Technology Demonstrations
The German built Inspector mission was a partially successful demonstration
near Mir in 1997. It was intended to perform an external survey of the station.
After deployment from a Progress spacecraft, ground controllers lost contact with
the vehicle. Control was eventually recovered, but Inspector was then too far from
Mir to return. Inspector relied on ground commands to get into correct position for
imaging operations.
The 1997 Japanese ETS-VII mission successfully executed autonomous ren-
dezvous and docking via a latching mechanism; ground controlled rendezvous and
docking; autonomous capture of a target satellite with a robot arm; inspection; and
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various manipulator operations. The target half of the docking mechanism was sub-
stantial in size and mass. With the exception of refueling, ETS-VII demonstrated
almost all phases of satellite servicing. All of the interfaces were explicitly designed
for robotic operations.
In 2003 the AFRL XSS-10 microsatellite flew as an auxiliary payload attached
to a Delta II upper stage. XSS-10 massed 28 kg and was battery powered. It suc-
cessfully performed close-in proximity maneuvering and close inspection of the upper
stage.
2.3 Future Servicing Technology Demonstrations
A number of flight programs are in progress that will advance the extent of robotic
servicing capabilities demonstrated in space. There are also a number of continuing
research programs advancing the level of robotic dexterity in hopes of future flight
opportunities. The following sections describe some of these programs.
2.3.1 Future Servicing Technology Flight Missions
A number of capable servicing missions are on the near horizon. They are shown in
Table 2.6 and described briefly below.
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Cone Express [27] DART [28]
miniAERCam [25] Orbital Express [37]
SPDM [20] XSS-11 [18]
Table 2.6: Upcoming Robotic Servicing Demonstration Missions
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2.3.1.1 Cone Express
Orbital Recovery Corporation is developing a vehicle to extend the life of a geosyn-
chronous spacecraft [27]. Their approach is to fly an additional spacecraft bus up to
an existing spacecraft that is low on fuel. After docking via the apogee kick motor,
Cone Express will provide North-South and other station keeping maneuvers to ex-
tend the useful life of the target spacecraft. A novel approach in the design is that
Cone Express serves as the interstage connector on a launch of other geostationary
spacecraft.
2.3.1.2 DART
The Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) project will
demonstrate autonomous capability to locate and rendezvous with another space-
craft [28]. The DART vehicle will be launched by a Pegasus rocket and inserted into
a circular low earth orbit. DART will then maneuver to a point near a target satellite
using GPS. Using its Advanced Video Guidance Sensor (AVGS), DART will perform
a series of proximity operations including station keeping, docking approaches, and
circumnavigation. Finally, the vehicle will demonstrate a collision avoidance maneu-
ver and then transit to its final orbit. All operations will be performed autonomously.
DART is sponsored by NASA and is being constructed by Orbital Sciences Corpora-
tion.
2.3.1.3 Mini AERCam
NASA is developing a next generation of the Autonomous Extravehicular Robotic
Camera (AERCam) [25]. Mini-AERCam is a small, free flying inspection vehicle,
and it will be capable of performing close imaging duties for both the International
Space Station (ISS) and the Shuttle. For ISS operations, AERCam would function in
both teleoperated and autonomous modes. For an autonomous mission, the free-flyer
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would deploy, maneuver to a target area while avoiding obstacles, acquire the needed
views, return to home base, dock, and recharge.
2.3.1.4 Orbital Express
DARPA is conducting a program named Orbital Express to demonstrate autonomous
spacecraft servicing capabilities [37]. The flight experiment consists of two vehicles.
Boeing is building the servicer called ASTRO, and Ball Aerospace is building the
target called NextSat. Launch is slated for 2005. Purpose built interface mechanisms
and fluid couplers are part of the hardware suite.
2.3.1.5 SPDM
To complete the Mobile Servicing System (MSS) on ISS, the SPDM will be delivered
to work in concert with the SSMRS and Mobile Base System (MBS) [20]. The MBS
will provide transport along the rails on the front face of the truss; the SSRMS will
provide crane capabilities to move large payloads around; and the SPDM will provide
the end point dexterous capability to replace robot compatible ORUs such as MDMs,
DDCUs, and IEA batteries. SPDM has been completed and is awaiting a spot on the
Shuttle manifest for a flight to the ISS.
2.3.1.6 XSS11
The USAF’s AFRL is constructing XSS-11 as a follow-on to the XSS-10 mission [18].
This solar powered micro-satellite will have a much longer life than the battery pow-
ered XSS-10. It is intended to extend the understanding of autonomous proximity
operations, and will use US-owned derelict rocket bodies as rendezvous targets. An
additional goal is to demonstrate technologies needed to enable NASA to use space-
craft to autonomously return Mars samples to Earth for analysis. XSS-11 is scheduled
for launch in late 2004.
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2.3.2 Dexterous Robotic Servicing Research Programs
A number of capable robotic servicing research programs are in development and are
shown in Table 2.7. Ranger and Robonaut are described briefly in Section 1.1.4.
SUMO (Spacecraft for the Universal Modification of Orbits) is a DARPA program
under development at the Naval Research Laboratory. The program is intended to
explore the space tug mission for target spacecraft relocation.
Ranger TSX [34] Robonaut [42]
SUMO [44]
Table 2.7: Ongoing Robotic Servicing Research Projects
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2.4 Robotic Serviceability Of Satellites
2.4.1 Target Satellites
Currently, the only on-orbit spacecraft designed for servicing are HST and ISS. The
chicken-and-egg of servicing is as follows. Because there are no servicers, satellites
are not designed for servicing, and because satellites are not designed for servicing,
there is no requirement for servicers. Designing serviceability into spacecraft costs
launch mass. Any such mass must be carved out of either payload mass or spacecraft
fuel. These both affect satellite revenue directly. While a number of previous studies,
as seen in Chapter 3, make the case to include serviceability into the design of future
spacecraft, current satellites present many opportunities. Because current spacecraft
are not designed for servicing, the dexterity requirements for the first servicing mis-
sions are higher than they would be for new spacecraft designed with servicing in
mind.
Quantifying the serviceability of current satellites is problematic. Ideally, tar-
get satellites would have beacons and radar targets for ease of rendezvous. A defined
docking approach corridor, docking aids (such as visual targets), docking success in-
dicators, and other items would facilitate docking. For dexterous servicing, fuel ports
would have standard quick-connect interfaces, and replaceable units would be stan-
dardized, well marked, and readily accessible. Control of the combined stack would
be handled seamlessly.
Early servicing missions will have exactly the opposite of the characteristics
described above. Early servicing robots will have to be more capable than follow-
on devices operating on next-generation serviceable satellites because they will be
operating with hardware not designed specifically to enable robotic servicing.
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2.4.2 Servicers
On the servicer side of the equation, a telerobotic servicer will include both a some-
what familiar spacecraft bus and a new robotic servicing payload. Challenges to
telerobotic servicing encompass many areas, including remote operations with time
delay (on the order of 2 seconds), visual and force feedback for 6 DOF dexterous
tasks, an effective multi-manipulator control interface, joint vehicle control, safe con-
figurations during loss of signal, and many more issues that are being addressed in
laboratories (UMD, CMU, MIT, Stanford, etc.), government (NASA JSC), and in-
dustry today. Two of the key operational robotic capabilities, docking and refueling,
are discussed in the following sections.
2.4.2.1 Robotic Docking
Rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking have been demonstrated by a wide va-
riety of crewed and supervised robotic (i.e. Progress capsules) vehicles. Autonomous
robotic docking was successfully demonstrated by ETS-VII in 1997 [80], [63], [53]. In
this case the target vehicle had a built-in docking interface. A more generic approach
likely will be required to enable servicing. For some targets, docking could be accom-
plished via the launch interface ring on the base of the satellite or the AKM nozzle.
The Ranger technology development program has recently performed a simulated 6
DOF docking simulation at the NRL facilities as seen in Figure 2.5. The NRL SUMO
[44] docking concept appears promising as well.
In addition to the launch adaptor ring, using the AKM nozzle has also been
investigated as a docking location. In particular, there is the inflatable stinger concept
from NASA JSC as seen in Figure 2.7. An ESA proposed AKM docking method is
shown in Figure 2.6. Both appear feasible but have not yet been proven.
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Figure 2.5: Ranger TSX Prepares To Dock With A Simulated Spacecraft [34]
Figure 2.6: ESA Crown Locking Mechanism [58]
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Figure 2.7: Apparatus for Attaching Two Spacecraft Under Remote Control [86], [87]
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2.4.2.2 Robotic Refueling
In order to perform a refueling mission for a current satellite, a servicer needs the
capability to access the ground fuel port on the target satellite and attach fueling
lines. In 1985, Shuttle astronauts successfully demonstrated repeated on-orbit fuel
transfer between a fuel supply and a Landsat satellite type of fuel port. Images from
the demonstration are shown in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9. Examining the EVA timeline
[46], tool list, and crew tasks, the Ranger TSX appears to have dexterous capability
required to perform the refueling task. This observation is not intended to imply that
Ranger is the only robot capable of tasks of such complexity, but that at least one
such robot currently exists.
An alternative to the fuel transfer approach is to simply attach an additional
propulsion module to a target satellite, as proposed by the Orbital Recovery Corpo-
ration [27]. While this approach reduces the use of dexterous robotics, it does include
transporting and attaching the substantial mass of an additional propulsion system
rather than transferring only fuel.
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ORS in Payload Bay [31] ORS in Payload Bay [31]
Astronauts Performing ORS Demon-
stration [31]
ORS Worksite Drawing [46]
Table 2.8: ORS - Shuttle Based Refueling Demonstration
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ORS EVA Tool Box [46] ORS Valve Dustcaps [46]
ORS Valve Lockwire [46] ORS Valve [46]
Table 2.9: ORS - Shuttle Based Refueling Demonstration
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Chapter 3
Previous Satellite Servicing Economic Models
The basic question here is the same as for any economic decision. Does the benefit
of servicing outweigh the cost? A number of previous studies have addressed this
question with a variety of economic evaluation methods, assumptions, and results.
The following sections examine previous servicing economic analyses. The papers and
reports reviewed include some level of detail in their economic models. The goal of
this review is to identify the strengths and limitations of these models. An evaluation
of the previous studies is included at the end of this chapter. This information will be
used for adaptation or extension to a new satellite servicing decision analysis method
in Chapter 4.
3.1 1981 - Manger
In 1981 Warren Manger and Harold Curtis [72] of RCA Astro-Electronics developed
a model to examine the economic tradeoffs affecting the choice of design life and
replacement strategy for a system of meteorological satellites. The purpose of the
model was to explore the economic possibilities of using the Space Shuttle to retrieve
or repair satellites, as opposed to simply replacing them.
The approach here was to find the total normalized cost for each of the options
and then to compare them to find which was lower. The model parameters are
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shown in Table 3.1. All costs in the study were normalized by dividing each cost
by the cost of the launch of one spacecraft on the Shuttle. $30M ($1981) was the
(optimistic) number used for this purpose. The baseline satellite design life was 2
years. Permutations off of this 2 year design were accommodated by the parameter
α. The authors chose a constellation life (H) of 10 years and a constellation size (N)
of 3 satellites to represent a planned meteorological satellite system. Operations costs
and ground system costs were omitted. Chances of launch failure, deployment failure,
docking failure and servicing failure were not addressed.
The normalized cost equation for the retrievable and repairable cases is shown
in Equation 3.1. For expendable satellites, the normalized cost model reduces to
Equation 3.2. Where the ratio of C to CE was less than 1.0, the reuse strategy was
deemed superior to the replacement.
C = N [1 + γ(H/L− 1)] +
[2.5 +
 δ0
+N +N(H/L− 1)(1− δ)]βCS(L/2)α (3.1)
CE = N(H/L) + [2.5 +N(H/L)]CS(L/2)
α (3.2)
The behavior of the models were explored and ”realistic” values of α, β, γ,
and δ were sought. The realism of these parameters is arguable. Figure 3.1 shows a
number of C and CE plots versus satellite design life for a variety of satellite costs
(CS). This shows that some cost savings from servicing is possible for higher cost,
longer life satellites. In Figure 3.2, cost ratio of C to CE, repair costs to expendable
costs, is plotted and shows that cost savings are possible for higher cost, shorter life
satellites.
After exercising the model further, the study concluded that for a benefit to
be derived, the spacecraft to be serviced must be “fairly expensive” and the retrieved
36
C Total normalized cost of launches and spacecraft required for the oper-
ational life of the retrievable and repairable systems.
CE Total normalized cost of launches and spacecraft required for the oper-
ational life of the expendable system.
CS Recurring cost for one of the satellites having a design life of 2 years.
H Horizon, or lifetime of the overall constellation.
L Spacecraft design life.
N Constellation size. This is the number of identical spacecraft which
must be in operation simultaneously.
α Accounts for the cost difference when the design lives other than 2 years
are considered.
β Allows for the extra recurring costs associated with providing the satel-
lite with the capability to be retrieved or repaired in orbit.
γ Can account for the extra cost for a repair on-orbit operation. Can also
reflect the extra costs associated with a launch in which not only is one
satellite put into orbit, but one is retrieved.
δ Fraction of the cost of a new spacecraft which is saved by recovery.
Table 3.1: Parameters for Manger Model
37
value must be high. Specific thresholds were not identified for either “fairly expensive”
or “high.” The authors decided that, for a small constellation of moderately priced
satellites, Shuttle based servicing would not present a significant economic benefit.
While this is a useful first order economic evaluation, this study has a num-
ber of limitations. Two of the major limits are that the decision model does not
include any chance of failure and that a number of arbitrarily valued parameters are
included - notably α (design life cost difference), β (recurring costs for retrievable or
repairable satellite), γ (on-orbit repair costs or launch costs for the retrievable case),
and δ (spacecraft cost saved by recovery). The values used in the study are acknowl-
edged as estimates. Sensitivity analysis for these parameters is included but is not
comprehensive.
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3.2 1981 - Vandenkerckhove
J. A. Vandenkerckhove of ESA published a series of satellite servicing papers in 1981
[100], 1982 [101], and 1985 [102]. They offer useful insights into the satellite servicing
problem. The 1981 paper assesses the economics of geostationary satellite services
including maintenance, repair, and refueling. The basic profitability equation is shown
in Equation 3.3. The components of that equation are further defined in Equations
3.4 thru 3.7. Substituting the values from Table 3.2 into Equation 3.7 yields Equation
3.8, which is the total satellite program cost in terms of just launch and subsystem
cost. Cost variables are in Millions of Accounting Units in 1980 prices or MAU(80).
1 MAU(80) is approximately US$ 1.2M (1980).
P = nG− C ′SER.TOT (3.3)
C ′SER.TOT = 1.859
∑
(C ′SS + CR) + T
′ + 8 + C ′LAUNCH (3.4)
G = (cREF − c)MPAY.TOTMTBF (3.5)
c =
CSAT.TOT
MPAY.TOTMBTF
(3.6)
CSAT.TOT = CSAT + CTEST + CMANAG + COPS + CLAUNCH (3.7)
CSAT.TOT = 1.859
∑
CSS + T + 8 + CLAUNCH (3.8)
This analysis is focused on comparing the costs of servicing versus not ser-
vicing (replacement). Actual geostationary communication satellite costs and masses
were used as opposes to estimates. A number of servicer configurations (Tankersat,
Servicesat, etc.) were evaluated against the model. Some top level conclusions from
the 1981 paper:
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c Unit telecommunications cost. Cost of placing and maintaining
1 kg of communications payload in orbit for 1 year.
cREF Specific cost of reference satellite.
CLAUNCH Satellite launch cost. Either 39.6 MAU(80) for Ariane-3 or 45.0
MAU(80) for Ariane-4.
CMANAG Spacecraft management cost. Equals 0.15CSAT .
COPS Spacecraft operations cost. Equals 8 + T MAU(80).
CR Cost of equipment brought by servicing satellite to serviced
satellite.
CSAT Spacecraft procurement cost. Equals 1.43
∑
CSS.
CSAT.TOT Total cost of the satellite.
CSS Cost of all of the satellite subsystems.
CTEST Spacecraft test cost. Equals 0.15CSAT .
C ′LAUNCH Launch cost of servicing satellite.
C ′SER.TOT Total cost of servicing satellite.
C ′SS Cost of all of the servicing satellite subsystems.
G Gain per satellite serviced.
MPAY.TOT Total communications payload mass, including dedicated por-
tions of the power and thermal subsystems. (Approx 63% of
satellite total mass.)
MBTF Mean Time Between Failures (for satellite)
n Number of satellites serviced by one servicing satellite.
P Profitability of servicing a group of satellites.
T ′ Lifetime of servicing satellite.
Table 3.2: Parameters for the 1981 Vandenkerckhove Model
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 Refueling alone is the most efficient of the possible intervention modes or com-
binations of modes (refuel, repair, preventive maintenance).
 Refueling appears to be profitable only for large servicing vehicles launched on
the Ariane 4 class launch vehicles.
 Refueling appears to be profitable only for long lifetime satellites (about 10
years).
 Advantages from on-orbit refueling would be eliminated by the use of electric
propulsion.
Again, chance of failure during either replacement or servicing is not accounted
for in the model. Also, the empirical spacecraft costing coefficients have changed with
time.
In 1982 Vandenkerckhove [101] extended the model to include several factors
including satellite mission failure insurance, servicer mission failure insurance, and an
on-ground spare satellite factor. Again, the output was profitability with additional
relative profitability comparisons. Further design details of a proposed Tankersat
servicing vehicle are included.
The 1982 analysis focused entirely on refueling and concluded that the highest
potential profitability occurs for a relatively light weight class of geostationary com-
munication satellites with long lifetimes. The author also notes that refueling may
be the optimal operational standard for satellites with lifetimes beyond the 10 year
mark.
3.3 1985 - Vandenkerckhove
Vandenkerckhove’s 1985 paper [102] lays out a method of comparing the cost-effectiveness
of expendable, retrievable, and serviceable spacecraft. It includes a large number of
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variables and is used to examine non-revenue generating earth observing systems,
micro-gravity science satellites, and other science spacecraft. Equations 3.10, 3.11,
and 3.12 show the costing equations for a scientific mission for the expendable,
reusable, and serviceable cases respectively. The variables in these equations are
defined in Table 3.3. Once again, the approach is to compare the total cost of the ser-
viceable satellites to the expendable satellites and look for situations where servicing
is less costly. While the structure of these models has depth and breadth, many of the
parameter values are estimates. Launch and other risks are somewhat addressed with
the α parameters, however, the values selected are arguable and include no sensitivity
analysis.
C◦TOT = (1 +m)(n+ 1 + αL)NC
◦
SAT + (1 + αL)N(C
◦
L + Cl) + (3.9)
NW +NwL
(Expendable Scientific Satellite)
C ′TOT = (1 +m){[n+ F λ + (N − F )r +NαL + (3.10)
(N − F )(1− r)αR]C ′PLAT +N(n+ 1 + αL)CPAY }+
N(1 + αL)(C
′
L + Cl) + (N − F )(C ′R + Cr) +NW +NwL
(Reuseable Scientific Satellite)
C ′′TOT = (1 +m){[n+ F λ + αL + αA + (3.11)
(N − 1)αS](C ′′PLAT + CPAY ) + (N − 1)(n+ 1)CPAY }+
[1 + αL + αA + (N − 1)αS](C ′′L + Cl) +
(1 + αA)C
′′
A + (N − 1)(C ′′S + Cs) +W +NwL
(Serviceable Scientific Satellite)
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αA In-orbit assembly risk
αL Launch risk
αR Retrieval risk
αS Servicing risk
Cl Launch operations costs
CL Launch costs
CPAY Payload recurrent costs
CPLAT Platform recurrent costs
Cr Retrieval operations costs
CR Retrieval costs
Cs Servicing operations costs
CS Servicing costs
CTOT Total project costs
F Number of retrievable / serviceable platforms
L Lifetime or time between flights
λ Learning curve exponent (nominally 0.926)
n Non-recurrent to recurrent cost ratio (nominally 2.5)
N Number of foreseen flights
m Overhead of procuring agency (nominally 0.12)
r Relative refurbishment costs
w Variable operations costs
W Fixed operations costs
◦ Superscript for expendable spacecraft
′ Superscript for retrievable / reusable spacecraft
′′ Superscript for serviceable spacecraft
Table 3.3: Parameters for the 1985 Vandenkerckhove Models
45
3.4 1989 - Yasaka
Tetsuo Yasaka of NTT has published a number of papers [109], [110], [112], [111]
related to satellite servicing and a proposed servicer called GSV (Geostationary Ser-
vicing Vehicle). The 1989 study [108] includes an exploration of the economic utility
of a number of geostationary spacecraft services, including initial operational moni-
toring, malfunction recover, health check, and satellite disposal. The approach was to
find a relationship between the ratio of the servicing system cost to the satellite cost
(CV /CS) and the ratio of the servicing gain to the satellite cost (CG/CS). The author
made a number of simplifying assumptions and derived the linear relationships shown
in Equations 3.12 thru 3.15. The variables in these equations are defined in Table
3.4.
These equations include a number of embedded factors such as insurance rate
(20%), BOL (beginning of life) failure rate (10%), technical gains (varied by case),
delta-v requirement factors, transponder to satellite cost ratios (1.7%), and others.
These embedded factors tended to reflect the costs inherent in the point design of
the GSV and its assumed target versus a more generally applicable model. Outcomes
from this method indicate that economic gains tend to go up with a higher number of
servicing visits. Combining missions is also identified as a way to increase potential
gain. No threshold to decide if servicing was superior to not servicing was established
in the study.
CG
CS
= (0.1r + 0.02− (1/N)CV
CS
) (3.12)
Initial Operations Monitoring Case)
“r” is BOL failure rate reduction ratio.
CG
CS
= (r + 0.02− (3/N)CV
CS
) (3.13)
Malfunction Recovery Case
“r” is malfunction recovery rate.
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CG
CS
= (0.17r + 0.01− (1/N)CV
CS
) (3.14)
Routine Health Check Case
“r” is gain in transponder-years.
CG
CS
= (0.125r − (2.5/N)CV
CS
) (3.15)
Satellite Disposal Case
“r” is EOL utilization ratio.
CG Economical gain in one service mission
CS Average customer satellite value
CV Servicer system cost of its life
r Definition varies by scenario
N Total number of services given
Table 3.4: Yasaka Model Parameters
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3.5 1992 - The INTEC Study
In 19992 NASA and the International Technology Underwriters (now AXA Space
space insurance company) conducted a joint study called, “NASA/INTEC Satellite
Salvage/Repair Study” [71]. The study examined the salvage and repair market
for commercial communications satellites. The two key questions that the study
addressed are as follows.
 For each spacecraft in the forecast, at what price does satellite servicing make
economic sense?
 Does the distribution of break-even repair costs represent a potential market
for a salvage/repair operator?
To answer these questions, the study performed a net present value analysis for each
of the current and near-term forecasted satellites in the commercial, defense, and civil
markets. The net present value formula is shown in Equation 3.16 and the variables
are identified in Table 3.5.
NPV =
∑T
t=0
CFt
(1 + r)t
(3.16)
As Table 3.6 shows the NPV cash flows by year for the replacement case. After
a newly launched satellite fails on-orbit, a updated satellite with a higher revenue rate
($85M versus $80) is launched after a 3 years of outlays to manufacture and launch
CFt Cash flow at time t.
NPV Net Present Value
r Discount rate. The cost of capital.
t Time step index
T Final time step
Table 3.5: Net Present Value Variables
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the replacement satellite. This replacement satellite is assumed to operate for 10
years. A discount rate of 7% is assumed for both this and the servicing case.
Table 3.7 shows the NPV cash flows by year for the servicing case. In the
repair scenario a one year repair timeframe is followed by 9 years of operations. The
NPV from the replacement scenario was used to back out the break-even cost for the
repair mission. In the case shown the break-even TBD cost was found to be $140M.
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 NPV
Cost -50 -50 -50
Revenue 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Cash Flow -50 -50 -50 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 356
Table 3.6: INTEC Satellite Replacement Scenario
This model was used to calculate the break-even repair cost for each of the
58 spacecraft in the commercial communications satellite segment of the forecasted
market for 1993 to 1996. The basic analysis showed that 57 of the spacecraft would
break-even on a $50M servicing mission, 49 for a $100M mission, and 12 for a $200M
mission. The model was also run with and without insurance. It was applied to
military and civilian science satellites by using the value of the satellite at launch
divided by its nominal lifetime as its quasi-revenue.
Input variables for this model included discount rate, replacement time, satel-
lite life, satellite cost, satellite revenue, and repair time. Additional sensitivity anal-
ysis was performed on cost with insurance, cost without insurance, underinsuring,
revenue with insurance, revenue without insurance, insurer repayment share, failure
rate, differential failure rates, and differential discount rates. The results were, as is
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 NPV
Cost TBD
Revenue 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Cash Flow TBD 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 0 0 0 356
Table 3.7: INTEC Satellite Repair Scenario
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always the case for NPV calculations, very sensitive to the discount rate.
The conclusion of the study was that a satellite salvage and repair business was
a marginal proposition. Affiliation with a spacecraft servicing business and participa-
tion of the U.S. Government were seen as factors which could improve the probability
of success. On the plus side, this study included actual satellite costs and good (direct
from industry and proprietary) estimates of future revenues. The downside is the use
of NPV with its high sensitivity to discount rate. Actual capital rates were nearly
half as much making long term projects more attractive. Also, the model assumes one
servicing mission per servicer. While this is reasonable for the rescue of satellites in-
tended for geostationary orbit with a requirement for a powerful upper stage to make
up for a low orbit, it is not a good assumption for all servicing scenarios. Additionally,
no account is taken of possible servicing or replacement mission anomalies.
3.6 1994 - Newman
In 1994 Lauri Newman completed a master’s thesis [77] at the University of Maryland
Space System’s Laboratory. The central focus of this thesis was the cost effectiveness
of on-orbit satellite refueling. The Ranger Telerobotic Flight Experiment (RTFX)
robotic servicer, as shown in Table 3.9, launched on a Delta II rocket was the point
design chosen for the cost effectiveness study. A satellite refueling economic model was
developed to assess various servicing scenarios. The basic equation, Equation 3.17,
states that in order for a refueling mission to be cost effective, revenues generated by
refueling a target satellite or satellites must exceed the cost of the refueling mission
and the cost of continuing to operate the satellites. Geosynchronous communications
satellites were used as servicing targets and a very detailed list of the then current
ranges of revenue per transponder is included. Non-commercial satellite lifetime gain
analysis is included as well.
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The parametric model developed captures the key costs and revenues involved
in servicing decision analysis. The key equations are shown in Equations 3.18 thru
3.23. Substituting these equations into Equation 3.17 yields Equation 3.25 which
shows the component costs and benefits of the servicing scenario. The parameters in
these equations are defined in Table 3.8. The model includes MTBFs for the target
satellites but does not address any chance of failure during the servicing missions
(launch, wrong orbit, operations, etc.). The time value of money is not addressed in
the model.
The analysis concluded that it is always profitable to use RTFX to refuel a
geosynchronous communications satellite versus replacing it with an identical satel-
lite. Conversely, it found that using a refueled spacecraft until it fails is never more
economical than replacing it with an improved technology spacecraft. Of course,
these conclusions must be tempered by the fact that this economic evaluation has a
point design (Ranger launched on a Delta II) for a servicer built into the calculations.
A smaller, more capable servicer would influence the results to be more favorable to
servicing.
PT = RT − CT (3.17)
RT = RTnR + ntRtmtLadd (3.18)
CT = CTnR +
c3
tfuel
Ladd + C
′
T (3.19)
RTnR = ntnsatRtmttfuel (3.20)
CTnR = (c1 + c2 + c3 + c4)nsat (3.21)
C ′T = c
′
1 + c
′
2 + c
′
3 (3.22)
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Ladd =
mfRtfuel
mfsat
(3.23)
PT = ntRtmttfuel(nsat +
mfR
mfsat
)− (3.24)
((c1 + c2 + c3 + c4)nsat + c3
mfR
mfsat
+ c′1 + c
′
2 + c
′
3)
c1 Satellite launch costs ($)
c2 Satellite costs ($)
c3 Satellite operations costs ($)
c4 Satellite insurance costs ($)
c′1 Servicer launch costs ($)
c′2 Servicer costs ($)
c′3 Servicer operations costs ($)
CT Cost of servicing scenario ($)
CTnR Cost of nominal satellite mission (sat, launch, ops, & insurance ($)
C ′T Cost of servicing mission (vehicle, launch, & ops) ($)
Ladd Added lifetime (years)
mfR Mass of fuel carried by servicer (kg)
mfsat Mass of maximum satellite fuel capacity (kg)
mt Mass of a transponder (kg)
nsat Number of satellites in family
nt Number of transponders per satellite
PT Profit of servicing scenario versus baseline scenario ($)
Rt Revenue per kg of transponder per year of ops ($/kg-yr)
RT Revenue of servicing scenario ($)
RTnR Revenue of baseline satellite scenario ($)
tfuel Satellite lifetime based on initial fuel load (years)
Table 3.8: Newman Servicing Parameters
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Ranger TFX On Delta II [77]
Ranger TFX Deployed [77]
Table 3.9: Ranger TFX Images
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3.7 1996 - Hibbard
Hibbard’s 1996 on-orbit refueling assessment [57] includes a review of enabling tech-
nologies for on-orbit satellite refueling. The author surveyed the operational lives
of US geosynchronous satellites in the 1984 to 1996 timeframe. Based on direct re-
ports from satellite operators, it was determined that the average satellite exceeded
its design life by about 3 years and that 52% of satellites experienced fuel related
operational impacts with 20% failing due to fuel depletion. Using these observations
as motivation for an on-orbit refueling study, a conceptual servicer, the OOR (On-
Orbit Refueler) was developed. It is based on the size and configuration of ETS-VII
(a NASDA telerobotics demonstration flight) combined with a DSCS-IIIB satellite (a
US military geosynchronous communications satellite). The derived characteristics
for the OOR and geosynchronous operational area drive the launch vehicle selection
to be a Titan IV class vehicle. The paper uses the USAF Unmanned Space Vehicle
Cost Model, 7th edition, to estimate the OOR recurring costs as $113M.
Equation 3.25 is Hibbard’s basic break even cost equation. The variables are
identified in Table 3.10. Hibbard focused on “i,” the number of satellites needed to
be refueled per refueling mission to break-even. Based on the values derived from
the OOR design, the author determined that a range of 3 to 5 GEO communications
satellites must be refueled to make a refueling mission economically feasible. While
the analysis does include actual target spacecraft data, the possibility of failure during
replacement or servicing missions is not addressed.
(RC + LC) <
∑
((SC + LC)i × PL∆) (3.25)
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RC Servicer cost
LC Servicer launch cost
SC Replacement satellite cost
LC Satellite launch cost
i Number of satellites refueled per mission
PL∆ Percent increase in satellite life
Table 3.10: Hibbard Parameters From Equation 3.25
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3.8 1998 - Davinic
Davinic’s 1998 satellite servicing analysis focused on the question of servicing ver-
sus replacing sensor equipped satellites in a theoretical LEO constellation. The ser-
vicer concept developed is called SMARD (Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design).
Comparing costs between various scenarios was accomplished by assessing the present
value of the life cycle cost for each scenario. Equation 3.26 shows this standard for-
mula and the parameters are shown in Table 3.11. Additionally, a Monte Carlo
simulation was included to address sensor failures and produce a sensor availability
metric for each scenario. PVLCC (Present Value of Life Cycle Costs) and sensor
availability were the model outputs and give a decision maker a clear trade between
cost and sensor coverage. The study concluded that servicing a particular LEO sen-
sor platform is cheaper and enables higher sensor availability than simply replacing
failed satellites. The proposed bus is further explored in additional papers by C. M.
Reynerson in 1999 [82] and 2001 [83]. A precursor report from NRL was published
in 1996 [4].
PV LCC =
∑n
0 (
1
(1 + dn−1)
$n) (3.26)
d The discount rate
n The year of the project
PV LCC Present value of life cycle costs (present value of all future expenditures)
$n The expenditure in a given year in constant year dollars
Table 3.11: Davinic Equation Parameters
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3.9 1999 - Leisman
In 1999 Gregg Leisman and AdamWallen of AFIT produced an extensive study [69] of
incorporating on-orbit servicing into the next generation of the GPS fleet. A summary
paper was also produced [70]. The study examined 8 servicing architectures including
servicers and depots in a variety of orbital locations. While accounting for the life
cycle cost of each of the alternatives, the study also incorporated “weights” associated
with various aspects of the resulting system. This approach gives a decision-maker
the ability to trade life cycle cost versus their own definition of utility (performance,
overall program viability, availability, etc.).
The “Value” for each alternative architecture is composed of a sum of different
terms with decision-maker supplied weights for each of the terms. Table 3.12 shows
the terms, their range values, and their weights in the overall “Value” calculation for
the analysis. Each of the terms is developed and analyzed in detail over the course
of the analysis. The plot of the values versus mission cost for each alternative is
plotted in Figure 3.3. Cost is found using a standard space systems cost estimation
tool called NAFCOM [15]. Alternatives with lower price and higher value are more
optimal. In other words, the upper left corner (zero cost, value of 10) of the graph
would be the most desirable. The circled alternatives indicate the boundary of the
desirable options.
Overall, this method is more about deciding which servicing architecture is
superior than in deciding to service or not to service. Also, the possibilities of failures
during servicing or replacement are not addressed.
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Max.
Measure Range Value Weight
Cycle Time 0-12 Years 10 0.190
Shared RDT&E 0-1 $B 10 0.190
3 Or 6 Planes 3 or 6 10 0.143
Capacity 0-230 kg 10 0.143
Multi-Usability None to High 10 0.143
Upgrade Frequency 0-4 Upgrades 10 0.095
Mean Time To Repair 0-90 Days 10 0.048
Orbit Transfer Capability None to High 10 0.048
Table 3.12: Leisman Parameters
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Figure 3.3: Value Of Servicing Architecture Versus Cost (Adapted from [69])
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3.10 2001 - Lamassoure
In 2001, Elizabeth Lamossoure completed an MIT thesis titled, “A Framework to Ac-
count for Flexibility in Modeling the Value of On-Orbit Servicing for Space Systems
[67].” A companion paper was also published [51] shortly thereafter. This analysis
seeks to address the uncertainties related to servicing and to establish a value of ser-
vicing separately from its cost. The first part seeks to demonstrate the value of having
the option to service a spacecraft in orbit in the context of uncertain future revenues.
The second part addresses the uncertainty of need for military systems. The utility
of reconfiguring a LEO radar constellation is compared to relocating geosynchronous
communications satellites. Real options theory, equations for which appear in the
next section, is employed and a case for servicing under certain conditions is made.
The model does not appear to include the possibility of failure in either the
servicing or replacement operations. A net present value calculation is embedded
in the model and leaves it susceptible to the discount rate. Sample calculations are
geared towards a small number of actual spacecraft, such as Iridium and Globalstar.
3.11 2002 - McVey
Michelle McVey’s MIT thesis from 2002 [74] is titled, “Valuation Techniques for Com-
plex Space Systems: An Analysis of a Potential Satellite Servicing Market.” A com-
panion paper was also published in 2003 [75]. This analysis also employs real options
analysis to assess the viability of servicing. Furthermore, this study seeks to de-couple
the servicer and customer sides of the model. A series of baseline missions against
typical satellites were costed and cost deltas provided by the option to service were
calculated. Viable servicing opportunities were identified. Net present value is in-
cluded in the evaluation. The Decision Tree Analysis used for dealing with market
uncertainty appears to be a form of expected value analysis. A positive result for ser-
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vicing geosynchronous communications satellites was found. The the Black-Scholes
equation, Equation 3.27, was used to determine the value of options. The associated
parameters are shown in Equations 3.28 thru 3.30 and Table 3.13. Values for some
of these parameters are not readily available and must be estimated.
VOPTION = S0 ×N(d1)− e−rT0 × (E + Cops)×N(d2) (3.27)
N(t) =
∫ 1√
2pi
e−t
2
dt (3.28)
d1 =
[ln (S0/E) + (r + σ
2/2)× T ]
σ
√
T0
(3.29)
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T0 (3.30)
VOPTION Value of the option of spacecraft life extension
S0 Present value of revenue stream over life extension
r Risk free interest rate
E Cost of servicing
Cops Operating cost of spacecraft over life extension
T0 Time of servicing for life extension (i.e. design lifetime
of the satellite)
σ Volatility of the revenues per year of continuously com-
pounded rate of return
Table 3.13: McVey Study (Black-Scholes) Equation Parameters
3.12 2004 - Walton
In Walton’s 2004 paper [104], portfolio theory is added to the real options approach
to valuation in the presence of uncertainty. The basic equation is shown in Equation
60
3.32 and the variables are shown in Table 3.14. Again, a number of key parameters
must be estimated. The focus in this study is more on whether to design servicing
into future satellites versus assessing the economic viability of servicing for current
satellites.
maximize rTw − k
2
wTQw (3.31)
subject to
∑n
i=1wi = 1
subject to w ≥ 0
k Risk aversion coefficient
Q Covariance matrix
r Return of an architecture, units vary by mission
w Investment weightings for architectures
Table 3.14: Walton Equation Parameters
3.13 Other Economic Studies
Additional studies exist which include economic results, but offer even less explanation
as to how the conclusions were reached. These studies include SAIC’s “Satellite
Servicing Mission Preliminary Cost Estimation Model [1],” “Satellite Servicing: A
NASA Report To Congress [2],” James Suttle’s “A Life Cycle Cost Effectiveness
Comparison Of Satellite Replacement And Space Repair Strategies [92],” MSFC’s
“Satellite Servicing Economic Study [3],” NASA’s “Group Task Force On Satellite
Rescue And Repair [98],” and a number of others.
In 1993 Donald Waltz of NASA GSFC published “On-Orbit Servicing Of Space
Systems” [105]. This book summarizes the results of work performed by a large num-
ber of people in an industry-wide study called SAMS (Space Assembly, Maintenance,
61
and Servicing). The focus was on national capability, and the study proposed an en-
tire space infrastructure architecture including STS, space station, OMV, FTS, and
other components. Satellite servicing was addressed but no details of the cost-benefit
assessment method were included. Servicing versus replacement was rated as having
savings of 20 to 30% with up to 50% possible.
Additionally, there was an AFIT thesis [50] published by Michael Delpinto in
1988 titled, “Assessing Potential Benefits For Service/Repair And Retrieval Of Satel-
lites: A Pilot Decision Analysis.” An approach to compare replacement, retrieval,
and replenishment strategies was formulated, however, the thesis was more focused
on developing a method for decision making than arriving at actual results.
Andrew Turner of Space Systems / Loral has developed a series of papers
([94], [93], [95], [96], and [97]) analyzing the possible implications of servicing geosyn-
chronous spacecraft on spacecraft design and launch vehicle utilization. Some intrigu-
ing first order economic assessments are included but a detailed analysis is not.
Joseph Saleh’s 2002 MIT dissertaion [60] is title, “Weaving Time Into System
Architecture: New Perspectives on Flexibility, Spacecraft Design Lifetime, and On-
Orbit Servicing.” Saleh is lead author on a pair of related papers [61] and [62]. This
analysis also uses real options analysis based on the Black-Scholes equation shown
in Section 3.11. The goal here is to find optimal spacecraft system design life in the
presence of both uncertain revenues and the option to extend life via servicing. An
additional area of exploration is to shift from economic to utility assessments based
on user values.
3.14 Cost Estimation Methods
A number of common spacecraft cost estimation models were used by the various
studies. A brief description of these models in shown in Table 3.15. While target
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satellite costs and revenues may be obtained from a number of sources, proposed
servicing vehicle costs must be estimated. Those studies that did not use the models
shown in the table sometimes used costs from a similarly sized existing satellite [57].
An excellent source for information on these and other models is available at the
NASA JSC Parametric Cost Estimating Handbook website [29].
# Model
Name
Description
1 NAFCOM NASA / Air Force Cost Model [15]. Cost estimation
based on a database of over 100 military and civil space
programs. Public and non-public versions are available
in order to protect military program data.
2 USCM Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model (USAF, Space Di-
vision, Los Angeles AFB). Intended to estimate total
space segment cost including non-recurring and recur-
ring cost of components as well as subsystems for earth
orbiting unmanned spacecraft.
3 SSCM Small Satellite Cost Model (Aerospace Corp.) [68]. The
model estimates the development and production costs of
a small satellite bus for Earth-orbiting or near-planetary
spacecraft.
4 SMAD SMAD Book (Microcosm) [106]. A set of spacecraft
CERs based on the other publicly available models.
Table 3.15: Cost Estimation Models
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3.15 Evaluation Of Previous Studies
The question at the start of this chapter remains central. Does the benefit of ser-
vicing outweigh the cost? The clearest method appears to be the relatively simple
approach at the base of Vandenkerckhove (Section 3.2), Newman (Section 3.6), and
Hibbard (Section 3.7). In slightly different forms they each attempt to quantify when
the financial benefit of servicing exceeds the cost of servicing by focusing on top
level, measurable parameters. What then is missing from this approach? Opera-
tional uncertainty is not addressed and real world spacecraft data is not assessed in
a comprehensive manner. Additionally, some models incorporated a servicer point
design into their economic models. These issues are described further in the following
subsections.
3.15.1 Operational Uncertainty
The possibility of operational failure in either the replacement or repair scenarios is
not addressed by previous studies. While target vehicle on-orbit failures are included
in Vandenkerckhove [100] and Newman [77], launch anomalies for the servicer or
replacement satellite are not. McVey [74] and Saleh [60] include probabilistic decision
trees that inspire the need to address these concerns, but their analyses were focused
on market uncertainties rather than operational failures. Both a new satellite and
a servicer face the significant possibility of a launch failure or other beginning of
life anomaly. Servicing operations themselves also include a chance of failure. These
alternatives need to be addressed and incorporated into an extended servicing decision
model.
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3.15.2 Comprehensive Market Assessment
Studies that were focused on making the case for incorporating servicing into the
design of new satellites used theoretical satellites as servicing targets. Other studies
incorporated small sets of real world satellites. Of the previous studies, Hibbard [57]
did the most extensive survey looking at over 100 real world geosynchronous commu-
nications satellites. Leisman [69] included GPS satellite information, and Lamassoure
[67] used Iridium satellites.
Understanding the various components of the satellite servicing market has
not been addressed methodically. An analysis of historical on-orbit failures is needed
to assess the failure servicing market. Information such as type of failure, frequency
of occurrence of failure type, complexity of the remediation action required, and
value of continued operations of repaired satellite need to be determined. For lifetime
extension analysis, a survey of current satellites and an assessment of life limiting
factors needs to be undertaken.
3.15.3 Decoupling Market Assessment From Servicer Design
An additional issue with the previous methods is that a number of studies (Manger
[72], Yasaka [108], Hibbard [57], Newman [77], and Leisman [69]) selected a ser-
vicer point design and worked out the economics from there. While this is a useful
pathfinder or order of magnitude approach, continually improving servicer technology
and improved operational concepts for servicing soon make the conclusions of such
models obsolete. A servicing market survey that does not rely on the economic char-
acteristics of one specific servicer design would have broader applicability. McVey
[74], Saleh [60], and others have incorporated this idea into their methods. As part of
this dissertation, a market assessment of the various segments of the servicing market
is included in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 4
A New Method To Evaluate Servicing Feasibility
In order to meet the three main shortfalls from the previous efforts (operational fail-
ures, comprehensive market survey, and servicer independent assessment), a number
of steps were taken. The comprehensive market survey was conducted by developing
databases on nominal satellite characteristics and of on-orbit failures. Descriptions
of these two databases may be found in Chapter 5. Analysis of the servicing oppor-
tunities derived from these databases follows in Chapter 7.
To address the significant chance of operational failure in both servicing and
non-servicing scenarios, a new method to evaluate satellite servicing feasibility is in-
troduced in the following sections of this chapter and developed in detail in Chapter 8.
Briefly put, the new method is based on the basic approach identified by Vandenker-
ckhove , Newman, and Hibbard, and is extended by incorporating the expected value
method to address operational uncertainty.
4.1 Previous Servicing Decision Method
The previous method, from Vandenkerckhove [100], Newman [77] and Hibbard [57],
can be expressed as Equation 4.1 with parameters defined in Table 4.1. This is a
simplified form ignoring, for now, the time value of money and rolling the launch,
operations, and other costs into the parameters shown.
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vExtendedLife− cSvcMsn > vNewSat− cNewSat (4.1)
vExtendedLife Value of the extended life for the serviced Sat
cSvcMsn Cost of the servicing mission
vNewSat Value of the life of a replacement spacecraft
cNewSat Cost of deploying the replacement spacecraft
Table 4.1: Parameters From Equation 4.1
Implicit in this formulation is that the chance of launch failure for the servicer
or the replacement satellite is zero. Also, the chance of the servicing mission failing
is zero. As will be shown in Chapter 7, the chance of any given launch to fail is about
4.8% over the last 10 years. Clearly, this and other operational uncertainties must be
addressed to formulate any meaningful comparison. One way to accommodate the
chance of failure is to recast the problem in expected value form.
4.2 Expected Value Method
As seen in [48], [52], and [45], the basic expected value equation is shown in Equa-
tion 4.2 and the parameters are shown in Table 4.2. Figure 4.1 illustrates that the
method can be used to find the value of different branches of a decision tree. Each
outcome has its own value and probability of occurring. For Option A in the fig-
ure to be selected (have the highest expected value), Equation 4.3 would need to be
true. Adaptation of this method to address operational uncertainty in servicing and
non-servicing scenarios is shown in the next section.
EV =
∑
i xiP(xi) (4.2)
xA1P (xA1) + xA2P (xA2) + xA3P (xA3) > xB1P (xB1) + xB2P (xB2) (4.3)
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EV Expected value
i Event
P(xi) Probability that event i will occur
xi Value of event i
Table 4.2: Expected Value Equation Parameters
Figure 4.1: Expected Value Method
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4.3 New Servicing Decision Method
A simplified servicing decision tree is shown in Figure 4.2. The expected value equa-
tion for this diagram is Equation 4.5. Introducing a break-even servicing fee, vSvcFee,
allows the conversion of the inequality to the form shown in Equation 4.6. This break-
even servicing fee represents the maximum amount a proposed servicer could charge
for the net value of the mission to be zero. Obviously, the lower this servicing fee is,
the more attractive servicing becomes.
Figure 4.2: Expected Value Diagram For Servicing
(pOK × vExtendedLife− pFail × cSvcMsn) > (4.4)
(pOK × vNewSat− pFTO × cNewSat)
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vSvcFee = (pOK × vExtendedLife− pFail × cSvcMsn)− (4.5)
(pOK × vNewSat− pFTO × cNewSat)
The above serves only as an example of the intended approach. The expected
value break-even servicing fees for each of the servicing markets identified in Chapter
7 are developed in detail in Chapter 8 using the above method. The method is also
demonstrated against a proposed servicer in Chapter 9.
4.4 Satellite Information Required For NewMethod
In order utilize this new method, a variety of spacecraft information is required. Key
parameters from the detailed development in Chapter 8 are collected in the Satellite
Information Database described in the next chapter. Aggregation and analysis of this
real world data is critical to provide a servicing feasibility assessment rooted more
firmly in reality than previous studies.
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Chapter 5
Database Development
One common shortcoming of the economic models examined in the previous chapter
is the lack of spacecraft technical and economic details to evaluate the claims. In
response to this, a detailed survey of satellites, launch vehicles, upper stages, and on-
orbit failures is needed. While various types of satellite information are available from
diverse sources, no single available database includes all of the information needed to
assess the technical and economic feasibility of satellite servicing.
Evidently a number of proprietary spacecraft failure databases exist. The
Aerospace Corporation, the Teal Group, Futron, and other organizations have re-
leased some summaries of on-orbit failures. However, none of these databases are
available for public use at this time. Therefore, a satellite information database and
an on-orbit failure database were developed for use in this analysis.
Descriptions of the satellite and on-orbit failure databases are presented in
this chapter. A summary of the records and fields in both are shown in Table 5.1.
The databases include information from the beginning of spaceflight in 1957 through
the end of 2003. The “Records” column corresponds to satellites and the “Fields”
column indicates the maximum number of attributes collected per satellite.
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Database Records Fields
Spacecraft Information 6,032 139
On-Orbit Spacecraft Failures 854 54
Table 5.1: Databases
5.1 Spacecraft Information Database
The spacecraft database includes launch information, spacecraft bus parameters,
transponder counts, launch costs, spacecraft costs, and other satellite specific in-
formation. Orbital information from a variety of sources and epochs is also included.
The primary source for orbital information was the NASA/GSFC Orbital Information
Group Web Site [26]. Each database record includes references to the sources from
which it was derived.
5.1.1 Spacecraft Identification Scheme
The many sources used to develop the satellite information database used a variety of
means to identify satellites. The COSPAR international identifier was used by many
of the data sources. Other sources used the NORAD identifier. Still others used only
the satellite name, which varied widely.
Either the NOARD or COSPAR identifier could have been used. Because the
COSPAR identifier includes launch year information and was in wider use, it was
selected as the basis for the unique identifier for this satellite information database.
However, with both NORAD and COSPAR there is no standard identification scheme
for launches that failed to orbit. Nor is there a standard method to call out payloads
that failed to separate. “Failed to separate” payloads are those that inadvertently
remained attached to their upper stages or that failed to separate from co-manifested
payloads. To meet all of these needs, the COSPAR augmented identification schemes
shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 were adopted.
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Sample ID Meaning
1900-001A Successful Launch, Payload A (Standard COSPAR Iden-
tifier)
1900-001A.01 Successful Launch, Payload Failed to Separate, Payload
Component 01
Where
1900 Launch Year
001 Launch identifier
A Payload identifier
.01 Payload Component identifier
Table 5.2: Identification Scheme For Successful Launches
Sample ID Meaning
FTO-1900-12-01 Single Payload Failed To Orbit
FTO-1900-12-01.01 Multiple Payload Launch Failed To Orbit
FTO-1900-12-01A Multiple Rockets With Single Payloads Failed on same
date
FTO-1900-12-01A.01 Multiple Rockets With Multiple Payloads Failed on same
date
Where
FTO Failed To Orbit
1900 Launch Year
12 Launch Month
01 Launch Day
A Differentiates rockets that failed on the same launch date
01 Identifier for payloads that failed to separate
Table 5.3: Identification Scheme For Missions That Failed To Orbit
5.1.2 Sources
The satellite information database was constructed from a number of open sources.
These are shown in Table 5.4. This table shows the source, the year of the earliest in-
formation, the year of the latest information, the number of records, and the number
of fields. Additional sources, [47], [76], [103], [107], and [30], were used to cross check
in a number of cases. The databases include all civilian, military, commercial, and
non-governmental organization spacecraft launched from 1957 through 2003. A num-
ber of United States and Russian military reconnaissance related sub-satellites were
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omitted because they were thought to be re-entry capsules containing reconnaissance
film canisters or small, short lived auxiliary spacecraft.
Source Ref Earliest Latest Records Fields
1 Aerospace Source Book [78] 1984 2003 672 23
2 Celestrak Satellite Catalog [64] 1957 2003 5,383 7
3 Hibbard [57] 1976 1990 125 14
4 Hughes [8] 1963 2000 195 11
5 Intelsat [10] 1980 1998 30 15
6 Isakowitz [59] 1965 1999 2,967 21
7 Jonathan’s Space Report [73] 1957 2003 6,407 11
8 Mission Spacecraft Library [6] 1957 1997 5,107 19
9 NSSDC Master Catalog [11] 1957 2003 5,604 16
10 PanAmSat [12] 1985 2000 22 17
11 Satellite Today Database [7] 1980 2000 247 8
12 AGI Spacecraft Digest [13] 1960 2003 2,375 24
13 The Satellite Encyclopedia [14] 1992 2003 2,251 64
Table 5.4: Satellite Database Sources
5.1.3 Fields
Tables 5.5 through 5.13 list and briefly describe the fields included in the satellite
information database. Additional fields consisting of calculations based on these
data fields are also included in the database. A sample satellite record is shown in
Appendix H.
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# Field Description
1 Joint IntID Identifier for satellite. Key field.
2 Joint Name NSSDC satellite name
3 Joint Launch Date Launch Date
4 Joint NORAD NORAD identifaction number
5 SvcDB Type of satellite
6 GeoDB Type of geosynchronous satellite
7 Program If satellite is part of a program of satellites
8 Block Geographic region of satellite country
9 Satellite Name Cleaned up satellite name
10 AKA1 Satellite also known as
11 AKA2 Satellite also known as
12 AKA3 Satellite also known as
13 AKA4 Satellite also known as
14 Acronym Explanation, if the satellite’s name is an acronym
15 Operator Satellite operator, owner, or organization
16 Country Country of operator
17 Original Country Country of original operator, if satellite has been sold
Table 5.5: Satellite Database Fields - ID Related Fields
# Field Description
1 Mkt Market: Commercial, Military, Civilian, NGO
2 Msn1 Mission: Comm, Sci, Tech, etc.
3 Mission1 More mission info
4 Msn2 Mission: Comm, Sci, Tech, etc.
5 Mission2 More mission info
6 Human Space Flight Indicates spacecraft used in human space flight
7 Crew (Up/Dn) Number of crew at launch and landing
8 Crew at Launch Names of crew at launch
9 Deployed by / Released Name of delivery spacecraft if released on-orbit
10 Firsts / Lasts Historical notes
11 Short Mission Description Brief mission description
12 Long Mission Description Longer mission description
Table 5.6: Satellite Database Fields - Mission Related Fields
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# Field Description
1 Launch Vehicle Launch vehicle
2 Payload Year Payload launch year
3 Launch Year Unique launch identifier. Only ’A’ payloads
4 Launch Site Launch site
5 Upper Stage Upper stage
Table 5.7: Satellite Database Fields - Launch Related Fields
# Field Description
1 Launch Mass (kg) Payload mass at launch
2 Spacecraft Bus Name of standard spacecraft bus
3 Manufacturer Satellite prime manufacturer
4 Xenon Propulsion Indicates ion propulsion system
5 Dimensions Spacecraft dimensions
6 Est In Orbit Mass (kg) Estimated mass in orbit
7 Est Dry Mass (kg) Estimated spacecraft dry mass
8 Est Life Fuel Mass (kg) Estimated fuel mass
9 In Orbit Mass (kg) Reported initial spacecraft mass in orbit
10 Dry Mass (kg) Reported spacecraft dry mass
11 Fuel Mass (kg) Reported spacecraft fuel mass
12 DC Power (W) Spacecraft power, typically at beginning of life
13 Solar Array Config Solar array description
14 Stabilization Type of stabilization: 3-axis, spin, etc.
15 NukeDB Indicates if spacecraft had nuclear power source
Table 5.8: Satellite Database Fields - Spacecraft Related Fields
# Field Description
1 Actual Duration (days) Spacecraft life in days
2 Actual Life (yrs) Spacecraft life in years
3 Design Lifetime (yrs) Reported spacecraft design life in years
4 Est Design Lifetime (yrs) Estimated spacecraft design life in years
5 Est EOL Estimated end of life
6 Status Spacecraft status: active, inactive
7 Status Date Date status reported
8 Decay Date Date spacecraft impacted planet
Table 5.9: Satellite Database Fields - Lifetime Related Fields
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# Field Description
1 Est Sat Cost ($M) Estimated spacecraft manufacturing cost
2 Est Launch Cost ($M) Estimated spacecraft launch cost
3 Total Cost ($M) Total spacecraft cost
4 Sat Cost ($M) Reported spacecraft manufacturing cost
5 Launch Cost ($M) Reported spacecraft launch cost
6 Insurance Cost ($M) Reported insurance premium
7 Insured Amount ($M) Reported insurance level
Table 5.10: Satellite Database Fields - Financial Related Fields
# Field Description
1 Orbit Loc Satellite location: FTO, EOR, BEO, DEC
2 Intended Orbit Intended orbit
3 Orbit Actual orbit
4 Missed Orbit Indicates spacecraft not delivered to correct orbit
5 Inc (deg) Inclination of spacecraft orbit
6 Perigee (km) Perigee of orbit
7 Apogee (km) Apogee of orbit
8 Period (min) Period of orbit
9 Epoch Date of orbital elements
10 Orbit Info Source Source of orbital elements
11 e Eccentricity of the orbit
12 RAAN (deg) Right angle of ascending node of the orbit
13 ArgPer (deg) Argument of perigee of the orbit
Table 5.11: Satellite Database Fields - Orbit Related Fields
# Field Description
1 Date in GEO Date satellite reached GEO
2 GEO Long (deg) Geosynchronous Longitude
3 Drift (deg/day) Rate of drift in GEO orbit
Table 5.12: Satellite Database Fields - GEO Related Fields
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# Field Description
1 Total Xpndr Total number of transponders on a GEO satellite
2 C-band Xpndr Total C-band transponders
3 C-band BW Bandwidth per transponder in MHz
4 Ka-band Xpndr Total Ka-band transponders
5 Ka-band BW Bandwidth per transponder in MHz
6 Ku-band Xpndr Total Ku-band transponders
7 Ku-band BW Bandwidth per transponder in MHz
8 L-band Xpndr Total L-band transponders
9 L-band BW Bandwidth per transponder in MHz
10 S-band Xpndr Total S-band transponders
11 S-band BW Bandwidth per transponder in MHz
12 X-band Xpndr Total X-band transponders
13 X-band BW Bandwidth per transponder in MHz
14 Coverage Area of communications coverage
Table 5.13: Satellite Database Fields - GEO Communications Related Fields
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5.2 Database of On-Orbit Spacecraft Failures
On-orbit spacecraft failure information was collected from a number of sources as
shown in Section 5.2.2. The failures database includes failure type, date, level, de-
scription, insurance claim, and other related details. To focus subsequent analysis
on probable candidates for servicing, a number of spacecraft failures were omitted.
Omitted types of spacecraft include those that failed to achieve orbit, spacecraft be-
yond earth orbit, spacecraft involved in human spaceflight, ASAT military spacecraft,
FOBS military spacecraft, spacecraft that exploded on-orbit, military reconnaissance
sub-satellites, amateur radio satellites, space burial payloads, spacecraft mass simula-
tors, passive radar calibration targets, and low mass, low cost experimental spacecraft.
5.2.1 Failures Identification Scheme
While launches and payloads are unique events, payloads themselves can suffer multi-
ple failures leading up to total failure. For this satellite failures database an additional
suffix was added to the satellite identifier to indicate failure events in chronological
order. A example of this scheme is shown in Table 5.14.
Sample ID Meaning
1900-001A#2 Successful Launch, Payload A, Failure Event #2
1900-001A.01#2 Successful Launch, Payload Failed to Separate, Payload
01, Failure Event #2
Where
1900 Launch Year
001 Launch identifier assigned
A Payload identifier assigned
01 Identifier for payloads that failed to separate
#2 Failure event number (chronological)
Table 5.14: Identification Scheme For On-Orbit Failure Events
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5.2.2 Sources
The on-orbit failures database was constructed from a number of open sources. These
are shown in Table 5.15. This table shows the source, the year of the earliest infor-
mation, the year of the latest information, the number of records, and the number of
fields.
Source Ref Earliest Latest Records Fields
1 Aerospace Source Book [78] 1998 2003 31 14
2 Dowa Insurance [5] 1984 1996 24 7
3 Encyclopedia Astronautica [103] 1958 2003 453 19
4 Group Task Force Report [98] 1970 1991 47 8
5 INTEC Study [71] 1980 1990 22 7
6 Isakowitz [59] 1958 1999 346 9
7 ISIR [99] 1993 1999 85 7
8 Satellite Encyclopedia [14] 1991 2003 295 10
9 Satellite News Digest [30] 1991 2003 26 13
10 Stockwell [90] 1977 1988 26 9
11 Waltz [105] 1977 1988 16 7
Table 5.15: On-Orbit Failures Database Sources
5.2.3 Fields
The on-orbit failure database contains a number of fields, including those shown in
Table 5.16. A sample of a failure record is shown in Appendix H.
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# Field Description
1 Event ID Unique identifier for event. IntID with chronolog-
ical sequence number appended
2 Sequence Chronological sequence number of event for satel-
lite
3 Joint IntID Unique identifier for satellite. Link to Satellite
Information Database
4 FailDB Serviceable Failure Indicator
5 Failure Year Year of failure
6 Prefail Life (Days) Days from initial operations to failure event
7 Prefail Life (Years) Years from initial operations to failure event
8 Total Life (days) Total satellite operational life in days
9 Total Life (yrs) Total satellite operational life in years
10 Beyond EOL (Years) Years past design life that failure event occurred
11 Era Era of failure: BOL (beginning of life), NomOps
(nominal operations), EOL (beyond end of design
life)
12 Event Date Date of anomaly
13 Fail To EOL Days Time from failure event to end of life in days
14 Simple Failure Level Total or Partial failure
15 Failure Level Level of failure (more distinctions)
16 Event Type Type of anomaly
17 Service Required Service required to mitigate failure
18 If ORUable ORU in component failure
19 Affected System System where failure occurrd
20 Other Svc Difficult failure type
21 Difficult Service Indicates if unknown or difficult failure occurred
22 Post Event Stability Spacecraft attitude - stable or tumbling
23 Brief Failure Description Brief description of the failure event
24 Failure Description Description of the failure event
25 Failure Source Source of failure: L/V (launch vehicle), S/C
(spacecraft bus), P/L (payload on spacecraft),
U/S (upper stage)
26 Salvage Note Describes response to failure. i.e. used lifetime
fuel to reach correct orbit
27 Then Value ($M) For uninsured satellites, combined satellite and
launch cost in then year dollars
28 2003 Conv BLS inflation rate
29 Life Ratio Percent of design life lost
30 Loss Value ($M) Value of loss in 2003 Dollars
Table 5.16: Failures Database Fields
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Chapter 6
Satellite Trends
The development of the databases in Chapter 5 enables the exploration of a num-
ber of avenues of analytical inquiry. The frequency, severity, and economic impact
of on-orbit satellite failures may be determined. Opportunities for satellite lifetime
extension can also be examined. These and other servicing opportunities are ad-
dressed in detail in Chapter 7. Beyond failure and lifetime extension analysis, other
satellite trends can be extracted from the Satellite Information Database. The fol-
lowing sections illustrate the type of information available by examining various key
characteristics of geosynchronous communications spacecraft.
6.1 Commercial Geosynchronous Communications
Satellites
Figure 6.1 shows the number of new, retiring, and net number of active commercial
geosynchronous satellites. While the launch rate has declined in recent years, there
has not been a year with fewer active satellites than the previous year since 1986.
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Figure 6.1: Active Commercial GEO Spacecraft
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6.2 Transponders Per Commercial Geosynchronous
Communications Satellite
Figure 6.2 shows the average transponder count on active geosynchronous commer-
cial communications satellites. There has been a steady increase in the number of
transponders per satellite barring a plateau in the 1980s.
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Figure 6.2: Average Transponder Count On Active Geostationary Commercial Satel-
lites
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6.3 Total Commercial Geosynchronous Communi-
cations Satellite Transponders
Figure 6.3 shows the total worldwide transponder count available from active geosyn-
chronous commercial communications satellites. There has been a steady and steep
increase in the total number of transponders barring a dip in the late 1980s. This
figure demonstrates a continuing strong demand for transponders in geosynchronous
orbit.
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Figure 6.3: GEO Spacecraft Commercial Transponder Capacity
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6.4 Bandwidth Per Transponder
Figure 6.4 shows the minimum, maximum, and average bandwidth (in MHz) of C-
band transponders on satellites launched over the twenty year period from 1984 to
2003. Data is available back to the first commercial geosynchronous communica-
tions satellite (Intelsat 1) launched in 1965, but in the interest of legibility only
the last 20 years are presented here. This information is collected from 182 space-
craft. Additional C-band payload satellites were launched but the bandwidth of their
transponders was not reported. Note that no C-band payloads were reported in 2001.
Surprisingly, the capacity of the average transponder is not increasing with time.
However, as seen in Figure 6.2, the transponder count per satellite is increasing,
yielding an effective increase in bandwidth capacity per satellite.
Figure 6.4: C-band Transponder Bandwidth By Year, 1994 To 2003
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Figure 6.5 shows the minimum, maximum, and average bandwidth (in MHz)
of Ku-band transponders on satellites launched over the twenty year period from
1984 to 2003. This information is collected from 238 spacecraft. Additional Ku-band
payload satellites were launched but the bandwidth of their transponders was not
reported. Again, the capacity of the average transponder is not increasing with time.
Figure 6.5: Ku-band Transponder Bandwidth By Year, 1994 To 2003
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6.5 Stabilization Of Commercial Geosynchronous
Communication Satellites
Figure 6.6 shows the stabilization method of the active commercial geosynchronous
communication satellites for the twenty year period from 1984 to 2003. Note the
steady increase in 3-axis stabilized spacecraft versus spin stabilized. The cross over
point occurred in 1986. This chart shows that the 3-axis satellites outnumber the
spin stabilized ones at a ratio of over five to one. This stabilization is important
to servicing because it strongly affects the docking approach. Docking and servicing
either is feasible, but is much less difficult for the 3-axis spacecraft because of the
much lower rotation rates.
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6.6 Geosynchronous Communication Satellite Buses
Figure 6.7 shows the number of each spacecraft bus type launched over the 20 year
period from 1984 to 2003. All of the buses which included at least four launches are
included here. A time history by the major types is shown in Figure 6.8. Servicing
fleets of similar spacecraft is likely more efficient than having to deal with a unique
design on each servicing mission.
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Figure 6.7: Geosynchronous Communication Satellite Buses, Launched From 1984 To
2003
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6.7 Commercial Geosynchronous Communications
Satellite Design Life
Finally, Figure 6.9 the design life of commercial geosynchronous communications
satellites is continuing to increase at a rate of about 0.28 years of design life per
year. This trend towards long lived satellites invites the argument to provide refuel-
ing versus replacement of high-value orbital assets. These and other lifetime extension
opportunities are included in Chapter 7.
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Figure 6.9: Average Design Life Of Active Geostationary Commercial Satellites
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6.8 Bandwidth-Design Life Trends
Another measure of satellite capability is the bandwidth-design life (BW-DL) of the
satellite. This is the communications capability of the satellite (in MHz) multiplied by
the design life (in years) of the satellite. This represents the utility of the spacecraft
over time. Figure 6.10 shows the total BW-DL launched per year over the last 20 years
and the number of satellites launched. The satellites included are geosynchronous
communications satellites with reported information on transponder bandwidth and
design life. Both show the upward trend through the late 90’s and the dramatic drop
off for 2001 and 2002.
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Figure 6.10: Total Bandwidth-Design Life Launched, 1984 to 2003
Examining bandwidth-design life on a per satellite basis is shown in Figure
93
6.11. Average, maximum, and minimum BW-DL are shown for geosynchronous com-
munications satellites launched over the last 20 years. The spread between the max,
min, and average show the variation in capabilities launched. In 2002 only 2 spacecraft
(TDRS 9 & TDRS 10) with identical capabilities were launched, hence the intersec-
tion of all three data sets that year. Note that the average trend is upward over time.
A five year moving average is shown in Figure 6.12 with a peak in 2000. The smaller
number of launches of less capable satellites is contributing to the decline.
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Figure 6.11: Bandwidth-Design Life Per Satellite, 1984 To 2003
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Figure 6.12: Five Year Moving Average, Bandwidth-Design Life Per Satellite
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6.9 Failure Rate
For complex mechanical and/or electronic systems, the failure rate over time typically
looks like Figure 6.13 ([43] and others). This “bathtub” curve is comprised of three
regions corresponding to different phases of a system’s life. The high but decreasing
failure rate of the initial section represents “infant mortality” or “burn-in” failures at
the start of a system’s lifetime. The middle section with the nearly constant failure
rate prevails for the midlife of a system, and the increasing rate at the end indicates
the wear-out of systems at the end of their lives. Systems with constant failure rates
are said to have a Poisson failure distribution.
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Figure 6.13: Typical Failure-Rate Curve Relationship (adapted from [43])
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Having developed the satellite information and on-orbit failure databases, can
satellites be observed to fit this classic Poisson failure distribution? Figure 6.14 shows
the failure rate over time for all spacecraft with reported lifetime and failure informa-
tion. To allow comparison of spacecraft with different lengths of design life, spacecraft
lives are normalized with respect to their reported design lives. Considering the sec-
tion up to 1 design-life, the curve somewhat conforms to the expected “bathtub.”
Typically, such curves are found from thousands of data points. While hundreds of
satellites are included here, the choppiness of the graph is likely a product of this
limited data set. Also note that this analysis includes total failures only.
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Figure 6.14: Failure Rate For All Satellites Launched From 1984 to 2003
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A close look at the graph over the 1 design life section is shown in Figure
6.15. The zero time failures (“Infant Mortality”) are omitted. Again, this section is
arguably consistent with a constant failure rate (Poisson), but cannot be definitively
labeled as such. The average failure rate here is 0.54 % chance of failure per five per-
cent of design life or 0.11 % chance of failure per percent of design life. Opportunities
for servicing on-orbit failures based on information in the databases is evaluated in
detail in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
On-Orbit Servicing Opportunities
Based on the information developed in the satellite database and the on-orbit failures
database, this chapter lays out the frequency and value of on-orbit servicing oppor-
tunities. The first two sections examine the launch rate and the economic impact of
on-orbit failures. Subsequent sections examine servicing opportunities by type and
attempt to quantify those markets. A summary of these opportunities is presented
at the end of this chapter.
7.1 Launches And Payloads
This section examines the trends of launch attempts and payloads on-orbit. The
history of all worldwide launch attempts and failures is shown in Figure 7.1. Vehicle
explosions on the launch pad and other ground damage events are not included.
Launches were counted once the launch vehicle left the pad. Launch failures include
all vehicles that left the pad but that did not result in a payload making it successfully
into orbit. Failure modes here include self-destruct, commanded destruction by Range
Safety, in-flight breakup, and low launch vehicle performance resulting in suborbital
flight. These cases are referred to as FTO (Failed To Orbit) in other parts of this
study. Intentionally suborbital flights are not included.
An overall launch failure rate may be derived from this data. A summary of
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Figure 7.1: Launch Attempts And Launch Failures
the launch and failure rates are shown in Table 7.1. These 5, 10, and 20 year totals
and annual averages include year spans up through 2003. The typical chance of launch
failure appears to be about 4.5%, though this varies widely by launch vehicle.
Launch vehicles often carry multiple payloads, therefore, there are more pay-
loads delivered to orbit per year than launches per year. Upper stages, fairings, and
other launch vehicle components that reach orbit are not counted as payloads. While
the raw number of payloads successfully orbited per year is useful, not all of these
payloads are good candidates for on-orbit servicing. To focus the analysis, a number
of satellites were filtered out a priori, including amateur radio satellites, ASAT related
payloads, human spaceflight vehicles, satellites that exploded in orbit, spacecraft be-
yond earth orbit, simulated satellite test masses, and others. After subtracting these
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Launch Launch Successful Chance of
Attempts Failures Launches Failure
20 Year Totals 1,863 70 1,793 3.8%
10 Year Totals 772 37 735 4.8%
5 Year Totals 351 15 336 4.3%
20 Year Annual Average 93.2 3.5 89.7
10 Year Annual Average 77.2 3.7 73.5
5 Year Annual Average 70.2 3.0 67.2
Table 7.1: Launches And Launch Failures
out, the payloads of interest remain. A summary of the payloads per year is shown
in Table 7.2. These 5, 10, and 20 year totals and annual averages all include year
spans up through 2003. These payloads per year totals will serve as a basis for various
satellite failure rates developed later in this chapter. Additional payload trends can
be found in Appendix A.
Payloads Payloads
Successful To Filtered Of
Launches Orbit Payloads Interest
20 Year Total 1,793 2,678 623 2,055
10 Year Total 735 1,210 346 864
5 Year Total 336 531 167 364
20 Year Annual Average 89.7 133.9 31.2 102.8
10 Year Annual Average 73.5 121.0 34.6 86.4
5 Year Annual Average 67.2 106.2 33.4 72.8
Table 7.2: Payloads Of Interest
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7.2 Economic Impact Of On-Orbit Satellite Fail-
ures
The following figures illustrate the economic impact of on-orbit satellite failures.
Spacecraft that were destroyed during launch or did not achieve initial orbit are
not included in these analyses. A list of the specific satellites and failure information
is shown in Appendix C.
Figure 7.2 shows the annual number of on-orbit failures and insurance claims
over the 10 years from 1994 through 2003. These claims are shown in then-year
dollars.
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Figure 7.2: Insurance Claims For On-Orbit Satellite Failures
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Figure 7.3 shows the estimated financial loss for uninsured on-orbit spacecraft
losses over the 10 years from 1994 through 2003. Only failures that ended spacecraft
operations were included. Additional significant partial failure events occurred. This
figure also includes the estimated value of insured spacecraft where the insurance
amounts were not published. For these uninsured failures, the estimated value of
the spacecraft and launch costs are converted to 2003 dollars. This value is then
prorated by the ratio of the satellite’s actual life to its design life. The resulting value
is converted back into then-year dollars and plotted during the year of failure. The
inflation factors for these calculations are from BLS [9] and are shown in Appendix
G.
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Figure 7.3: Estimated Value Of Uninsured On-Orbit Satellite Failures
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A combination of the two previous figures is shown in 7.4. Over the last 10
years, while there was great variability, the annual average is 7.4 events valued at
a total of $748M or about $100M per event. These figures demonstrate that on-
orbit failures occur on a regular basis. While these rates of failures and significant
economic impacts are notable, additional detailed analysis is required to identify
specific servicing markets. Not all of these failures are serviceable. The following
sections will delve into the failures database to identify serviceable failures.
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Figure 7.4: Value Of Insured And Uninsured On-Orbit Satellite Failures
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7.3 Spacecraft Failure Servicing Opportunities
7.3.1 Wrong Orbit
This section examines the occurrence of satellites being delivered to the wrong orbit.
For this failure case, the typical scenario is that a launch vehicle or upper stage
malfunctioned and left the spacecraft in a lower than planned orbit. An example
of this would be the Orion 3 commercial geostationary telecommunications satellite
which was left in a low, unusable orbit. The spacecraft was perfectly healthy, but it
was not in a location where it could perform its mission. It did not possess enough
onboard fuel to achieve proper orbit and was subsequently abandonded. A servicer
that could rendezvous and dock with this target and then relocate it to its proper
position could potentially recoup an appreciable fraction of the value of the spacecraft.
Launch anomalies related to spacecraft intended for geosynchronous operations will
be examined initially. Where applicable, this analysis will be extended to spacecraft
in other orbits.
7.3.1.1 GEO Launch Anomalies
The annual payloads launched to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) over the 20 years from
1984 through 2003 can be seen in Figure 7.5. Three categories of launch outcome
are shown. Satellites that failed to orbit are indicated at the bottom of each column.
The second category is for “Wrong Orbit” spacecraft. These are spacecraft that
successfully made it into orbit, but were not delivered to the correct orbital location.
The remaining spacecraft in the figure were successfully launched and maneuvered to
their correct orbital locations. On average there is about one “Wrong Orbit” failure
per year for satellites intended for GEO.
Further detail on the “Wrong Orbit” GEO spacecraft is seen in Figure 7.6.
The outcomes for these spacecraft include rescue by STS, self rescue, partial use,
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Figure 7.5: Results Of Launch Attempts To Geosynchronous Orbit
and total loss. STS rescued satellites were repaired on orbit or retrieved for ground
refurbishment by the Shuttle. Self rescue satellites utilized onboard fuel to achieve
correct GEO orbit. Substantial lifetime and revenue reduction was the typical penalty
for this method. Inclined operation was also common for these spacecraft, resulting in
reduced revenues. Some spacecraft with insufficient fuel to reach GEO accomplished
partial mission objectives in elliptical sub-geosynchronous orbits. The final category
is for spacecraft with no possibility of useful life that were abandoned in orbit or
commanded to re-enter.
Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 illustrate the regular occurrence of “Wrong Orbit”
anomalies for GEO spacecraft. The economic impacts are also significant as shown
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Figure 7.6: Results Of Launch Anomalies For Geosynchronous Payloads
in Table 7.3. Values are in then-year dollars. Most of the values shown represent
reported insured losses. For other affected spacecraft “Spacecraft Value” is composed
of reported satellite manufacturing costs, launch costs, insurance costs, and other
program costs. Insurance claims are typically in the range of 50 to 100 % of “Space-
craft Value.” For the spacecraft that used onboard fuel to reach GEO, some part of
the spacecraft value was salvaged.
Another look at the GEO FTO (Failed To Orbit) and “Wrong Orbit” (WO)
events is shown in Figure 7.7. This shows that the five year moving averages of FTOs
are trending down over time and “Wrong Orbit” failures are trending up over time.
Viewing these in Figure 7.8 as percentages of satellites launched to GEO reveals
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Anomaly Value
# Year Satellite Outcome ($M) Basis
1 1984 Westar 6 Retreived by STS 105 Insurance Claim
2 1984 Palapa B2 Retreived by STS 56 Insurance Claim
3 1984 Intelsat 509 Commanded Deorbit 102 Insurance Claim
4 1985 Leasat 3 Repaired by STS 20 Insurance Claim
5 1988 USA 31 Total Loss Unpublished
6 1988 GStar 3 Used onboard fuel 65 Insurance Claim
7 1989 Hipparcos Partial Mission 500 Spacecraft Value
8 1990 Intelsat 603 Repaired by STS 260 Spacecraft Value
9 1993 UFO 1 Used onboard fuel 188 Insurance Claim
10 1994 ETS 6 Partial Mission 668 Spacecraft Value
11 1995 Koreasat 1 Used onboard fuel 64 Insurance Claim
12 1996 Chinasat 7 Total Loss 120 Insurance Claim
13 1997 Agila 2 Used onboard fuel 290 Spacecraft Value
14 1997 HGS-1 Used lunar flyby 215 Insurance Claim
15 1998 COMETS Partial Mission 8 Insurance Claim
16 1999 DSP 19 Total Loss 625 Spacecraft Value
17 1999 Milstar 2-1 Total Loss 1,233 Spacecraft Value
18 1999 Orion 3 Total Loss 265 Insurance Claim
19 2001 GSAT 1 Used onboard fuel Unpublished
20 2001 Artemis Used onboard fuel 75 Insurance Claim
21 2001 BSAT 2B Total Loss 143 Spacecraft Value
22 2002 DRTS Used onboard fuel 311 Spacecraft Value
23 2002 Astra 1K Commanded Deorbit 217 Insurance Claim
Table 7.3: Economic Impacts Of GEO Wrong Orbit Failures
five year moving averages which also show FTOs trending down and “Wrong Orbit”
failures trending up.
The altitude history shown in Figure 7.9 of the Koreasat 1 satellite is an
illustration of the gradual orbit raising of a satellite that was delivered into a low orbit.
The satellite’s onboard engines are smaller than the upper stage engine and require
a longer period to achieve the same change in orbital altitude. For comparison, the
altitude history of a nominal launch for a similar satellite, Koreasat 2, is also shown.
Both satellites are GE-3000 type spacecraft and were launched on Delta II rockets.
To get from its initial low orbit to GEO, Koreasat 1 had to burn 7.5 of its 12 year
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Figure 7.7: GEO FTO And WO Five Year Moving Averages
lifetime fuel supply. It has also given up North-South station-keeping to extend its
life, hence it now operates in inclined mode. Altitude and inclination histories for
additional satellites that utilized onboard fuel for self rescues are shown in Appendix
D.
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7.3.1.2 Other Launch Anomalies
While the previous section addressed launch anomalies for payloads intended for
geosynchronous orbit, anomalies have occurred for payloads intended for other orbits.
There are no reported MEO failures of this type, and there are only two reports of
LEO spacecraft that were injected into low orbits. In 1990 the US Military DMSP
F10 satellite was placed in a lower than planned orbit due to the failure of its AKM
nozzle. Despite its lower than planned altitude, it was able perform most of its
meteorological mission. In 1997 the Indian Space Research Organization’s IRS 1D
satellite was launched into a low orbit due to a launch vehicle anomaly. Using on
board fuel, it was able to achieve a useful elliptical sun synchronous orbit, versus a
planned circular sun synchronous orbit. Because these opportunities are few and far
between, LEO only “Wrong Orbit” servicing does not appear to be a viable market.
7.3.2 Deployment Problems
Once a satellite reaches its operating location in orbit, it will typically deploy antennas
and solar arrays that were stowed during launch. Table 7.4 lists seven such reported
failures from 1984 through 2003. Partial failure of the solar arrays to deploy limits
the power available to spacecraft. Total failure to deploy arrays can limit the life
of the satellite to its initial battery charge. Antenna deployment failures limit a
communications satellite’s ability to fulfill its mission. Converting these loss values
to 2003 dollars and averaging, yields a loss of $91.1M per event or $31.9M per year
over the last 20 years.
7.3.3 Component Failures
During the life of a spacecraft, any number of systems or components can degrade
or fail. Redundancy in design is the only current method to address these failures.
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Event
Satellite Deployment Orbital Value
Year Name Failure Level Location ($M) Basis
1987 TVSat 1 Solar Array Total GEO 51 Insurance
Claim
1989 INSAT 1C Solar Array Major GEO 68 Insurance
Claim
1990 BS-3A Solar Array Partial GEO 8.6 Estimated
Revenue Loss
1996 Asiasat 2 Antenna Partial GEO 36 Insurance
Claim
1997 STEP M4 Solar Array Total LEO
300 km
66.0 Spacecraft
Total Loss
1998 Echostar 4 Solar Array Major GEO 219.3 Insurance
Claim
1998 PAS 8 Antenna Major GEO 68 Insurance
Claim
Table 7.4: Spacecraft Suffering Deployment Anomalies
The robotic dexterity required to repair or replace these components varies by failure
type. For spacecraft designed for servicing (HST, ISS), the critical components that
may need replacement are designed as replaceable modules called Orbital Replaceable
Units (ORUs). While none of the current GEO spacecraft are explicitly designed in
such a modular fashion, certain current components are somewhat ORU-like. Replac-
ing a failed battery, reaction wheel, or similar ORU-like component requires a basic
level of dexterity and complexity. Trouble-shooting a problematic power system or
propulsion system plumbing requires a higher order of magnitude in dexterous com-
plexity. Looking at the failures of interest and focusing on those that were ORU type
of failure on spacecraft that remained under control yields a history of potentially
serviceable ORU-like failures.
For GEO satellites, Figure 7.10 shows that there were an average of 4.4 annual
ORU-like failures over the ten year span from 1994 through 2003. Because these were
GEO satellites, the value of the affected spacecraft was in the $100M range. Some
113
of these events led to significant insurance claims, and others were accommodated
by the spacecraft’s design redundancy. These rates and values show that a potential
market might exists if there were a servicer to address these failures, however, there
does not appear to be enough frequency to form a market on its own. The additional
major caveat is that none of these spacecraft is designed for on-orbit servicing so the
ORU-ness of their design is low.
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Figure 7.10: ORU-Like Failures In GEO
A similar analysis was performed for LEO spacecraft as seen in Figure 7.11.
A lower rate of 1 ORU-like failure per year was found. The LEO spacecraft also had
a generally lower economic value.
In addition to the ORU-like failures shown, an additional three GEO satel-
lites suffered ORU-like failures but became unstable shortly thereafter and are not
included. Over the course of the same 1994 to 2003 period, there were five of these
type of failures in LEO satellites. Once the ability to service stable targets is shown,
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Figure 7.11: ORU-Like Failures In LEO
perhaps addressing these failures on un-commanded spacecraft can be attempted as
well.
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7.3.4 Fuel Depletion
A number of spacecraft have experienced early fuel depletion for a variety of reasons.
One case occurs when a fault sends a spacecraft into a safe mode. While the spacecraft
controller is operating at a diminished capacity, an unexpected spacecraft disturbance
can lead to inefficient use of propellant to maintain stability. Another increase in fuel
consumption can occur when thrusters on the spacecraft fail. Usually operations
can continue, but fuel efficiency is affected and propellant consumption occurs at
a higher than normal rate. There have also been failures of xenon ion propulsion
systems, resulting in spacecraft switching to backup conventional propulsion systems
with greatly reduced lifetime capacity. Instances of all of these types of failures are
shown in Table 7.5 and are reported primarily for GEO spacecraft.
7.3.5 Other Failures
In addition to the failures described, other potentially serviceable failures have oc-
curred. These include spacecraft with challenging servicing needs such as systemic
problems with their power, communications, or propulsion systems. This category
also includes “Unknown” failures where a failure has occurred but few or no details
have been published. Figure 7.12 shows that these failures occur with some regular-
ity and breaks the 38 events out between stable and unstable spacecraft. Addressing
these failures would be even more challenging than the already described scenarios.
The difficulty here is that these tend to be systemic rather than component level
problems. Ambiguity in the reported failure symptoms also drives some events into
this category. Additional information on these failures is included in Appendix C.
Servicing such spacecraft would have the highest requirements for robotic dex-
terity, human supervision of operations, and contingency spares to address poorly
understood satellite anomalies. The high dexterity is needed to have broad ability to
116
Satellite Failure Failure Value
# Year Name Description Level Orbit ($M)
1 1996 Hot Bird 2 Abnormal fuel con-
sumption. Leaking
thrusters.
Lifetime GEO 280
2 1997 Intelsat 801 Inadvertent spin dur-
ing testing. Substan-
tial fuel expended.
Spacecraft recovered.
Lifetime GEO 162
3 1998 JCSat 1 Fuel system leak Lifetime GEO
4 1998 TOMS EP Fuel exhausted in
safe mode anomaly
Total LEO 56
5 2000 Galaxy 8i Xenon ion propulsion
systems failed. Life-
time reduced from 15
to 5 years
Lifetime GEO 250
6 2000 INSAT 2B Inadvertent oxidizer
depletion
Total GEO 106
7 2001 GSAT 1 Fuel depleted at-
tempting to stabilize
unbalanced satellite
Total GEO
8 2002 TDRS 9 One of four tanks
cannot be pressur-
ized normally. Us-
ing less efficient work
around.
Partial GEO 298
9 2002 Echostar 8 2 of 12 thrusters have
failed. Uses higher
than normal fuel be-
ing consumed.
Partial GEO 235
10 2003 Galaxy 4R Xenon ion propulsion
system failed. Life-
time reduced from 15
to 3 years.
Lifetime GEO 240
11 2003 PAS 6B Xenon ion propulsion
system failed. Life-
time reduced from 15
to 4.5 years.
Lifetime GEO 240
Table 7.5: On-Orbit Fuel Depletion Anomalies (1994 to 2003)
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address potential servicing tasks. Increased human supervision is needed to make real
time assessment of the state of the target satellite (rather than preplanning against a
well understood failure type) and to determine the repair actions required. Because
the repair required is either extensive and or widespread, the repair kit would need
more components than a well characterized mission. Increased dexterity and spares
drive up the mass and cost of the servicing mission. The increased human supervision
could drive the need for additional camera views, communications bandwidth, and
ground station personnel. All of which also drive up cost.
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Figure 7.12: Additional Servicing Opportunities
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7.3.6 Spacecraft Family Anomalies
Upon examining the component failures analysis in Section 7.3.3, certain repeated
failures emerge. Some spacecraft have common design or component flaws. A number
of these common anomalies are addressed in the following subsections.
7.3.6.1 BSS-601 Spacecraft Control Processors
A number of the Boeing Satellite Systems model 601 geosynchronous communications
satellites launched before August 1997 have tin-plated relay switches. Under the
influence of the space environment, these switches can develop tin whiskers that cause
electrical shorts resulting in the failure of the Spacecraft Control Processor (SCP).
The 601s have a primary and a backup SCP. Loss of both SCPs leads to loss of
vehicle. Table 7.6 shows the 601s that are vulnerable to this problem. The estimated
cost column is the sum of the manufacturing costs and the launch costs associated
with the each satellite and is shown in then-year dollars. Long term net value of the
potential revenue stream is even higher. The US military also has a set of ten UHF
Follow-On GEO communication satellites that are based on the same bus. So far no
such failures have been reported for this set.
The common failure mode for this whole family of high value satellites rep-
resents a prime opportunity for a dexterous servicer. Based on reported design life,
Figure 7.13 shows how many of these spacecraft will continue in operation for the
near future. As noted in Section 7.4.2 these spacecraft are often operated for 125%
of their nominal design life or about 3.5 additional years, so Figure 7.13 is likely a
conservative illustration.
7.3.6.2 BSS-702 Solar Arrays
The Boeing 702 model satellites included a new solar array configuration with solar
concentrators. The optical qualities of these arrays have degraded more rapidly than
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Est. Design Years
Satellite Launch Cost Lifetime Before
Name Date SCP ($M) (yrs) Failure
Optus B1 8/13/92 Possible Tin 212 13.7
Galaxy 7 10/28/92 Both Failed 235 15 8.1
Astra 1C 5/12/93 Possible Tin 166 15
Galaxy 4 6/25/93 Both Failed 250 15 4.9
Solidaridad 1 11/20/93 Both Failed 152 14 6.8
DirecTV 1 12/18/93 One Failed 247 15
PAS 2 7/8/94 Tin-plated relay 162 15
DirecTV 2 8/3/94 Possible Tin 275 15
Optus B3 8/27/94 Possible Tin 206 13.7
Solidaridad 2 10/8/94 Possible Tin 161 14
Astra 1D 11/1/94 Possible Tin 158 15
AMSC 1 4/7/95 Possible Tin 262 12
DirecTV 3 6/10/95 One Failed 275 15
PAS 4 8/3/95 One Failed 198 16
JCSat 3 8/29/95 Possible Tin 206 12
Astra 1E 10/19/95 Possible Tin 198 15
Galaxy 3R 12/15/95 One Failed 230 10
PAS 3R 1/12/96 Tin-plated relay 157 15
Anatolia 1 2/1/96 Possible Tin 154 14
Astra 1F 4/8/96 Possible Tin 160 15
MSAT M1 4/20/96 Possible Tin 222 12
Palapa C2 5/16/96 Possible Tin 128 14
JCSat 4 2/17/97 Possible Tin 200 12
Superbird C 7/28/97 Possible Tin 200 13
Table 7.6: BSS-601 Spacecraft Susceptible To SCP Failure
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Figure 7.13: SCP Vulnerable BSS-601s Remaining In Service
predicted and the power production has declined as a result. It is anticipated that
the spacecraft will reach end of life power levels sooner than originally planned. Some
pessimistic estimates indicated EOL power in 5 years versus the intended 15. Table
7.7 shows the model 702 satellites with this problem. Subsequent 702s use different
arrays.
On-orbit replacement of these solar arrays would be a significant challenge,
however, the spacecraft will remain stable with high value (but underpowered) com-
mercial communications payloads into the 2010s.
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Design
Satellite Launch Lifetime
# Name Date (yrs) Insurance
1 Galaxy 11 12/22/99 15 $286M Paid
2 Thuraya 1 10/21/00 12 $250M Pending
3 PAS 1R 11/16/00 15 $343M Paid
4 Anik F1 11/21/00 15 $136M Paid so far
5 XM-2 3/18/01 15 $200M Pending
6 XM-1 5/8/01 15 $200M Pending
Table 7.7: BSS-702 Spacecraft Susceptible To Early Solar Array Degradation
7.3.6.3 Space Systems / Loral Solar Arrays
In early 2001 Space Systems / Loral reported that eleven orbiting FS-1300 geosyn-
chronous communications satellites could be affected by short circuits in their solar
arrays [30]. The solar arrays for these spacecraft do not appear to be degrading as
rapidly as the BSS-702s, but this group could also be a worthwhile set of targets for
servicing. The spacecraft that could be affected along with their launch date, com-
bined launch and manufacturing costs, and nominal end of life are shown in Table 7.8.
Both Tempo 2 and PAS 6 have already had significant solar array related insurance
claims filed.
7.3.7 Failed Spacecraft Relocation
A number of spacecraft fail in their operational orbits. This means that they will
then present a collision hazard to other spacecraft in that operational area. For the
GEO ring refer to the analysis in Section 7.5.2.
An analysis of the MEO GPS constellation reveals that there may be some
candidates for relocation. Figure 7.14 shows that the six retired GPS satellites with
the lowest perigees overlap with the orbits of the active spacecraft. Additional analysis
is needed to determine the actual closest approach distances.
The altitudes of the LEO Iridium satellites is shown in Figure 7.15. In this
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End Of
Satellite Launch Cost Design
# Name Date ($M) Life
1 Tempo 2 3/8/97 220 2009
2 Telstar 5 5/24/97 220 2009
3 PAS 6 8/8/97 240 2012
4 Telstar 6 2/15/99 220 2011
5 Echostar 5 9/23/99 205 2011
6 Telstar 7 9/25/99 230 2011
7 Orion 2 10/19/99 250 2014
8 Sirius-1 6/30/00 235 2015
9 EchoStar 6 7/14/00 250 2012
10 Sirius-2 9/5/00 230 2015
11 Sirius 3 11/30/00 230 2015
Table 7.8: FS-1300 Spacecraft Susceptible To Early Solar Array Degradation
case it also looks like there are six inactive satellites near the active orbital region.
There are also two Globalstar satellites that have failed, but they are not near the
rest of the constellation. Clearing the failed Iridium satellites away from the active
satellites probably bears further scrutiny.
A GEO or MEO relocation servicer would need to be able to capture a tum-
bling satellite and alter its orbital altitude by tens to hundreds of kilometers away
from the active orbits. For a LEO relocation servicer, in addition to relocation, re-
entry is another option. The existence of such a servicer would allow spacecraft in any
orbital regimes to expend more of their fuel for productive operations versus reserving
some fuel for end of life maneuvers.
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Figure 7.14: Perigees And Apogees For Active And Inactive GPS Satellites
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Figure 7.15: Perigees And Apogees For Active And Inactive Iridium Satellites
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7.3.8 Observations Concerning Serviceable Failures
Identifying the demand for services is an essential concern for a servicing organization.
Part of this is orbital location. Because of the propulsive requirements for transition-
ing between LEO, MEO, and GEO, a count of how the opportunities break out by
orbit is needed. Table 7.9 shows the count of potentially serviceable failures by orbit
that occurred over the 20 year span from 1984 to 2003. Unserviceable failures are
omitted (explosion, re-entry, etc.) as are Russian and Chinese government spacecraft
due to lack of detail. Failures indicated are first failures per satellite. Additional
failures may have occurred but are not included in order to avoid double counting.
This table indicates that the most reported failure opportunities occur in GEO, less
than half of that count occur in LEO, and a very few are reported in MEO.
The financial investments vary significantly by orbit. Figure 7.16 shows the
total investment (satellite, launch, and other reported program costs) and active
satellites by orbit for the year 2003. This graph consists of potentially serviceable
spacecraft which were active in 2003 and had reported information on total costs as
well as other life time information. This graph shows that LEO (198 active satellites)
and GEO (326 active satellites) are far more populated than MEO (31 active satel-
lites). The graph also shows that the average investment per spacecraft in GEO is
$216 versus $116 in LEO. While these are sunk costs and not future revenue streams,
these numbers do tend to focus economic analysis towards the GEO market.
Collecting the failure information previously reported, the overall rates at
which certain types of failure occur as a fraction of total failures are shown in Ta-
Orbit Serviceable Failures
LEO 40
MEO 3
GEO 95
Table 7.9: Serviceable Failures By Orbit (1984 To 2003)
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Figure 7.16: Total Investments And Active Satellites By Orbit - 2003
ble 7.10. The “Service Required” column indicates what level of dexterous servicing
was needed to mitigate the reported failure. “Simple Dexterous” failures included
external-only operations, typically an antenna or solar array deployment malfunc-
tion. “Refuel” failures occurred when spacecraft either prematurely depleted their
fuel supplies or suffered a propulsion system failure such as a xenon ion primary
propulsion system failure. The “Inspection” category includes spacecraft known to
have suffered some collision damage (from fairings or upper stages) or to have suffered
from an unknown failure. Such inspection missions are not meant to indicate that
the problem would have been mediated, but rather that this would be a necessary
first step to assess the spacecraft for further, likely dexterous, repairs if warranted.
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“Boost” indicates that the spacecraft was delivered to the wrong orbit. The remain-
ing “Complex Dexterous” failures include internal component repairs such as failed
momentum wheels, spacecraft control processors, and so forth.
The information from this table in isolation tends to lead towards initially
developing a very capable, dexterous servicer in order to meet the large percentage
of failures that require a high level of robotic capability. However, other servicing
opportunities beyond failure servicing exist. In the next section, lifetime extension
servicing opportunities will be examined.
Service Required Percent Of Failures
Complex Dexterous 57.4
Boost 17.7
Inspection 12.1
Refuel 7.8
Simple Dexterous 5.0
Table 7.10: Failures By Required Service Type
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7.4 Spacecraft Lifetime Extension
As noted in Section 1.1.2, the majority of costs involved in geostationary telecommu-
nications satellite business occur up front. Methods to extend the life of these and
other spacecraft should be of interest if these methods cost less than launching new
satellites and have a similar probability of success. The following sections examine
some of the options for extending the life of spacecraft on-orbit.
7.4.1 Relocation
7.4.1.1 Delivery To Initial Orbit
As seen in Section 7.3.1.1, some spacecraft that are delivered to the wrong orbit
utilize onboard lifetime fuel to achieve geosynchronous orbit. Once the rescue of such
satellites by a servicer was demonstrated, this orbital transfer capability could be
extended to healthy spacecraft as well. Such a service would allow the spacecraft to
shift initial orbital injection fuel mass to lifetime fuel mass. Other trades such as
payload mass versus fuel load could be conducted as well. Andrew Turner of Space
Systems Loral has published a paper that address these potential tradeoffs in more
detail [97].
7.4.1.2 Geosynchronous Satellite Relocation
Another method for extending the life of a geostationary satellite is to perform rephas-
ing or relocation maneuvers during the operational phase of the satellites life. By
extracting satellite location history from The Satellite Encyclopedia Online [14] and
Jonathan’s Space Report Online [73], a history of GEO spacecraft relocations can be
found. Analysis of this history reveals the potential demand for relocation services in
GEO over time. Based on data extracted from the sources mentioned, the number of
annual maneuvers is shown in Figure 7.17. This includes all GEO communications
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satellites. Because the before and after GEO longitudes of the spacecraft are known,
the annual degree changes requirement as well and the annual total degrees changed
are shown in Figure 7.18. Dividing the annual degrees by the annual maneuvers re-
sults in an average of 36.2 degrees per maneuver. Also from the figures, there is an
average of 13 maneuvers per year.
From [39] the ∆V to perform a longitude change in GEO is given by Equation
7.1 where ∆λ is the change in longitude and n is the number of days to accomplish
the maneuver.
∆V = 5.66
∆λ
n
(m/s) (7.1)
From this ∆V equation, the fuel mass required for the maneuver may be
calculated from the form of the rocket equation shown in Equation 7.2 [106]. Where
mp is the mass of fuel used in the maneuver, mo is the mass of the vehicle at the
start of the burn, Isp is the specific impulse of the fuel being burned (typically 220
seconds), and g0 is earth’s gravitational constant (9.81 m/s
2).
mp = mo
1− exp−
0@ ∆V
Ispg0
1A (7.2)
For a typical GEO satellite, such as Superbird 4 (with a BOL on-orbit mass of
2,460 kg) the annual station-keeping fuel budget is about 60 kg, or 5 kg per month,
or 0.16 kg per day. Knowing this burn rate enables a direct trade between fuel
mass and time out of service. Total time lost, TTotal, is shown in Equation 7.3,
where TManeuverDuration is the duration of the maneuver in days and TLifetimeLost is
the satellite lifetime lost due to the expenditure of station-keeping fuel for relocation.
The equation may be reformulated as Equation 7.4.
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TTotal = TManeuverDuration + TLifetimeLost (7.3)
TTotal = n+mo/(0.16(kg / day) (7.4)
Substituting Equation 7.2 formo and solving empirically, a minimum for TTotal
is found to be 76.4 days (or 2.5 months), where n is 37 days, and mp is 6.3 kg of fuel.
With an average monthly revenue of $3.7M, this maneuver costs a total of $9.2M.
While this full amount cannot be recovered, at least the fuel half of it can be provided
by a servicer. Therefore, on an annual basis, if there are 13 relocations costing $4.6M
each, a savings of about $60M per year is possible.
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Figure 7.17: Annual GEO Relocations
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Figure 7.18: Annual GEO Relocations Degrees
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7.4.1.3 Transfer Out Of GEO Orbit
By international convention (but not law) and by FCC ruling [49], when GEO satel-
lites are retired, they are required to maneuver away from GEO. To avoid interference
with working spacecraft they are sent to a higher orbit. While the FCC rule is that
the new perigee must be a minimum of 200 km above GEO, some international space
organizations advocate a 350 km limit. For analysis purposes a 300 km limit will be
used here. In order to find how much of a savings a retirement service could provide,
the fuel mass a typical GEO satellite requires to perform its retirement maneuver must
be found. That value is then compared to the satellite’s monthly station-keeping fuel
budget.
Analysis shows that the fuel for this maneuver can be traded for about three
months of operational life for GEO satellites. Fuel gauging uncertainties makes the
retirement fuel mass reserve even larger. The GEO communications satellites that
have retired over the twenty year span from 1984 through 2003 are shown in Figure
7.19. They were retired at a rate of 7.5 per year over this period and at a rate of
9.1 over the last 10 years. Again, Russian and Chinese spacecraft are excluded due
to lack of detailed data. Looking ahead as shown in Figure 7.20, there will be 16.9
retirements per year on average for the years 2004 through 2015 based solely on design
life. Additionally, there are a number of spacecraft currently operating beyond their
design lives. The commercial geosynchronous communications satellites in this class
are shown in Figure 7.21. The military and civilian satellites are shown in Figure
7.22. Most members of this combined group of 52 spacecraft will likely also be retired
over the course of the next decade and represent additional servicing opportunities.
Based on these communications satellites and the additional weather and in-
telligence satellites, there will probably be 15 to 25 retirements per year over the next
decade. Providing a GEO retirement maneuver service will save approximately three
months of fuel per satellite. Overall, this implies that an additional 60 vehicle-months
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of operations for high value GEO satellites per year could be provided.
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Figure 7.19: Geosynchronous Communication Spacecraft Retirements From 1984 To
2003
7.4.1.4 De-Orbit Maneuver
Because retired LEO spacecraft can end up entering the earth’s atmosphere, they are
often commanded to de-orbit in a controlled manner at the end of their design life to
minimize the chance of their impacting an inhabited area. The ∆V required for de-
orbit is significant and requires a substantial portion of the spacecraft’s fuel budget.
Providing a de-orbit service could extend the life for a typical LEO spacecraft, such as
an Iridium communications satellite. The annual fuel budget for an Iridium spacecraft
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Figure 7.20: Geosynchronous Communication Spacecraft To Retire From 2004 To
2015
is 0.725 kg, as seen in Table 7.11. A LEO de-orbit service for Iridium satellites would
allow these spacecraft to convert their 18.0 kilograms of decommissioning fuel into
24.8 years of operational life. While the design life for these buses is only 5 years,
some have already been operating for 7 years. With a combined $16M launch and
manufacturing cost per satellite, a low cost disposal method would seem to be worth
investigating further.
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Figure 7.21: Commercial Geosynchronous Communication Spacecraft Operating Be-
yond Design Life In 2004
7.4.2 Refueling
Most geosynchronous spacecraft reach the end of their station-keeping fuel before
other major systems start to fail [57]. Examining the satellite information database,
a number of trends in geosynchronous spacecraft lifetimes can be seen.
Of particular interest is the set of geosynchronous communications satellites
launched since 1980 which have reached end of life. They have on average exceeded
their design life by 24%. This yielded an average additional 1.6 years of service past
their design life. Figure 7.23 illustrates the actual life of geosynchronous communi-
cations satellites versus their design life. This analysis includes all geosynchronous
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Figure 7.22: Civilian And Military Geosynchronous Communication Spacecraft Op-
erating Beyond Design Life In 2004
communications satellites launched since 1980 which have since become inactive (mi-
nus the Russian and Chinese government satellites). The figure shows a cross over
point at the 31st spacecraft. All of the satellites before the 31st ended their useful
lives before the end of their design lives. Satellites to the right of the 31st all exceeded
their design life. Another view of this result is shown in Figure 7.24, in which the
lifetime surplus or shortfall is normalized versus the nominal design life.
A subset of the previous set includes geosynchronous communications satel-
lites launched since 1980 which have reached end of life and which have operated in
an inclined mode. These spacecraft have on average exceeded their design life by
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Fuel
Mass
Event (kg) Note
Orbit Insertion 17.5 Initial Maneuver
Orbit Trim 2.2 8 Years Worth
Drag Makeup 3.6 8 Years Worth
Decommission maneuver 18.0 Final Maneuver
Total Fuel Load 41.3 Of 689 kg Total Spacecraft Mass
Table 7.11: Iridium Fuel Budget
30%. This yielded an average additional 2.0 years of service past their design life.
Figure 7.25 shows the breakout between design and extended life and between un-
inclined and inclined operations. An additional criterion for this set was that they at
least reached their design life before retiring. Un-inclined operations allow a greater
number of simpler ground stations to utilize the spacecraft services, generating the
maximum communications satellite revenues. Inclined operations generate significant
but reduced revenues. The inclined years of operation represented here amount to
about 200 spacecraft-years. Calculating the exact amount of revenue that could have
been realized by refueling these spacecraft is problematic. To find a floor on this
value, it can be conservatively estimated that inclined operations generate at least
20% less than the revenue of un-inclined operations (about $44.4M per GEO commu-
nications satellite per year as shown in Appendix B). Given this loss of $8.8M per
satellite per year and 200 years of inclined operations, the order of magnitude of the
opportunity to refuel inclined mode satellites is $1.8B over those years. Of course the
effect of increased supply on the transponder market would in turn drive the prices
down.
While refueling these inclined mode spacecraft represents a substantial oppor-
tunity, it does not include fully functional spacecraft that transitioned directly from
un-inclined active operations to a graveyard orbit.
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Spacecraft
Figure 7.23: Years Actual Life Exceeded Design Life For Retired Geosynchronous
Communications Satellites Launched Since 1980
7.4.3 Consumables Replenishment
The 1999 failure [14] of the $90M WIRE (Wide-Field Infrared Explorer) spacecraft
points to the opportunity to resupply scientific spacecraft with consumables. In the
case of WIRE, a LEO astronomy satellite, when the spacecraft was activated, a power
surge prematurely triggered explosive bolts, which then deployed the cover of the
infrared telescope. Solid hydrogen needed to cool the system sublimated and vented,
causing the spacecraft to spin out of control. Control was later regained, however,
by then the hydrogen supply had been depleted. Coolant is used on a number of
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Figure 7.24: Ratio Of Active Life Beyond Design Life To Design Life For Retired
Geosynchronous Communications Satellites Launched Since 1980
satellites to enable sensitive sensors. A cryogen supply vehicle could enable longer
life or lower launch mass for such high-value spacecraft.
7.4.4 Preventative Maintenance
For components common on a number of spacecraft, MTBF information can be col-
lected over time. This component level information could be used to predict failures.
Were more of this level of information available, proactive replacement of key space-
craft components would likely be a valuable service.
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Figure 7.25: Actual And Design Life For Retired Geosynchronous Communications
Satellites Launched Since 1980 That Functioned Inclined While Active
7.4.5 Spacecraft Upgrade
The ability to add more capable sensors, instruments, or other payloads to existing
spacecraft could extend the useful life of functioning satellite buses with obsolete
payloads. Leisman studied this extensively for the GPS constellation [69].
7.4.6 Optical Surface Maintenance
A number of scientific satellites, including Chandra, Stardust, Cassini, and others,
have accumulated contaminants on optical surfaces. In most cases heaters or exposure
142
to direct sunlight has removed these substances. The ability to clean or repair such
optical surfaces could someday provide a mission saving service. Because of the
infrequency of occurrence, this type of servicing capability would be a secondary or
tertiary capability on a servicer with another primary mission.
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7.5 Other Services
Beyond servicing failures and extending spacecraft life, other services are conceivable,
including inspection and relocation.
7.5.1 Inspection
7.5.1.1 Initial Deployment
In February 2000, the Hughes constructed Galaxy XI (model BSS-702) was the first
commercial satellite to include onboard cameras to monitor solar array deployment.
The 30 minute deployment sequence was recorded and downlinked to verify operation
of the new solar array configuration. This is a clear demonstration that satellite oper-
ators see a need to monitor spacecraft during deployment activities. The deployment
anomalies discussed in Section 7.3.2 also argue for such a capability. A servicer, with
a primary mission tied more directly to a financial benefit could readily provide this
ability as a secondary servicing mission capability.
7.5.1.2 Health Monitoring
Another inspection task is to periodically check the external condition of a satellite
(solar array degradation, micro-meteor damage, etc.). The Boeing and Loral solar
arrays mentioned previously would be likely candidates for such a service. A number
of spacecraft, such as CHAMP in 2000 and Telstar 6 in 2002, also experienced signif-
icant micro-meteor impacts. Inspection of damage from such impacts would provide
valuable information on assessing the affect on spacecraft longevity.
7.5.1.3 Insurance Investigation
Visual validation of multi-million dollar insurance claims also seems like a likely use
for an inspection vehicle.
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7.5.2 Debris And Failed Spacecraft Relocation
A number of studies ([88], [55], [56], [89], [85], [84]) make the case for increasing
concern regarding the effect of the orbital debris environment on active spacecraft.
Imposing the requirement for disposal maneuvers on future spacecraft is a useful
approach, but numerous satellites have already failed in or near working orbits. While
removing these collision hazards from active orbits benefits all of the other spacecraft
in such orbits, no revenue is produced directly from this activity. Such a service
appears to be a useful secondary mission for a servicer.
Of particular interest is the geostationary orbit. Because all these (about
250) high-cost, high-revenue spacecraft share the same orbit, clearing away failed
spacecraft, rocket bodies, and other orbital debris is evolving from a good idea into
a necessity. Table 7.12 lists the 16 objects which pass within 1 kilometer of GEO.
Each of these objects is a satellite except for the IUS R/B, which is an Inertial Upper
Stage rocket body. All of these objects are of substantial mass and would inflict
serious damage in the event of a collision with a working satellite. The Figures 7.26,
7.27, and 7.28 illustrate the nearest hazards. There are 63 objects which pass within
5 kilometers of GEO. Expanding the buffer out to 50 kilometers, there are a total
of 175 objects. Currently, collision avoidance is managed with the help of ground
radars. In some cases, spacecraft maneuver to avoid collision. Removing the hazards
to a safer distance would provide an additional benefit by eliminating the need for
such fuel expenditures.
The objects described have accumulated over the years. Figure 7.29 shows the
number of new objects arriving near (within 200 km) of GEO per year. An average
of 10.5 objects were added annually over the twenty years from 1984 to 2003.
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Dist.
To
Satellite Inc. Perigee Apogee GEO
# Name ID Source (deg) (km) (km) (km)
1 FltSatCom 4 1980-087A US 13.5 35,767 35,805 0.13
2 IUS R/B(2) 1991-054D US 9.4 35,649 35,923 0.31
3 FltSatCom 3 1980-004A US 12.4 35,673 35,900 0.33
4 Raduga 6 1980-016A CIS 14.4 35,763 35,808 0.37
5 Raduga 26 1990-112A CIS 8.1 35,764 35,807 0.37
6 GSTAR 1 1985-035A US 6.0 35,756 35,817 0.62
7 Raduga 14 1984-016A CIS 12.2 35,771 35,802 0.63
8 NATO 2B 1971-009A NATO 14.3 35,773 35,800 0.64
9 Satcom C5 1982-105A US 9.0 35,772 35,801 0.64
10 Cosmos 2085 1990-061A CIS 8.3 35,779 35,794 0.64
11 GSTAR 3 1988-081A US 11.5 35,775 35,798 0.64
12 GOES 7 1987-022A US 8.2 35,779 35,794 0.64
13 Koreasat 2 1996-003A SKOR 0.1 35,783 35,790 0.64
14 Skynet 1 1969-101A UK 13.4 35,678 35,896 0.86
15 Intelsat 3-F3 1969-011A ITSO 6.1 35,767 35,803 0.87
16 Cosmos 775 1975-097A CIS 14.6 35,736 35,834 0.92
Table 7.12: Objects Which Pass Within 1 km Of GEO
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Figure 7.27: Objects Which Pass Within 50 km Of GEO
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Figure 7.29: Annual New Inactive Objects Passing Within 200 km Of GEO
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7.6 Summary Of Opportunities
In order to begin to rank the servicing opportunities identified earlier in this chapter,
discriminating factors need to be identified. Table 7.13 shows the missions and in-
formation on their targets. Target Status indicates in what phase of life the satellite
is. BOL is beginning of life. Midlife is during the nominal design life. Near EOL
means operational but approaching retirement. Inactive means that the spacecraft
has ceased functioning. The Remove Inactive mission includes removing both in-
active spacecraft and other orbital debris near GEO. The Benefit column indicates
what the benefit of a successful servicing would be. Servicing satellites with BOL is-
sues will enable a large (possibly around 90%) fraction of the full life to be achieved.
The Extends Life benefit indicates that the service will allow a functioning satellite
to continue operations. The Remove Inactive benefit is that it reduces the collision
hazard to active spacecraft in GEO. The Annual Events column lists how many ser-
vicing opportunities are available in any particular year. Further economic valuation
of these missions in conjunction with operational uncertainties is presented in detail
in the next chapter.
Target Annual
Mission Status Benefit Events
LEO to GEO Transfer BOL Enables Full Life 1.1
Retirement Maneuver Near EOL Extends Life 20
Relocate In GEO MidLife Extends Life 13
Remove Inactive Inactive Prevents Damage 10.5
Deployment Monitoring BOL Enables Full Life 20
Health Monitoring MidLife Issue Detection 200
ORU-like Repair MidLife Extends Life 4.4
General Repair MidLife Extends Life 3.8
Deployment Assistance BOL Enables Full Life 0.3
Refuel MidLife Extends Life 20
Table 7.13: Candidate Servicing Missions
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Chapter 8
Expected Value Of Servicing Market Segments
Having identified numerous servicing opportunities and substantial financial incen-
tives in Chapter 7, the question becomes which missions to pursue first. The candi-
date missions from Table 7.13 are summarized below, and subsequent sections will
determine the expected-value break-even servicing fee for each case based on the ap-
proach outlined in Chapter 4. The majority of these opportunities involve satellites in
geosynchronous orbit, therefore, those satellites will be examined first and the results
will be extended where applicable to LEO and MEO spacecraft.
1. LEO to GEO Transfer - The servicer docks to a target in LEO or GTO and
boosts it to GEO. This enables nearly full lifetime for target.
2. Retirement Maneuver - Servicer docks to target and removes it from GEO.
Allows target to burn relocation and margin fuel for extended lifetime.
3. Relocate In GEO - Servicer docks to target and relocates in GEO. Saves both
time out of service and fuel expenditure for relocation.
4. Remove Inactive - Servicer captures an inactive spacecraft or other orbital
debris and removes it from GEO. Reduces collision hazard.
5. Deployment Monitoring - Servicer provides video downlink of deployment
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operations. Gives ground controllers additional information to resolve deploy-
ment anomalies.
6. Health Monitoring - Inspection provides additional health status information
to ground controllers. Allows better prediction of satellite performance over
time and identifies impending problems.
7. ORU-like Replacement - Servicer docks with target and may or may not
remove old failed components. Servicer adds replacement components to target
to overcome failures.
8. General Repair - Servicer docks with target and performs complex, dexterous
robotic servicing tasks beyond simpler ORU-level tasks.
9. Deployment Assistance - Servicer docks with target and uses manipulators
to assist stuck appendage to deploy.
10. Refuel - Servicer docks with target. Manipulators access port for fuel transfer.
A subtype of this servicer docks and provides propulsions services instead of
transferring fuel.
The following sections examine the expected value equation (from Chapter 3)
for each mission. The probabilities for each chance node outcome are discussed in
Section 8.1. A summary of the expected values of the candidate missions is shown in
Section 8.3.
The servicing break-even fee derived in follow sections is the fee that drives
the net benefit of servicing to zero. Obviously, an actual servicing fee would have to
be lower. How much lower is an argument left to others.
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8.1 Chance Node Probabilities
Throughout the expected value calculations later in this chapter, a number of event
outcome probabilities are identified. These probabilities are explained below. The
Launch, Orbital Transfer, Deployment and Graveyard Transfer chance nodes apply to
both target satellites and servicers and can be derived from the Satellite Information
Database. The rest of the chance nodes apply only to servicers and must therefore
be estimated. Where possible, these estimates are based on similar mechanisms or
operations that have previously flown in space. The chance nodes listed in Table 8.1
will be examined in the following sections.
Chance Node Description
Launch Outcomes Probability of a successful launch
Orbital Transfer Out-
comes
Probability of successful transfer from one orbital lo-
cation to another
Graveyard Transfer
Outcomes
Probability of a GEO spacecraft successfully achieving
the proper retirement orbit altitude
Deployment Outcomes Probability appendage deployment success
Docking Outcomes Probability of successful docking
Undocking Outcomes Probability of successful undocking
Refueling Outcomes Probability of successfully refueling a target satellite
Dexterous Repair Out-
comes
Probability of performing a successful dexterous oper-
ation on a target satellite
Table 8.1: Chance Nodes
8.1.1 Launch Outcomes
Table 8.2 shows the possible outcomes of launching a spacecraft to geosynchronous
orbit. Upon launch, a satellite can be destroyed in a launch failure; be delivered to
the wrong orbit; achieve orbit but fail before becoming operational; or achieve orbit
and successfully begin operations. Satellites that were launched into the wrong orbit
but which were able to achieve correct orbit using onboard fuel are not counted here
as having suffered a wrong orbit failure. The first three options are derived from
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the Satellite Information Database, and the calculation for the final option is shown
below in Equation 8.1.
pGEOok = 1− pGEOfto− pGEOwo− pGEOim (8.1)
Parameter Basis
Total Launch Attempts (1994 to 2003) 772
Launch Failures 37
Chance Of Launch Failure 4.8 % pGEOfto Sat DB
Satellites Intended For GEO 261
Satellites Failed In Wrong Orbit 8
Chance Of Wrong Orbit Failure 3.1 % pGEOwo Sat DB
Satellites Delivered To GEO 253
GEO Satellites Failing In First 30 days. 6
Chance Of Beginning Of Life Failure 2.4 % pGEOim Sat DB
Chance for GEO Success 89.8 % pGEOok Sat DB
Table 8.2: Expected Value Probabilities - GEO Satellite Delivery To Orbit
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8.1.2 Orbital Transfer Outcomes
Orbital Transfer refers to a satellite relocating itself within the geosynchronous orbital
belt. An example of such a relocation would be the movement of GOES-5 from a
geostationary location monitoring weather over the Atlantic Ocean to a position over
the Pacific Ocean. As seen in Table 8.3, over the course of the last 10 years there have
been 172 identifiable satellite relocations in GEO. Some of these maneuvers are from
online reports ([73], [14]) and some are from the orbital analysis programs developed
by the author and described in Appendix E. A number of additional military satellite
maneuvers may have occurred, but their orbital elements are not reported by the
NSSDC. Only one active geostationary satellite experienced unexpected propulsion
system failure over that time. An additional 3 satellites experienced propulsions
system anomalies resulting in premature fuel depletion, but these anomalies were
detectable and took time to empty the fuel tanks. The table shows the possible
outcomes of orbital transfer and Equation 8.2 shows how pXferOK is found.
pXferOK = 1− pXferFail (8.2)
Parameter Basis
Satellites Relocations In GEO (1994 to 2003) 172
GEO Satellite Propulsion Failures 1
Chance Of Relocation Failure 0.6 pXferFail Sat DB
Chance Of Successful Relocation 99.4 pXferOK Sat DB
Table 8.3: Expected Value Probabilities - Orbital Transfer
8.1.3 Graveyard Transfer Outcomes
Graveyard Transfer is a special case of Orbital Transfer and applies to a satellite
transferring itself from geosynchronous orbit to a retirement orbit. Until recently,
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there was no penalty for leaving a defunct spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit. In
order to extract maximum economic output from their satellites, some operators
misjudged their retirement maneuver fuel reserve and their spacecraft failed to reach
the retirement orbit. Table 8.4 is derived from the Satellite Information Database.
139 spacecraft of all types which operated in geosynchronous orbit became inactive
over the 10 year period from 1994 thru 2003. Of these, 69 continue to pass within
200 km (the FCC limit [49]) of geosynchronous orbit. The table shows the possible
outcomes of maneuvering to the graveyard orbit and Equation 8.3 shows how pGY ok
is found. It is granted that once a more serious penalty is regularly imposed, the
probability of reaching the graveyard will likely increase.
pGY ok = 1− pGY fail (8.3)
Param. Basis
GEO Satellite Retirement Maneuvers (1994 to 2003) 139
Inactive Sat.s Passing Within 200 km Of GEO 69
Chance Of Graveyard Transfer Failure 49.6 % pGYfail Sat DB
Chance Of Successful Graveyard Transfer 50.4 % pGYok Sat DB
Table 8.4: Expected Value Probabilities - Graveyard Transfer
8.1.4 Deployment Outcomes
At the start of life spacecraft typically deploy solar arrays, antennas, and other ap-
pendages. In order to evaluate a deployment monitoring scenario, an value for chance
of deployment failure is needed. Over the last 10 years (1994 thru 2003), 253 satel-
lites have arrived successfully in geosynchronous orbit. Of these, 7 (as seen in Table
7.4) have reported experiencing a deployment failure. There maybe more unreported
deployment anomalies due to the sparse reporting for military spacecraft. Table 8.5
shows the rates used in this analysis.
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Percent Param. Basis
Chance Of Deployment Failure 3.0 % pDeployFail Sat DB
Chance Of Deployment Success 97.0 % pDeployOK Sat DB
Table 8.5: Expected Value Probabilities - Deploy
8.1.5 Docking Outcomes
Until servicers are in regular use, a value for the probability of successfully docking
a servicer to a target must be estimated. ETS-VII [38] successfully demonstrated
robotic docking and Orbital Express [37] will do so again in the near future. The
Progress modules that resupplied Mir [103] were docked using an automatic system
(Kurs) with human supervision. Apollo and Soyuz modules have also performed many
human-in-the-loop dockings. While there have been difficulties, there have been few
outright failures. An eventual robotic docking failure rate under 1% seems within the
realm of reason, but it is not clear how to refine that number at this point. Table
8.6 shows the values and Equation 8.4 shows how pDockOK is found. A sensitivity
analysis of this parameter is included in subsequent analysis, such as Figures 8.3 and
8.4.
pDockOK = 1− pDockFail (8.4)
Percent Parameter Basis
Chance Of Docking Failure 1.0 % pDockFail Estimate
Chance Of Successful Docking 99.0 % pDockOK Estimate
Table 8.6: Expected Value Probabilities - Docking
8.1.6 Undocking Outcomes
After docking with a target satellite and performing a servicing task, the servicer
must then undock from the target and move on to its next task. Failure to undock
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would likely lead to the loss of both the target satellite and the servicer. James
Oberg’s landing safety report [79] on Soyuz shows an occurrence of serious undocking
anomalies at a rate of about 1%. He notes that the failures that did occur happened
early in the history of undockings and that the failure rate dropped off with time.
Table 8.7 shows the rates used in this analysis. It is likely that pUnDockFail would
be even lower in practice.
A 1% chance of undocking failure will be used in this analysis, but in practice,
a built-in separation plane could be incorporated into the docking mechanism to
guarantee (approaching 0% chance of failure) vehicle separation. Use of the separation
plane would leave some portion of the docking mechanism still locked onto the target
and the servicer unable to perform any docking operations until repaired. This would
leave the target satellite functional as opposed to locked to the servicer and probably
unable to fully perform its mission.
Percent Parameter Basis
Chance Of Undocking Failure 1.0 % pUnDockFail Estimate
Chance Of Successful Undocking 99.0 % pUnDockOK Estimate
Table 8.7: Expected Value Probabilities - Undocking
8.1.7 Refueling Outcomes
From the Satellite Information Database, it can be seen that over the last 25 years the
uncrewed Russian Progress modules have flown over 100 flights. On these flights the
Progress modules performed automated on-orbit refueling for various space stations
including Salyut-6, Salyut-7, Mir, and ISS. There are no reported failures to accom-
plish refueling. Astronauts on STS-41G [46] were able to demonstrate accessing a
Landsat type fuel port on-orbit using the Orbital Refueling System. These Landsat
ground fuel ports are not designed for on-orbit access and require a number of spe-
cialty tools for the task. Once the connection between the Landsat port and the fuel
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reservoir was established, fuel was successfully transferred between the two multiple
times. Given that automated fueling has been accomplished on-orbit many times,
and given that a EVA crew member in a dexterity-limiting spacesuit has proved the
ability to access a fuel port not built for that purpose, it would appear that prospects
for robotic refueling are good. While the task is complex, Ranger [54] has demon-
strated much of the required dexterous capability. Still, assessing a percent chance
of successfully completing a telerobotic refueling task is still a subjective endeavor.
The argument may be made that a refueling mission would only be attempted once
ground tests and simulations had raised the probability of success to an acceptable
level. Based on these considerations, Table 8.8 shows the rates used in this analysis.
Percent Parameter Basis
Chance Of Refueling Failure 5.0 % pRefuelFail Estimate
Chance Of Successful Refueling 95.0 % pRefuelOK Estimate
Table 8.8: Expected Value Probabilities - Refuel
8.1.8 Dexterous Repair Outcomes
Finding a firm basis for estimating the probabilities associated with the dexterous
repair chance nodes (ORU Replacement, General Repair, Deployment Assistance) is
problematic. No parallels emerge readily from the Satellite Information Database.
Based on experience with Ranger [54] increasing robotic capability tends to drive
up the probability of successfully completing dexterous tasks. The uniqueness and
complexity of the General Repair task and the Deployment Assistance task tend to
drive their probabilities of success down. The Deployment Assistance opportunities
are also very specialized. A servicer would need to be able to dock with the target and
then be able to react loads through both the stuck appendage and the satellite body.
Table 8.9 shows the rates used in this analysis. Capture probabilities are included as
well.
158
Percent Parameter Basis
Chance ORU Replacement Fails 5.0 % pORUfail Estimate
Chance ORU Replacement Succeeds 95.0 % pORUok Estimate
Chance General Repair Fails 5.0 % pRepairFail Estimate
Chance General Repair Succeeds 95.0 % pRepairOK Estimate
Chance Deployment Assistance Fails 5.0 % pAssistFail Estimate
Chance Deploy. Assistance Succeeds 95.0 % pAssistOK Estimate
Chance Of Unsuccessful Capture 5.0 % pCaptureFail Estimate
Chance Of Successful Capture 95.0 % pCaptureOK Estimate
Table 8.9: Expected Value Probabilities - Dexterous Repair
8.2 Servicing Mission Expected Values
The following subsections describe the calculation of the expected value break-even
servicing fee for each of the servicing mission types. A summary of these calculations
is included in Section 8.3. Note that these calculations are for the maximum break-
even servicing fee chargeable to a client satellite operator. In most cases it is assumed
that the servicer is operational in its working orbit. Calculations for a sample servicer
are shown in Chapter 9 and include additional costs and failure regimes over the whole
life of the servicer.
8.2.1 Retirement Maneuver
For this mission, the servicer docks to the target satellite at the end of its life and
removes it from GEO. This service allows the target spacecraft to burn reserved
relocation and margin fuel for a two to three month lifetime extension. More details
on this type of mission are available in Section 7.4.1.3. The Expected Value Diagram
for this mission is shown in Figure 8.1.
The chance node probabilities for this expect value calculation are established
in Section 8.1. Outcome values include 3 cases. The nominal case is that the target
satellite successfully transfers itself from geosynchronous orbit to the graveyard orbit.
159
Figure 8.1: Expected Value Diagram For Retirement Mission
Because this is the baseline case, it has a value of zero. The case where the servicer
successfully transfers the target satellite to the graveyard orbit provides a revenue
benefit (due to extended revenue life) to the target satellite operator of $11.1M,
as shown in Appendix B. The third possible outcome is that the satellite remains
as a hazard near geosynchronous orbit. While a set penalty for this has not been
established, the FCC has threatened to suspend an operator’s license. For a typical
geosynchronous communications satellite, the annual income is $44.4M (Appendix
B). Then again, collision with an active satellite insured for $200M would be an even
larger concern. A one year license suspension with a penalty of $44.4M (one year of
operational revenue) is assumed for this analysis. The Expected Value Diagram for
this mission populated with outcome probabilities and values is shown in Figure 8.2.
The expected value equation for not using servicing is shown in Equation 8.5.
Here that represents standard retirement procedure, which is to reserve two to three
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Figure 8.2: Expected Value Diagram For Retirement Mission
months worth of operating fuel for the retirement maneuver. Because this is the
baseline case, vNominal = 0 and the equation simplifies to Equation 8.6.
EVNom = (pGY ok × vNominal) + (pGY fail × vHazard) (8.5)
EVNom = pGY fail × vHazard (8.6)
The servicing equation, Equation 8.8, is more complex. The servicer must
successfully dock with the target and then transfer it to the retirement orbit. It is
important to note that the servicing fee, vSvcFee, represents a cost to the satellite
operator and is therefore a negative number.
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EVSvc = (pDockOK × ((pXferOK × vSaveFuel) + (8.7)
(pXferFail × vHazard))) +
(pDockFail × vHazard) + vSvcFee
In the break-even case, the two expected values are set equal to each other
as shown in Equation 8.8. This can be recast in terms of the fee in Equation 8.10,
and simplified into Equation 8.11. Inserting the values from Table 8.10 as shown in
Equations 8.12 and 8.12, the break-even servicing fee is $32.2M. This implies that
a servicing company could charge up to $32.2M to provide a relocation service, and
the net value to the operator of the target satellite would be zero. A lower fee would
clearly be more attractive to the target satellite operator.
EVSvc = EVNom (8.8)
vSvcFee = (pGY fail × vHazard)− (8.9)
(pDockOK × ((pXferOK × vSaveFuel) +
(pXferFail × vHazard)))−
(pDockFail × vHazard)
vSvcFee = vHazard(pGY fail − pDockFail − (8.10)
(pDockOK × pXferFail))−
vSaveFuel(pDockOK × pXferOK)
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vSvcFee = vHazard(0.496− 0.01− (0.99× 0.006))− (8.11)
vSaveFuel(0.99× 0.994)
vSvcFee = −$44.4M(0.48)− $11.1M(0.98) (8.12)
Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the retirement service
EVSvc Expected value of using the retirement service
pDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pGY ok 0.504 Probability of successful self transfer to graveyard or-
bit
pGY fail 0.496 Probability of unsuccessful self transfer to graveyard
orbit
pXferOK 0.994 Probability of successful orbital transfer
pXferFail 0.006 Probability of unsuccessful orbital transfer
vHazard -$44.4M Value of satellite remaining near GEO as a hazard
vNominal $0 Value of satellite successfully transiting to the grave-
yard orbit
vSaveFuel $11.1M Value of additional 3 months of operations enabled
by saved fuel
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.10: Retirement Maneuver Expected Value Parameters
To explore the sensitivity of this assessment to the estimated probability of
docking success, the value of pDockFail can be varied to check the effect. Figure
8.3 shows vSvcFee as a function of pDockFail. The feasible value of vSvcFee varies
from $32.7M if there is no chance of failure up to the cross over point at 73.6%
where vSvcFee becomes zero. This illustrates that there is a large feasible span of
pDockFail. While the first attempts at such docking will be challenging, learning
effects should decrease the chance of failure over time. For the purposes of this
analysis, pDockFail will be set to 1%.
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Figure 8.3: vSvcFee Sensitivity To Changes In pDockFail
If there were no major penalty for leaving a spacecraft in GEO, but oper-
ators still wanted to keep the orbit clear, the above equations can be re-evaluated
with vHazard = 0. In this case Equation 8.11 can be reduced to Equation 8.13.
Substituting in the other values in from Table 8.10, this reduces to Equation 8.14
and then Equation 8.15. The break-even servicing fee for this case is $10.9M per
satellite retired. To be conservative (not account for hazard penalty), this value will
be used versus the $32.2M found earlier. Also note that this calculation is for the
nth retirement mission. The first mission must account for the chance of the servicer
experiencing a launch anomaly. An example of this accounting is shown in Section
8.2.2. Additionally, there is a chance that the servicer could fail to make the tran-
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sition to this target from its previous location. These inter-mission failures must be
accounted for when assessing proposed servicers. Chapter 9 includes such accounting.
vSvcFee = −vSaveFuel(pDockOK × pXferOK) (8.13)
vSvcFee = −$11.1M(0.99× 0.994) (8.14)
vSvcFee = −$10.9 (8.15)
Figure 8.4 shows the sensitivity of this case to pDockFail. Here it can be seen
that, because there is no hazard penalty, there is no cross over point. vSvcFee is
feasible over the entire span of pDockFail.
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Figure 8.4: vSvcFee Sensitivity To Changes In pDockFail (No Hazard Penalty)
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8.2.2 LEO to GEO Transfer
In this scenario, a spacecraft intended for geosynchronous orbit is stranded in LEO or
GTO by the under performance of its launch vehicle or launch vehicle’s upper stage.
See Section 7.3.1.1 for examples. In some cases, spacecraft have enough onboard fuel
to achieve GEO albeit with a significantly reduced fuel lifetime. Those with insuffi-
cient fuel to reach working orbit are abandoned in place or commanded to re-enter
the atmosphere for disposal. This servicing mission must include a large propulsion
package to make up the velocity increment required to achieve geosynchronous orbit.
While many other mission opportunities could be performed multiple times per year
per servicer, each of these missions is unique and occurs at a rate of about once per
year.
The expected value diagram for this mission is shown in Figure 8.5. The top
level expected value equations are shown in Equation 8.16 and 8.18. vWrongOrbit
represents the value of the satellite in wrong orbit. It will be taken as zero here.
vLoss is the value of the satellite if the servicer fails to undock. This will also
be taken as zero. Making these substitutions and setting the two expected value
equations equal to each other, the servicing fee can be solved for as shown in Equation
8.19. Inserting the values from Table 8.11 results in Equation 8.19 which reduces to
Equation 8.20. vFullMsn, the value of life of the target satellite, can have different
interpretations. It can be the sunk costs to date (manufacturing, launch, insurance,
etc.), the insured amount of the spacecraft (typically $150M), or the revenue stream
the satellite represents (up to 12 years of $44M per year). For the purposes of this
analysis the more conservative $150M will be used for vFullMsn, therefore, the final
value of Equation 8.20 is $131M.
EVNom = vWrongOrbit (8.16)
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Figure 8.5: Expected Value Diagram For GTO Relocation Mission
EVSvc = vWrongOrbit(pGEOfto+ pGEOwo+ pGEOim) + (8.17)
pGEOok(pDockOK(pXferOK(pUnDockOK(vFullMsn) +
pUnDockFail(vLoss)) +
pXferFail(pUnDockOK(vWrongOrbit) +
pUnDockFail(vLoss))) + pDockFail(vWrongOrbit)) +
vSvcFee
vSvcFee = −(pGEOok × pDockOK × (8.18)
pXferOK × pUnDockOK × vFullMsn)
vSvcFee = −(0.898× 0.99× 0.994× 0.99× vFullMsn) (8.19)
vSvcFee = −0.875vFullMsn (8.20)
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Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the GTO relocation ser-
vice
EVSvc Expected value of using the GTO relocation service
pDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pGEOfto 0.048 Probability launch failing to orbit
pGEOwo 0.031 Probability of satellite entering wrong orbit initially
pGEOim 0.024 Probability of early satellite failure
pGEOok 0.898 Probability of successful launch and operations
pUnDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful undocking
pUnDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful undocking
pXferOK 0.994 Probability of successful orbital transfer
pXferFail 0.006 Probability of unsuccessful orbital transfer
vFullMsn Value of satellite after transiting to working orbit
vLoss Value of satellite if servicer fails to undock
vWrongOrbit Value of satellite in wrong orbit
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.11: GTO Relocation Maneuver Expected Value Parameters
To check the sensitivity of these results to the estimated docking and undocking
failure rates, the equations were re-evaluated as shown in Table 8.12. Finding 1% or
less perturbations from 50% changes in the rate, it appears that these estimates do
not have undue influence on the results.
The analysis so far was to answer the question of what the break-even servicer
fee would be to rescue a geosynchronous satellite stranded in a low orbit. The servicing
option can also be compared directly to replacing the satellite. In this case, the
expected value for the replacement case is shown in Equation 8.22. vSatLoss is the
value of the replacement mission if the launch or satellite fails. This value is zero.
vReplace is the costs for the launch of the new spacecraft (manufacturing, launch,
etc.). Setting Equation 8.22 equal to the servicing option, Equation 8.19, and solving
for the servicing break-even fee, Equation 8.23 results. Substituting the values from
Table 8.11, Equation 8.23 then reduces to Equation 8.24. This implies that the
servicing break-even fee can be as high as the cost of the replacement mission minus
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Parameter Value Change Percent
Change
Basic vSvcFee Coefficient 0.875
Effect Of Doubling Dock-
ing Chance Failure
pDockFail 0.866 -0.009 1.0%
Effect Of Halving Docking
Chance Failure
pDockFail 0.879 0.004 0.5%
Effect Of Doubling Unock-
ing Chance Failure
pUnDockFail 0.866 -0.009 1.0%
Effect Of Halving UnDock-
ing Chance Failure
pUnDockFail 0.879 0.004 0.5%
Table 8.12: Docking And Undocking Parameter Sensitivity
2.3% of the value of the full mission. Setting vReplace and vFullMsn to $150M, the
break-even servicing fee becomes $146M.
EVReplace = vSatLoss(pGEOfto+ pGEOwo+ pGEOim) + (8.21)
pGEOok(vFullMsn) + vReplace
vSvcFee = vReplace+ (pGEOok × vFullMsn)× (8.22)
(1− pDockOK × pXferOK × pUnDockOK)
vSvcFee = vReplace+ (0.898× vFullMsn)(1− (0.99× 0.994× 0.99))(8.23)
vSvcFee = vReplace+ (0.023× vFullMsn) (8.24)
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8.2.3 Relocate In GEO
During the life of a geosynchronous satellite, its operator may decide to change the
longitude over which it is stationed. To accomplish this, the satellite performs a
pair of maneuvers. The first burn alters the orbit from near circular to a slightly
more elliptical shape with a period different than earth synchronous. Because of this
difference of orbital periods, the satellite can walk its apsis along the geostationary
orbit. Once in the correct new location, the satellite performs a second burn of equal
magnitude to the first burn and re-circularizes its orbit. The amount of fuel burned to
accomplish this relocation is directly tradeable against time in transit. In other words,
a bigger burn results in a quicker transition from one location to another. During the
transition time, the satellite typically cannot perform its nominal revenue or other
tasks. It is also important to note that fuel burned during relocation is no longer
available for spacecraft lifetime. A relocation service allows a fast transition and
allows the client spacecraft to preserve its lifetime fuel. Earth and moon gravitational
affects determine the satellite’s drift rate in GEO [39] and can also be used to assist
in some long duration relocation maneuvers.
In this scenario the servicer docks to the target, performs the relocation ma-
neuvers, and then undocks from the target and moves on. The expected value diagram
is shown in Figure 8.6. The expected value for the nominal case is shown in Equation
8.25 and the servicing case is shown in Equation 8.27. Because no value is gained or
lost the nominal mission, vNominal, has a value of zero. In the case that the ser-
vicer cannot undock from the target, both vehicles would be lost (vLoss). The ideal
outcome would be the successful relocation which would result in the target satellite
saving the relocation fuel and extending its lifetime (vSaveFuel). Substituting a zero
value for vNominal and setting the two expected value equations equal to each other,
the break-even servicing fee (vSvcFee) is shown in Equation 8.27. Substituting the
values from Table 8.13 into that yields Equation 8.29 which reduces to Equation 8.29.
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Substituting $4.6M for vSaveFuel and -$150M for vLoss, this equation reduces to
an expected value break-even value of $3.0M per relocation.
Figure 8.6: Expected Value Diagram For Relocation Mission
EVNom = vNominal (8.25)
EVSvc = pDockOK(pXferOK(pUnDockOK(V SaveFuel) + (8.26)
pUnDockFail(vLoss)) + pXferFail(pUnDockOK(vNominal) +
pUnDockFail(vLoss))) + pDockFail(vNominal) + vSvcFee
vSvcFee = −vSaveFuel(pDockOK × pXferOK × pUnDockOK)−
vLoss× pDockOK(pXferOK × pUnDockFail) +
(pXferFail × pUnDockFail)) (8.27)
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vSvcFee = −vSaveFuel(0.99× 0.994× 0.99)− (8.28)
vLoss× 0.99(0.994× 0.01) + (0.006× 0.01))
vSvcFee = −vSaveFuel(0.974)− vLoss(0.010) (8.29)
Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the GEO relocation ser-
vice
EVSvc Expected value of using the GEO relocation service
pDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pUnDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pUnDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pXferOK 0.994 Probability of successful orbital transfer
pXferFail 0.006 Probability of unsuccessful orbital transfer
vSaveFuel Value of fuel savings
vLoss Value of satellite if servicer fails to undock
vNominal Value of target performing GEO relocation itself
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.13: Relocation In GEO Expected Value Parameters
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8.2.4 Refuel
In this scenario the servicer docks with the target satellite and the servicer accesses
the target’s fuel port to enable a propellant transfer. The expected value diagram is
shown in Figure 8.7. The expected value for the nominal case is shown in Equation
8.30 and the servicing case is shown in Equation 8.32. Because no value is gained
or lost the nominal mission, vNominal, has a value of zero. In the case that the
servicer cannot undock from the target, both vehicles would be lost (vLoss). The
ideal outcome would be the successful refueling enabling the target satellite to extend
its life (vRefueled). Substituting a zero value for vNominal and setting the two
expected value equations equal to each other, the break-even servicing fee (vSvcFee)
is shown in Equation 8.32. Substituting the values from Table 8.14 into that yields
Equation 8.34 which reduces to Equation 8.34. A servicer could refuel the target
all the way up to its full capacity. The trade study for how much fuel to deliver
per mission is a separate analysis. Assigning vRefueled to be $44.4M (one year of
revenue) and vLoss to be $150M, yields a vSvcFee of about $40M.
Figure 8.7: Expected Value Diagram For Refueling Mission
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EVNom = vNominal (8.30)
EVSvc = pDockOK(pRefuelOK(pUnDockOK(vRefueled) + (8.31)
pUnDockFail(vLoss)) + pRefuelFail(pUnDockOK(vNominal) +
pUnDockFail(vLoss))) + pDockFail(vNominal) + vSvcFee
vSvcFee = −vRefueled(pDockOK × pRefuelOK × pUnDockOK)−
vLoss× pDockOK(pRefuelOK × pUnDockFail) +
(pRefuelFail × pUnDockFail)) (8.32)
vSvcFee = −vRefueled(0.99× 0.95× 0.99)− (8.33)
vLoss× 0.99(0.95× 0.01) + (0.05× 0.01))
vSvcFee = −vRefueled(0.931)− vLoss(0.010) (8.34)
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Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the refueling service
EVSvc Expected value of using the refueling service
pDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pUnDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pUnDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pRefuelOK 0.95 Probability of successful refueling
pRefuelFail 0.05 Probability of unsuccessful refueling
vRefueled Value of fuel savings
vLoss Value of satellite if servicer fails to undock
vNominal Value of nominal satellite operations
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.14: Refueling Expected Value Parameters
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8.2.5 ORU-Like Replacement
In this scenario a replacement ORU is launched and the servicer docks first with ORU
carrier. It retrieves the ORU, undocks, rendezvous and docks with the target satellite,
performs the ORU replacement, and then undocks. The expected value diagram is
shown in Figure 8.8. The expected value for the nominal case is shown in Equation
8.35 and the servicing case is shown in Equation 8.37. Because no value is gained or
lost the nominal mission, vNominal, has a value of zero. Setting the two equations
equal to each other, inserting the values from Table 8.15, and solving for the servicing
fee results in Equations 8.37 through 8.39.
Figure 8.8: Expected Value Diagram For ORU-Like Replacement Mission
EVNom = vNominal (8.35)
177
EVSvc = (pGEOok × pDockOK × pUnDockOK × pDockOK × (8.36)
pORUok(pUndockOK(vFullFunc))) +
(pGEOok × pDockOK × pUnDockOK × pDockOK ×
pORUok(pUndockFail(vLoss))) +
(pGEOok × pDockOK × pUnDockOK × pDockOK ×
pORUfail(pUndockFail(vLoss))) + vSvcFee
vSvcFee = −(pGEOok × pDockOK × pUnDockOK × pDockOK)×
((pORUok × pUndockOK × vFullFunc) +
(pUndockFail × vLoss)) (8.37)
vSvcFee = −(0.898× 0.99× 0.99× 0.99)× (8.38)
((0.95× 0.99× $100M) + (0.01×−$100M))
vSvcFee = −$81M (8.39)
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Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the service
EVSvc Expected value of using the service
pDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pGEOfto 0.048 Probability launch failing to orbit
pGEOwo 0.031 Probability of satellite entering wrong orbit initially
pGEOim 0.024 Probability of early satellite failure
pGEOok 0.898 Probability of successful launch and operations
pORUok 0.95 Probability of successfully replacing ORU
pORUfail 0.05 Probability of unsuccessful ORU replacement
pUnDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful undocking
pUnDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful undocking
vFullFunc $100M Value of satellite if repaired
vLoss -$100M Value of satellite if servicer fails to undock
vNominal $0 Value of nominal satellite operations
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.15: ORU-Like Replacement Expected Value Parameters
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8.2.6 General Repair
This mission is similar to but more dexterously complex than the ORU case. The
expected value diagram is shown in Figure 8.9. Given the similar parameters, the
servicing fee is taken to be the same.
Figure 8.9: Expected Value Diagram For General Repair Mission
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8.2.7 Deployment Assistance
This scenario assumes that a dexterous servicer docks with target and uses its ma-
nipulators to assist a stuck appendage to deploy. Figure 8.10 shows the expected
value diagram. The expected value for the nominal case is shown in Equation 8.40
and the servicing case is shown in Equation 8.41. Because no value is gained or lost
the nominal mission, vNominal, has a value of zero. Setting the two equations equal
to each other, inserting the values from Table 8.16, and solving for the servicing fee
results in Equations 8.42 through 8.44.
Figure 8.10: Expected Value Diagram For Deployment Assistance Mission
EVNom = vNominal (8.40)
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EVSvc = ((pDockOK × pAssistOK × pUnDockOK)vFullFunc) +
((pDockOK × pAssistOK × pUnDockFail)vLoss) +
((pDockOK × pAssistFail × pUnDockFail)vLoss) +
vSvcFee (8.41)
vSvcFee = −((pDockOK × pAssistOK × pUnDockOK)vFullFunc) +
((pDockOK × pAssistOK × pUnDockFail)vLoss) +
((pDockOK × pAssistFail × pUnDockFail)vLoss) (8.42)
vSvcFee = −((0.99× 0.95× 0.99)$91M) + (8.43)
((0.99× 0.95× 0.01)− $91M) +
((0.99× 0.05× 0.01)− $91M)
vSvcFee = −$81M (8.44)
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Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the service
EVSvc Expected value of using the service
pDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pAssistOK 0.95 Probability of successfully assisting deployment
pAssistFail 0.05 Probability of unsuccessful deployment assistance
pUnDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful undocking
pUnDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful undocking
vFullFunc $91M Value of satellite if repaired
vLoss -$91M Value of satellite if servicer fails to undock
vNominal $0 Value of nominal satellite operations
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.16: Deployment Assistance Expected Value Parameters
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8.2.8 Deployment Monitoring
In this case the servicer provides video downlink of the deployment operations of the
target spacecraft, including solar and antenna deployment. This service gives ground
controllers additional information to resolve deployment anomalies. Given the small
number of total failures resulting from deployment anomalies, this is unlikely to be a
service driving servicer development. However, once such a capability was available, it
seems likely that it would be attractive. For instance, on Galaxay 11 [19], a dedicated
camera was integrated onto the spacecraft to monitor the deployment of a new solar
array type. The mass and cost of the camera was small relative to the satellite, but
every kilogram in GEO costs $40,000 to get there (Appendix F).
The expected value diagram is shown in Figure 8.11. The expected value for
the nominal case is shown in Equation 8.45 and the servicing case is shown in Equation
8.47. Because no value is gained or lost in the nominal mission, vNominal, has a
value of zero. Combining the equations, solving for the servicing fee, and substituting
the values from Table 8.17, leads from Equations 8.48 and 8.48 to Equation 8.49.
While a value can be found for vDeployFail based on past deployment failure losses,
assigning a value to vProblemDetect is difficult. The servicer would have to have
the correct view to see the deployment anomaly before damage was done and the
ground operators would have to react in time to halt deployment in the face of a
communications time delay. Even granting the detection of the anomaly, it is not
clear that the controllers could do anything about it. Basically, vProblemDetect can
range anywhere from zero to vDeployFail. Not having any additional information,
vProblemDetect will be set to 50% of vDeployFail. This is shown in Equation 8.50,
and the final value is shown in Equation 8.51.
EVNom = vNominal(pDeployOK) + vDeployFail(pDeployFail) (8.45)
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Figure 8.11: Expected Value Diagram For Deployment Monitoring Mission
EVSvc = vNominal(pDeployOK) + (8.46)
vProblemDetect(pDeployFail) + vSvcFee
EVSvc = (vNominal(pDeployOK) + vDeployFail(pDeployFail))− (8.47)
(vNominal(pDeployOK) + vProblemDetect(pDeployFail))
EVSvc = pDeployFail(vDeployFail − vProblemDetect) (8.48)
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EVSvc = 0.03(vDeployFail − vProblemDetect) (8.49)
EVSvc = 0.03× 0.5×−$91.1M (8.50)
EVSvc = $1.4M (8.51)
Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the service
EVSvc Expected value of using the service
pDeployOK 0.97 Probability of successful deployment
pDeployFail 0.03 Probability of unsuccessful deployment
vProblemDetect Value of detecting a deployment anomaly
vDeployFail -$91.1M Value of deployment failure
vNominal $0 Value of nominal satellite operations
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.17: Refueling Expected Value Parameters
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8.2.9 Remove Inactive
In this case the servicer captures an inactive spacecraft or other orbital debris and
removes it from GEO. This is done to reduce the chance of collision with an active
spacecraft. The Expected Value diagram for this case is shown in Figure 8.12. As seen
in the figure, no revenue source is included. This service is primarily for reducing the
chance of negative outcomes. For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that the
target spacecraft is in violation of the FCC retirement regulation and that vHazard
has a value of -$44.4M.
Equations 8.52 and 8.52 show the nominal and servicing cases. Setting these
equations equal to each other and solving for the servicing fee results in Equation
8.55. Simplifying this equation and substituting the parameters from Table 8.18 is
shown in Equations 8.56 through 8.57. Solving numerically, the servicing fee is shown
in Equation 8.58.
Figure 8.12: Expected Value Diagram For Removal Of Inactive Mission
EVNom = vHazard (8.52)
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EVSvc = pCaptureFail(vHazard) + (8.53)
pCaptureOK(pXferFail(vHazard) +
pXferOK(vRemoved)) + vSvcFee
EVSvc = vHazard(pCaptureFail + (8.54)
(pCaptureOK × pXferFail)) + vSvcFee
vSvcFee = vHazard− (vHazard(pCaptureFail + (8.55)
(pCaptureOK × pXferFail)))
vSvcFee = vHazard(1− pCaptureFail − (8.56)
(pCaptureOK × pXferFail))
vSvcFee = −$44.4M(1− 0.05− (0.95× 0.006)) (8.57)
vSvcFee = −$41.9M (8.58)
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Parameter Value Description
EVNom Expected value of not using the removal service
EVSvc Expected value of using the removal service
pCaptureOK 0.95 Probability of successful capture
pCaptureFail 0.05 Probability of unsuccessful capture
pUnDockOK 0.99 Probability of successful docking
pUnDockFail 0.01 Probability of unsuccessful docking
pXferOK 0.994 Probability of successful orbital transfer
pXferFail 0.006 Probability of unsuccessful orbital transfer
vHazard -$44.4M Value of continuing hazard
vRemoved $0 Value of removing hazard
vSvcFee Break-even value of servicing fee
Table 8.18: Refueling Expected Value Parameters
189
8.2.10 Health Monitoring
Health monitoring consists of an external visual survey of a target spacecraft. This
inspection could be conducted by a dexterous servicer or even a small, light dedi-
cated camera platform (AERCam [25], SCAMP [34], etc.). Solar array degradation,
micrometeor damage, and other effects of the space environment could be monitored.
This is a prophylactic service and could be called upon in a number of circumstances.
For instance, if a family of spacecraft began to experience similar failures, operators
might want to examine their spacecraft of that type. While every active GEO satellite
could conceivably be an annual client, there does not appear to be a direct way to
show a benefit for health monitoring. Given these considerations, no expected value
diagram or servicing fee was developed for this case.
8.3 Summary Of Servicing Mission Expected Val-
ues
Table 8.19 summarizes the findings from the previous sections in descending order
of average annual market value. For each of the servicing missions, the break-even
servicing fee, the annual opportunities per type of service, and the maximum annual
market value are listed. Note again that the break-even fee is the maximum fee
chargeable for the revenue of the serviced satellite to balance the servicing fee and
possible negative outcomes. Having fully populated the table, a number of caveats
are required. The market value for the Remove Inactive mission is based on avoiding
a penalty for leaving an inactive object near GEO. This penalty is not yet being
enforced and could drop this sizable market value to zero. Also, a market value for
the Health Monitoring service could not be established.
While this identification of over $2B worth of annual opportunities should en-
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Service
Break-Even
Servicing Fee
Average
Annual Op-
portunities
Annual
Market
Value
Refuel $40M 20 $800M
Remove Inactive $41.9M 10.5 $440M
ORU Replacement $81M 4.4 $356M
General Repair $81M 3.8 $308M
GEO Retirement $10.9M 20 $218M
LEO To GEO Transfer $131M 1 $131M
Relocation In GEO $4.6M 13 $60M
Deployment Monitoring $1.4M 20 $28M
Deployment Assistance $84M 0.3 $25M
Health Monitoring $0 200 $0
Total $2,366M
Table 8.19: Expected Value Break-Even Servicing Fees
courage the prospects for a commercial servicing market, a single servicing vehicle is
unlikely to be efficient at performing in each of these missions areas. For instance,
a servicer providing relocation services is concerned primarily about propulsive ef-
ficiency. Transport of additional dexterous arms and equipment needed for other
mission types would only decrease the servicer’s effectiveness in this regime. The
question now becomes which segment to pursue first. This is a complex issue. Simply
picking the segment from Table 8.19 with the highest annual market value would
lead one towards the Refuel mission. However, other missions with higher payoffs per
target serviced are also attractive, such as LEO To GEO Transfer. Another useful
criterion to apply is to check for the minimum number of events per service type that
has occurred over the ten year period from 1984 to 2003. To be completely conserva-
tive, the Remove Inactive and Deployment Monitoring mission values are set to zero
as well due to the uncertainty of the expected benefits for those missions.
Table 8.20 shows the result of seeking the floor for the annual value of these
market segments. This shows that while the LEO To GEO Transfer service is a big
payoff, there have been years where no such failure occurred. This means that a
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servicer for this market segment would generate no revenue. Again we find Refuel at
the top of the value ranked list. Are there any other considerations for selecting a
first mission type? The next section will take a look at the complexity of the robotic
tasks required to accomplish the missions.
Service
Break-Even
Servicing Fee
Minimum
Annual Op-
portunities
Annual
Market
Value
Refuel $40M 6 $240M
GEO Retirement $10.9M 6 $65M
Relocation In GEO $4.6M 10 $46M
Deployment Monitoring $1.4M 18 $0
Remove Inactive $0 2 $0
ORU Replacement $81M 0 $0
General Repair $81M 0 $0
LEO To GEO Transfer $131M 0 $0
Deployment Assistance $84M 0 $0
Health Monitoring $0 200 $0
Total $351M
Table 8.20: Minimum Annual Servicing Market
8.4 Robotic Complexity
In addition to the primarily economic factors examined so far, this section reviews the
robotic complexity of the various servicing missions. Table 8.21 rank orders the mis-
sions in terms of increasing robotic task complexity. The “Video” column indicates
the need for a video system for inspection, docking, and dexterous operations. Future
satellites and servicer designed specifically for servicing could have such complimen-
tary designs so as to obviate the need for video, but such future vehicles are not part
of this consideration. The “Dock. Mech.” column refers to a docking mechanism
capable of attaching the servicer to the target. For GEO targets, this will likely be
accomplished via the launch interface ring on the base of the satellite or the AKM
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nozzle. While there is not a standard geometry for all GEO satellites, there are large
families of spacecraft with similar configurations. The “Dex. Arms” column shows
whether dexterous operations, beyond docking, are required to fulfill the mission re-
quirements. The “Dex. Task Variety” column indicates the variety in the tasks to
be performed by the dexterous arms included on the servicer. Finally, the “Robotic
Complexity” column is a basic stair-step rating that increments as a new robotic
capability is required. While an increment of one is shown between each rank, this is
not intended to imply that the robotic complexity (and cost) increases linearly along
the scale.
Dex.
Dock. Dex. Task Robotic
Mission Video Mech. Arms Variety Complexity
Deployment Monitoring x 1
Health Monitoring x 1
LEO to GEO Transfer x x 2
Retirement Maneuver x x 2
Relocate In GEO x x 2
Refuel x x x 1 3
Remove Inactive x x x 1+ 4
ORU-like Replacement x x x Varied 5
Deployment Assistance x x x Varied 5
General Repair x x x Complex 6
Table 8.21: Robotic Complexity By Mission
The simplest missions are the Deployment Monitoring and Health Monitoring
missions. These are likely secondary missions and are enabled by the video capa-
bility required for any of the other missions. The Deployment Assistance mission
opportunity is infrequent and is enabled by the dexterous capability achieved by ei-
ther the ORU-like Repair, General Repair, or perhaps the Remove Inactive servicer.
The task specific arms for the Refuel mission may not lead to an adaptable system
for Deployment Assistance. The Refuel servicer will perform a single task with its
arms. The Remove Inactive servicer will also be attempting only one type of task,
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namely grappling either inactive spacecraft or rocket debris and removing such from
an operational orbit. While this is one task type, the grasps required will likely vary
significantly, and the arms of this servicer will need more adaptability than those of
the Refuel servicer. Both the ORU-like Replacement and the Deployment Assistance
servicer will be performing a variety of tasks depending on the configuration of the
target. Finally, the General Repair servicer will include the most capable dexterous
manipulators in order to perform the most difficult type of repairs. This difficulty
rating is assessed both for the systemic nature of these types of failures and because
ambiguous and unknown failures are also included in this category.
Ranking the top three contenders from the previous section on this scale yields
a tie between Retirement Maneuver and Relocate In GEO as most desirable with
Refuel in the next echelon. Both Retirement and Relocation missions consist of ren-
dezvous, docking, and relocation operations. No additional dexterous robotic activity
is needed. For Refuel, the servicer must perform rendezvous and docking, as well as,
dexterous operations to access the fuel port and to transfer fuel.
How then to break the tie between Retirement and Relocation? Both provide
propulsive services and extend the useful lifetime of the target satellite. A final
discriminator is the nature of the target. For Relocation, the target satellite can be
in any stage of its life. A significant mishap during such a servicing mission could
affect the entire lifespan of an active satellite. Conversely, the Retirement missions
are by definition intended for satellites nearing the end of their useful lives.
This low risk mission provides an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the
technical and economic feasibility of telerobotic on-orbit satellite servicing. The
chance of success for this mission is high and the potential downside is low. Suc-
cess will increase the likelihood of opening and expanding the servicing market to the
additional more complex services previously defined. An illustration of the Retire-
ment mission performed by a proposed servicer is further evaluated in the following
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chapter. This analysis will reveal a profitable market segment reachable with current
technologies.
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Chapter 9
Demonstration Of The New Method
Having developed the expected-value break-even servicing fees for various missions in
Chapter 8 and having identified GEO Retirement from amongst these as the prime
candidate for an initial servicing market segment to be developed, this chapter demon-
strates the utility of the new feasibility method in conjunction with a proposed ser-
vicing system. In particular, a low mass, Mini-Class Servicer is investigated for its
viability to provide retirement services to geosynchronous spacecraft.
9.1 Servicer Description
The Mini-Class Servicer is a 300 kg dexterous servicing vehicle based on the SSL’s
100 kg dexterous MODSS servicing robot [40]. An extension of this design modified
to utilize a Ariane 5 “Mini” payload slot was explored in [91]. The Mini slots are
1.5m high and 1.5m in diameter [17]. Up to 4 Mini payloads can be accommodated
on the Ariane 5 ASAP5 auxiliary payload structure. An image of MODSS is shown
in Figure 9.1. While this image shows a multi-armed dexterous servicer, the Mini
design has a dedicated docking device in place of the manipulators. An additional
modification of the MODSS design was to increase the fuel capacity up to the Mini
class launch mass limit. Table 9.1 contains a mass breakout of the Mini-Servicer.
Components and masses are based on MODSS. The mass breakout for GasPod, a
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fuel delivery vehicle, is shown in Table 9.2. 10% mass margins for both vehicles were
maintained due to the preliminary nature of these designs.
Figure 9.1: MODSS Servicer [40]
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Component Unit Mass (kg) Qty Mass (kg)
Ring Docking Device 24 1 24
Batteries 4 1 4
Power 6 1 6
Solar Arrays 7 2 14
Processor 3 1 3
Pan-Tilt 2 1 2
Communications 3 1 3
Structure 10 1 10
Propulsion System 5 1 5
Propellants 20 1 19
Margin 9 1 10
Subtotal 100
Additional propellants 160
Additional tankage structure 20
Additional margin 20
Total Additional 200
Total Mass 300
Dry Mass 121
Total Fuel Mass 179
Fuel Mass Fraction 0.60
Table 9.1: Mini-Class Servicer Mass Breakout
Component Mass (kg)
Propellant 240
Vehicle 30
Margin 30
Total Mass 300
Dry Mass 60
Fuel Mass Fraction 0.80
Table 9.2: GasPod Mass Breakout
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9.2 Servicer Operations Concept
The targets for Mini-Class servicing operations are typical commercial geosynchronous
communications satellites near end of life. Given an assignment, the Mini will transi-
tion from a parking orbit (between geosynchronous and the graveyard) to a target in
geosynchronous. It will rendezvous and dock with the target and then transfer that
target to the graveyard orbit. Once there, the Mini will release the target and then
return to its parking orbit to await additional tasking.
The approach for this servicing concept is to launch the servicer and additional
fuel deliveries (GasPods) as auxiliary payloads on a geosynchronous launch vehicle.
For an Ariane 5, launch cost for a 300 kg “Mini” payload is quoted as 7.5 MEUR in
[17] in July, 2004, which coverts to $9.2M. After launch vehicle shut down in GTO,
the Mini transfers itself to geosynchronous and begins providing geosynchronous re-
tirement services. Between missions, the spacecraft parks in an orbit above geosyn-
chronous but below the graveyard orbit. As fuel is depleted, a GasPod is launched
and transfers itself to near geosynchronous. The Mini will then rendezvous with the
GasPod, transfer fuel to itself, remove the empty GasPod to the graveyard orbit, and
finally return to its parking orbit to await additional tasking. Note that a 1% chance
of refuel failure is used for the GasPod to Mini fuel transfer because the design of this
fuel transfer interface is fully controlled by the servicer designer (versus an unmodi-
fied ground fill port). Figure 9.2 shows the fuel accounting for the initial fuel load of
the servicer. Figure 9.3 shows the fuel accounting for the nth fuel load of the servicer.
Table 9.3 includes description of the columns in those two previous figures. Table 9.4
shows the fuel onboard the Mini at the end of each stage of operations. This table
illustrates the basic pattern of servicing until near fuel depletion and then refueling
from a GasPod. From this table, also note the expenditure of an average of 6.5 kg of
fuel per service provided. For a fee of $10.9M, this results in an unburdened value of
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$1.7M per kg of fuel expended. Given a delivery-only cost of $0.031M per kg (300 kg
Mini launched for $9.2M), a very large potential return can again be inferred.
Column Description
Trip Number of targets serviced
Svcr Initial Mass (kg) Total mass of the servicer at start of mission
Target Initial Mass (kg) Mass of the target satellite
Isp (s) Speciifc impulse of the servicer’s fuel
Park Alt (km) Altitude of parking orbit above GEO
GY Alt (km) Altitude of graveyard orbit above GEO
v Park To GEO (km/s) Delta-V for maneuver from parking orbit to GEO
m Park To GEO (kg) Fuel mass expended for Delta-V expended
Docking Fuel Cost (kg) Fuel mass expended in rendezvous and docking ops
Srvcr Mass (kg) Servicer mass in GEO
To GEO Mass (kg) Combined servicer and target vehicle mass
v GEO to GY (km/s) Delta-V for maneuver from GEO to graveyard orbit
m GEO to GY (kg) Fuel mass expended for Delta-V expended
Srvcr Mass (kg) Servicer mass after release of target vehicle
v GY to Park (km/s) Delta-V for graveyard orbit to parking orbit
m GY to Park (kg) Fuel mass expended for Delta-V expended
Srvcr Mass (kg) Servicer mass at end of mission
Fuel Mass (kg) Total expended fuel mass for mission
Table 9.3: Description Of Columns In Fuel Load Accounting
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Figure 9.2: Mini-Class First Fuel Load
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Figure 9.3: Mini-Class nth Fuel Load
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Mini Operations
Target
Serviced
Onboard
Fuel
Mass
(kg)
Fuel
Mass
Per
Service
(kg)
Note
At Launch 179.0 Launch
From GTO To Park 68.5
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 1 62.0 6.6
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 2 55.4 6.5
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 3 48.9 6.5
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 4 42.5 6.4
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 5 36.1 6.4
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 6 29.8 6.3
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 7 23.5 6.3
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 8 17.3 6.2
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 9 11.1 6.2
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 10 5.0 6.1
From Park To GasPod, GY, Park 139.0 Refuel
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 11 131.8 7.1
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 12 124.8 7.1
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 13 117.7 7.0
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 14 110.8 7.0
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 15 103.9 6.9
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 16 97.0 6.9
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 17 90.2 6.8
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 18 83.4 6.8
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 19 76.7 6.7
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 20 70.1 6.6 1 Yr.
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 21 63.5 6.6
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 22 57.0 6.5
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 23 50.5 6.5
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 24 44.0 6.4
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 25 37.6 6.4
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 26 31.3 6.3
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 27 25.0 6.3
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 28 18.8 6.2
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 29 12.6 6.2
From Park To GEO, GY, Park 30 6.4 6.1
From Park To GasPod, GY, Park 140.4 Refuel
Table 9.4: Mini Operations Fuel Accounting
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9.3 Application Of The New Feasibility Method-
ology
While the expected-value break-even servicing fees in the previous chapter were found
on a per mission basis, to evaluate a proposed servicer, the event probabilities for the
entire scenario must be linked together. The expected value per service is still the
same to the satellite’s operator, but here the value to the service providing organiza-
tion will be determined.
The costs to the servicing organization are shown in Table 9.5. First and nth
unit costs were found using the Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle Cost Model [35] which
is based on NAFCOM [15]. These models include launch and orbital operations
support costs for the first year of operations. To break out the annual operations
costs beyond the first year, small spacecraft CERs (applying twice the standard error
to be conservative) for operations costs from [106] were used.
Item Cost ($M)
Cost For The First Mini 53.9
Cost For The First GasPod 36.7
Annual Operations Costs (Beyond First Year) 3.3
Cost For The nth Mini 10.5
Cost For The nth GasPod 6.6
Launch Cost 9.2
Table 9.5: Mini Program Costs
Tables 9.6 and 9.7 show the application of the expected value method. The
“Event” column indicates the phase of Mini’s life. The “Cost, Benefit ($M)” column
indicates the cost or benefit accrued during that phase. The “Chance Of Failure”
column corresponds to the failure probabilities identified in the previous chapter. The
initial Launch failure probability (10.3%) is the sum of the chance of launch failure
(4.8%), the chance of wrong orbit (3.1%), and the chance of infant mortality (2.4%).
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The “Probability Of Continuing Success” column indicates likelihood of continuing
mission success. Because these are serial activities, each additional chance of failure
diminishes the chance of continuing success accordingly. The “Expected Value ($M)”
column indicates the expected value of the entries in the “Cost, Benefit ($M)” column
(vehicle and launch expenses are , of course, charged directly). Finally, the “Total
Expected Value ($M)” column indicates running total expected value of the serving
mission.
The expected value (“Total Expected Value ($M)” from Table 9.6) and the
unmodified costs and benefits (“Cost, Benefit ($M)”) are plotted in Figure 9.4. Here
one can see the difference between the new method and the old. The “Cost, Bene-
fits” line is a simple summation of scenario costs and benefits as they occur. This
then shows the predicted value for the servicing mission predicted by previous mod-
els. The lower line shows the more economically conservative prediction generated
using the expected value method. Because there are, on average, 20 GEO retirement
opportunities per year, this figure (with only 10 missions) encompasses about a half
a year of operations. Because the graveyard orbit and GEO orbit are both nearly
24 hour orbits, each of the transitions listed takes about a half a day. Therefore,
if the servicer were assigned a new task immediately after each previous task was
completed, it could perform nearly one service per day. Over the course of a 365 day
year there are only expected to be 20 such opportunities, therefore, this is a target
limited queue. Of course, rendezvous orbit phasing time must be accounted for, but
18 days per mission appears more than sufficient.
What does Figure 9.4 demonstrate? It shows economic feasibility of the pro-
posed servicer. Break-even is achieved after target 8 is retired. It also shows that
the new method is more conservative, hence realistic, than the old method where
break-even was predicted after target 6 was serviced. After 10 missions, the Mini’s
fuel supply is nearly exhausted. One could terminate operations here with a net gain.
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Figure 9.4: Expected Values By Target Serviced, First Mini
This scenario represents an annual expected value of $34.8M per year (two of these 10
mission sets). For Mini success throughout the scenario, the maximum annual value
is $91.8M per year (again, two mission sets).
Another option is to continue resupplying the Mini with fuel. Refueling the
servicer can be accomplished by launching a GasPod. After rendezvous, docking,
fuel transfer, and disposal of the GasPod, this will provide the Mini with fuel to
perform another 20 missions (see Figure 9.3 for fuel mass accounting). Figure 9.5
illustrates such a scenario. Note that the vehicle and launch cost for the GasPod
are assessed after mission 10 and operations costs for a second year are assessed just
after mission 20. Again, overall profitability is predicted. This scenario represents an
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annual expected value of $31.3M per year (two thirds of the value of the 30 mission
set). For Mini success throughout the scenario, the maximum annual value is $143.1M
per year (also two thirds of the value of the 30 mission set).
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Figure 9.5: Expected Values By Target Serviced, First Mini, First GasPod Added
Another view of the costs and expected values is shown in Figure 9.6. The
X-axis is accumulated total program costs (vehciles, launch, and operations) and the
Y-axis is accumulated total expected value (servicing fees). Totals above the diagonal
line represent profitability and those below represent a deficit. Break-even is shown to
occur after the 8th mission for the Mini alone. Adding a GasPod, the new break-even
occurs after mission 16.
The previous graphs were for the first Mini and first GasPod. Using the values
207
020
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Costs ($M)
E
x
p
ec
te
d
 V
al
u
es
 (
$
M
)
Mission #1
Mission #30
Mission #11Mission #10
PROFIT
LOSS
Figure 9.6: Expected Values Versus Costs For First Mini And First GasPod Scenario
from Table 9.5 for the nth versions, Figure 9.7 is generated. This indicates an even
higher expected profitability. Again, the lower line represents the expected value
given the operational hazards. Were the Mini and GasPod to accomplish this entire
scenario, the final profit of the upper line would be achieved. This scenario represents
an annual expected value of $82.5M per year (two thirds of the value of the 30 mission
set). For Mini success throughout the scenario, the maximum annual value is $192.1M
per year (also two thirds of the value of the 30 mission set).
Another view of the costs and expected values is shown in Figure 9.8. The
X-axis is accumulated total program costs (vehciles, launch, and operations) and the
Y-axis is accumulated total expected value (servicing fees). Totals above the diagonal
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Figure 9.7: Expected Values By Target Serviced, nth Mini, nth GasPod Added
line represent profitability and those below represent a deficit. Break-even is shown
to occur after the 3rd mission for the Mini alone. Adding a GasPod in this case does
not take the system back into deficit.
To check the sensitivity of these results to variations in pDockFail, Figure 9.9
shows the same scenario with a docking failure rate of 10% (with commensurately
reduced break-even servicing fees of $9.9M). This scenario represents an annual ex-
pected value of $15.1M per year (two thirds of the value of the 30 mission set). For
Mini success throughout the scenario, the maximum annual value is $172.1M per year.
Given how the expected value curve flattens out, this indicates that this is nearing
the maximum rate that pDockFail can have while still remaining a feasible scenario.
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Figure 9.8: Expected Values Versus Costs For nth Mini And nth GasPod Scenario
Still, this demonstration of the expected value approach for assessing servicing sce-
narios is shown to be more economically conservative than the standard approach.
Also, the analysis shown in this chapter indicates that the proposed servicer design
merits further development.
A further examination of pDockFail from 1 to 15% is shown in Table 9.8.
Again the flat curve at 10% indicates marginal profitability and 15% line shows no
chance of long term viability.
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Figure 9.9: Expected Values By Target Serviced, nth Mini, nth GasPod Added,
pDockFail is 10%
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Event
Cost,
Benefit
($M)
Chance
Of
Failure
Probability
Of
Continuing
Success
Expected
Value
($M)
Total
Expected
Value
($M)
First Mini -53.9 -53.9 -53.9
Launch -9.2 0.103 0.897 -9.2 -63.1
Mini To Park 0.006 0.892 -63.1
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.886 -63.1
Dock 0.01 0.877 -63.1
Mini To GY 0.006 0.872 -63.1
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.872 9.5 -53.6
Undock 0.01 0.863 -53.6
Mini To Park 0.006 0.858 -53.6
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.853 -53.6
Dock 0.01 0.845 -53.6
Mini To GY 0.006 0.839 -53.6
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.839 9.2 -44.4
Undock 0.01 0.831 -44.4
Mini To Park 0.006 0.826 -44.4
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.821 -44.4
Dock 0.01 0.813 -44.4
Mini To GY 0.006 0.808 -44.4
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.808 8.8 -35.6
Undock 0.01 0.800 -35.6
Mini To Park 0.006 0.795 -35.6
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.790 -35.6
Dock 0.01 0.783 -35.6
Mini To GY 0.006 0.778 -35.6
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.778 8.5 -27.2
Undock 0.01 0.770 -27.2
Mini To Park 0.006 0.765 -27.2
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.761 -27.2
Dock 0.01 0.753 -27.2
Mini To GY 0.006 0.749 -27.2
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.749 8.2 -19.0
Table 9.6: Mini Scenario, Expected Value Accounting
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Event
Cost,
Benefit
($M)
Chance
Of
Failure
Probability
Of
Continuing
Success
Expected
Value
($M)
Total
Expected
Value
($M)
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.749 8.2 -19.0
Undock 0.01 0.741 -19.0
Mini To Park 0.006 0.737 -19.0
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.732 -19.0
Dock 0.01 0.725 -19.0
Mini To GY 0.006 0.721 -19.0
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.721 7.9 -11.1
Undock 0.01 0.713 -11.1
Mini To Park 0.006 0.709 -11.1
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.705 -11.1
Dock 0.01 0.698 -11.1
Mini To GY 0.006 0.694 -11.1
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.694 7.6 -3.6
Undock 0.01 0.687 -3.6
Mini To Park 0.006 0.683 -3.6
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.679 -3.6
Dock 0.01 0.672 -3.6
Mini To GY 0.006 0.668 -3.6
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.668 7.3 3.7
Undock 0.01 0.661 3.7
Mini To Park 0.006 0.657 3.7
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.653 3.7
Dock 0.01 0.647 3.7
Mini To GY 0.006 0.643 3.7
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.643 7.0 10.7
Undock 0.01 0.636 10.7
Mini To Park 0.006 0.632 10.7
Mini To GEO 0.006 0.629 10.7
Dock 0.01 0.622 10.7
Mini To GY 0.006 0.619 10.7
Servicing Fee 10.9 0.619 6.7 17.4
Table 9.7: Mini Scenario, Expected Value Accounting, Continued
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Table 9.8: Mini Scenario By Docking Failure Rate
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
An improved method for evaluating the feasibility of telerobotic on-orbit satellite
servicing was developed and demonstrated in this research. This chapter includes
discussion of the discoveries made during the effort, a description of the contributions
of this work to the state of the art, recommendations for additional research, and a
final summary.
10.1 Results
Overall, the key discovery of this dissertation is the determination of the annual
expected value break-even servicing fees for the various servicing market segments
listed in Table 8.19. It shows that there are tens of servicing opportunities per year
with total values in the $100M’s. Rather than simply pointing to the substantial
sunk costs invested in geosynchronous communications satellites, this study provides
an improved analytical basis for evaluating any proposed servicing system. After
identifying a logical initial market segment to pursue, a final important finding is
that a small, low mass, low cost servicer providing retirement maneuvers is a viable
first step on the path to a servicing industry. The conclusions reached are discussed
in more detail in the following subsections.
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10.1.1 Assessment Of Previous Studies
Previous studies did not fully account for operational uncertainties. While they did
account for the primary economic considerations of evaluating the costs and benefits
of servicing versus replacement, they did not fully include the chance of failure in
either scenario. Chance of launch failure, chance of servicing mishaps, and other
hazards must be included to arrive at a more accurate evaluation of the economic
comparison between the two options. The new method developed here addresses
these operational uncertainties.
Previous studies did not include a comprehensive analysis of actual spacecraft
lifetimes and failure events. These studies would typically pick a representative space-
craft and perform their analysis on that target. Conclusions would then be extended
to the greater population of satellites with little consideration of whether the chosen
sample satellite truly represented the median satellite or was in fact skewed to one
end of the spectrum of spacecraft characteristics. In contrast, this analysis gathered
information on all satellites and then used that knowledge to identify the average
satellite to be used for analysis. This directly improves the accuracy of predictive
capabilities of the new model over the previous approaches.
10.1.2 Identification Of Servicing Opportunities
Constructing a comprehensive spacecraft database was a critical component of this
research. In the end, the spacecraft database contained information for 6,032 space-
craft launched from 1957 thru 2003. Overall, there were 20 fully populated mandatory
fields per satellite and the database itself had over 300,000 filled fields with a total
loading of 36% (ratio of populated fields to all fields). Key characteristics such as
mass, fuel mass, orbital location, end of life information, transponder counts and
others were accumulated.
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Collecting and analyzing thousands of satellite orbital histories was essential
to the understanding of operational lives of actual spacecraft. Sample plots of this
data are included at the end of Appendix E. Over 10,000 such plots were generated in
the analysis. A few hundred of these plots in particular provided key information on
the relocation history of various high-value geosynchronous spacecraft. This history
in turn enabled an assessment of the annual geosynchronous relocation market.
Constructing a comprehensive on-orbit failures database was also accomplished.
The issue here was not in quantity of information but in paucity. Satellite manufac-
turers are understandably reluctant to publish any issues with their products. While
some failure information was accumulated during the construction of the satellite in-
formation database, additional effort was directed at thoroughly investigating space
industry news, magazines, books, annual reports, and websites for every report of
satellite anomalies. Discovered information varied widely level of detail.
A number of surprising trends, directly affecting opportunities for servicing,
in spacecraft characteristics were discovered from investigation into the spacecraft
information database. For instance, a non-intuitive finding is that transponder band-
width is not rising over time, rather geosynchronous communication spacecraft de-
signs are growing larger and incorporating more transponders. This enables growth in
the total bandwidth per spacecraft without a substantial growth in per transponder
bandwidth. For servicers, a servicing-positive observation is that even with the slow
down in geosynchronous launches over the previous few years, there has not been
a year since 1986 in which there were less active satellites than the previous year,
thus indicating a continuing demand for geosynchronous communications satellites.
Such demand is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to even consider a servicing
system in that orbital regime. Another key trend is that a substantial number of
spacecraft tend to outlive their design lives (by 30.0% of design life on average for
geosynchronous communications satellites). Because initial fuel loads are sized to
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meet spacecraft design life, this trend leads naturally to a motivation to investigate
refueling or other propulsive services.
10.1.2.1 Opportunities To Service On-Orbit Failures
Analysis of the on-orbit failures database identified a variety of failure servicing op-
portunities. In Table 7.13 it was shown that nearly once a year a high value spacecraft
intended for geosynchronous orbit fails to be delivered to the correct orbit. While
some of these spacecraft were able to utilize onboard resources to achieve proper orbit,
they did so with a significantly reduced lifetime fuel load. Others were left in such low
orbits that they were abandoned or commanded to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere
for controlled disposal. Opportunities for dexterous servicing such as deployment as-
sistance, ORU-like repairs, and systemic repairs were also identified and occur with
single digits of annual frequency.
For failure-only servicing, a dexterous servicer is strongly indicated by the
percent of failures by type. Table 7.10 shows that nearly 60% of serviceable failures
require a dexterous servicer.
10.1.2.2 Opportunities For Spacecraft Lifetime Extension
Analysis of the spacecraft information database revealed a number of lifetime exten-
sion servicing opportunities. The spacecraft information database and the associated
orbital history files detail a steady number of annual opportunities to provide propul-
sive services to existing spacecraft. Any maneuver requiring a significant amount of
lifetime fuel that can be performed by a servicer will enable the target spacecraft
to conserve its fuel for other essential lifetime needs. Identified maneuvers include
relocation in the operational orbit (20 per year) and a retirement maneuver out of
the active orbit (about 20 per year). Refueling is also an attractive, though more
dexterously challenging, servicing option (also 20 per year).
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10.1.3 Determination Of Expected Value Outcomes And Prob-
abilities
Application of the new method requires historical spacecraft operations information
along with estimates of servicing failure rates. In order to evaluate the opportuni-
ties identified with the new servicing feasibility method, economic values for various
servicing outcomes (Section 8.2) and probabilities (Section 8.1) of those outcomes
occurring are required. For operations applicable to both replacement satellites and
servicers (such as launch), the database provides a definitive chance of failure. New
servicing operational uncertainties (such as docking) must currently be estimated,
though sensitivity analysis of profitability to such parameters can now be performed
with this new formulation of the satellite servicing problem.
10.1.4 Assessment Of Servicing Markets
Evaluation of the identified servicing opportunities using the new method allowed
the establishment of an average annual servicing market size by mission type. Table
8.19 shows these values with a total annual expected value of $2.4B, which is an
economically significant result. After finding a minimum annual market segment size,
taking robotic complexity and target vehicle time of life into account, geosynchronous
retirement service was identified as a prime candidate as the first mission type to
consider.
10.1.5 Evaluation Of A Proposed Servicer
Utilization of the new method for evaluating the feasibility of a proposed servicing
system enabled an assessment based on real-world spacecraft cost-benefits including
accounting for operational uncertainties. This new approach yielded a more accurate
result than can be produced by previous methods. The proposed Mini-Class servicer
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was found to break-even after providing retirement services to 8 targets.
10.1.6 Parametric Analysis Of The Required Docking Suc-
cess Rate
Another important result is the determination that, for the geosynchronous retirement
mission, the chance of successful docking must be 90% or better to yield a profitable
system. Figure 9.9 in particular shows how the expected value curve for a system
with a 10% chance of docking failure flattens out to become, at best, marginally
profitable. This finding has immediate implications for servicing vehicle designers.
Failure to implement a system with a less than 90% chance of docking success will
result in an economically inviable system.
10.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation to the state of the art concerning assess-
ing the feasibility of servicing is reformulation of the standard approach. Evaluating
the satellite servicing problem with the new method enables a more real-world deci-
sion. By incorporating expected value calculations into the assessment of servicing
scenarios, the approach developed in this dissertation allows for the inclusion of previ-
ously unaccounted for possibilities of failure for both the servicing and non-servicing
scenarios. This is an essential feature that enables more informed economic decision-
making when considering satellite servicing. Additional contributions are discussed
in the following subsections.
10.2.1 Market Segment Selection
By defining and fully populating the annual satellite servicing market segmented
by mission type, this dissertation enables potential satellite servicing organizations
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to better decide which market segment to pursue first. Based on largest minimum
anticipated market value, minimum robotic complexity, and minimum potential tar-
get spacecraft lifetime impact, retirement services for geosynchronous spacecraft was
identified as the segment with which to start.
10.2.2 Operational Uncertainties
Identification and then determination or estimation of the entire set of probabilities
of failure for operations in both the servicing and non-servicing scenarios has not been
published before this dissertation. By collecting and analyzing historical spacecraft
operations information, the failure probabilities for standard spacecraft operations
were found. Because such operations have not yet been conducted, estimates for
servicer-only operational failures were assigned preliminary values.
10.2.3 On-Orbit Failures By Type
Another valuable contribution is the determination of the historical percent of ser-
viceable failures by failure type (Table 7.10). This breakout shows that for failure
servicing (but not lifetime extension servicing) a dexterous servicer is required to
fulfill the majority of the opportunities.
10.2.4 Overall Servicing Market Characterization
Application of the new method to the entire set of current spacecraft enabled the
development of an annual satellite servicing market assessment based on break-even
servicing fees (Table 8.19). These fees show the value of servicing to the satellite
operators in the face of potential operational failures. Because these operational
uncertainties are included, this is a more realistic approach than the standard form.
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10.2.5 Feasibility Demonstration
Demonstration of the new method for a proposed servicer illustrates the utility of the
method and the positive prospects for satellite servicing, including annual expected
profit values in the $10M’s range for a small servicer providing retirement services
for geosynchronous satellites. Because this is a less dexterously intensive option, a
low mass, low cost servicer design is found to be both technically and economically
feasible.
10.2.6 Determination Of Technology Performance Require-
ments
Determination of 10% as the cutoff value for the chance of docking failure in the
geosynchronous retirement scenario is an important result. This informs servicer
designers as to what level of performance is required in the reliability of future tech-
nology in order to justify such missions.
10.3 Recommendations
While the chance of launch anomalies and other failures applicable to current space-
craft are well documented here, developing a better estimate for the chances of dock-
ing failure (pDockFail) and other servicer related operations will make this an even
stronger tool. Because these are new activities, there is no historical database of op-
erational outcomes for on-orbit telerobotic servicing. Further simulation and analysis
of such operations is needed. Upcoming full 6 DOF docking simulations at the NRL
robotics test-bed should begin to provide more accurate estimates of the probability
of success for these operations.
In order to assess the near term viability of telerobotic on-orbit satellite ser-
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vicing, this research was conducted with an eye towards servicing currently operating
spacecraft. The redesign of future spacecraft to more readily accommodate servicing
(such as refueling or ORU changeout) will greatly facilitate servicing, decrease the
required robotic complexity, and reduce the chance of servicing mishaps. Application
of the new method defined here to next-generation serviceable spacecraft will produce
more economically realistic servicing assessments for those systems.
10.4 Final Summary
In this dissertation, an improved formulation of the satellite servicing equation has
been established. By incorporating operational uncertainties into the servicing deci-
sion, a more accurate assessment is now possible. Determination of actual spacecraft
failure rates and opportunities for lifetime extension based on the analysis of histori-
cal spacecraft operations provides a much more realistic method than any previously
shown. The overall expected value market assessment and evaluation of a proposed
small servicer for geosynchronous retirement operations clearly demonstrate the eco-
nomic feasibility of telerobotic on-orbit satellite servicing.
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Appendix A
Satellite Trends
The figures containing satellite populations by market, populations by orbit, and
inclined lifetime surveys included in this appendix are derived from information in
the satellite information database.
A.1 Satellites By Market
This section shows breakouts of payloads by market, where the markets are Civilian
(CIV), Commercial (CML), and Military (MIL). A small number of payloads have
been flown by Non-Governmental Organizations as well, but are not shown here. The
civilian market includes government sponsored scientific, weather, and other satellites.
224
Figure A.1: Payloads By Market
Figure A.2: Military Payloads By Country
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Figure A.3: Russian Military Payloads By Orbit
Figure A.4: United States Military Payloads By Orbit
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Figure A.5: Military Payloads By Orbit
Figure A.6: Civilian Payloads By Country
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Figure A.7: Commercial Payloads By Country
Figure A.8: Civilian Payloads By Orbit
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Figure A.9: Commercial Payloads By Orbit
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A.2 Satellites By Orbit
Figure A.10: Payloads By Orbit
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Figure A.11: Commercial Payloads - IGO Breakout
Figure A.12: Commercial Payloads Minus IGOs
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The following figures show the population density of various orbital locations.
Figure A.13: Orbital Location Of All Spacecraft Near Earth
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Figure A.14: Orbital Location Of Active Spacecraft In LEO
Figure A.15: Orbital Location Of Active Spacecraft In MEO
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Figure A.16: Orbital Location Of Active Spacecraft In GEO
Figure A.17: Orbital Location Of Active Spacecraft In Molniya Orbits
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A.3 Geosynchronous Satellite Lifetimes
The following figures show the active (uninclined) life and inclined life for geosyn-
chronous communications satellites that operated in an inclined mode.
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Figure A.18: Lifetimes Of Inclined Commercial Communications Satellites Launched
Between 1980 And 1985
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Figure A.19: Lifetimes Of Inclined Commercial Communications Satellites Launched
From 1986 Onwards
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Appendix B
Geosynchronous Communications Satellite
Revenues
This appendix includes commercial geosynchronous communications satellite revenue.
Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3 show the annual revenues for the top 10 satellite operators for
the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. Combining the average annual revenue per satellite
with the average transponder count per satellite (from Figure 6.2), Table B.4 shows
the revenue per transponder and the monthly satellite revenue. These quantities are
used elsewhere in this analysis.
Satellite Operator Country
2001
Revenue
($M)
Satellites
Revenue
Per Sat.
($M)
SES Global Luxembourg 1,162.2 29 40
Intelsat US 1,100.0 22 50
PanAmSat US 870.1 21 41
Eutelsat France 593.5 18 33
Loral Space & Comm. US 388.9 7 56
JSAT Japan 298.2 8 37
New Skies Satellites Netherlands 209.0 6 35
Telesat Canada Canada 201.6 5 40
Space Comm. Corp. Japan 170.8 4 43
Shin Satellite Thailand 116.8 3 39
Total 5,111.1 123 41.6
Table B.1: Satellite Revenues For The Top 10 Satellite Operators For 2001 [33]
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Satellite Operator Country
2002
Revenue
($M)
Satellites
Revenue
Per Sat.
($M)
SES Global Luxembourg 1,410.0 29 49
Intelsat U.S. 992.0 26 38
PanAmSat U.S. 812.3 23 35
Eutelsat France 690.8 23 30
Loral Space & Comm. U.S. 391.2 7 56
JSAT Japan 380.8 8 48
Space Comm. Corp. Japan 218.7 4 55
Telesat Canada Canada 207.4 5 41
New Skies Satellites Netherlands 200.5 6 33
Shin Satellite Thailand 115.5 3 39
Total 5,419.2 134 40.4
Table B.2: Satellite Revenues For The Top 10 Satellite Operators For 2002 [33]
Satellite Operator Country
2003
Revenue
($M)
Satellites
Revenue
Per Sat.
($M)
SES Global Luxembourg 1,520.0 30 51
Intelsat US 1,100.0 26 42
Eutelsat France 954.0 24 40
PanAmSat US 831.0 21 40
JSAT Japan 421.0 9 47
Telesat Canada Canada 266.2 6 44
Space Comm. Corp. Japan 241.9 5 48
New Skies Satellites Netherlands 214.9 5 43
Loral Space & Comm. US 152.4 4 38
Shin Satellite Thailand 146.5 3 49
Total 5,847.9 133 44.0
Table B.3: Satellite Revenues For The Top 10 Satellite Operators For 2003 [33]
Year
Revenue
Per
Satellite
($M)
Transponders
Per Satellite
Revenue Per
Transponder
($M)
Revenue Per
Satellite Per
Month ($M)
2001 41.6 28.0 1.5 3.5
2002 40.4 30.0 1.3 3.4
2003 44.0 30.8 1.4 3.7
Table B.4: Average Geosynchronous Communications Satellite Revenues
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Appendix C
On-Orbit Satellite Failures
This appendix includes spacecraft and anomaly information for reported on-orbit
spacecraft failures. Table C.1 lists insurance claims for failure events from 1984
through 2003. Table C.2 lists the estimated value of uninsured losses for spacecraft
which experienced mission ending failures. Claims for launch vehicle failures are not
included. A number of spacecraft that experienced on-orbit failures were also not
included. Omitted types of spacecraft include spacecraft with failures that occurred
after the end of their published design life, spacecraft that exploded or inadvertently
re-entered, and low mass, low cost experimental spacecraft. Additionally, Russian
and Chinese government satellites are not included.
While the first two tables address failures and economic losses, Table C.3 shows
additional on-orbit failures. These failures either did not result in loss of vehicle or
did not include sufficient financial information to include them in the first two tables.
Year
Satellite Loss Claims Total
# Year Name Cause Level ($M) ($M)
1 1984 Westar 6 Wrong Orbit Retrieved 105
2 1984 Palapa B2 Wrong Orbit Retrieved 56
3 1984 Intelsat 509 Wrong Orbit Total 102 263
4 1985 Arabsat 1D Unknown Partial 5
5 1985 Leasat 3 Wrong Orbit Repaired 20
6 1985 Leasat 4 Payload Total 84 109
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Year
Satellite Loss Claims Total
# Year Name Cause Level ($M) ($M)
7 1987 TVSat 1 Solar Array Total 51 51
8 1988 GStar 3 Wrong Orbit Partial 65 65
9 1989 INSAT 1C Solar Array Partial 68 68
10 1993 UFO 1 Wrong Orbit Total 187.7 188
11 1994 Anik E2 Attitude Control Partial 4.5 5
12 1995 AMSC 1 Payload Partial 66
13 1995 Europe*Star B Wrong Orbit Partial 64.4 130
14 1996 Anatolia 1 Attitude Control Partial 32
15 1996 Asiasat 2 Antenna Partial 36
16 1996 Anik E1 Solar Array Partial 142.5
17 1996 Chinasat 7 Wrong Orbit Total 120
18 1996 SPOT 3 Attitude Control Total 13
19 1996 Hot Bird 2 Fuel Depletion Partial 19.9 363
20 1997 Telstar 401 Power System Total 132.5
21 1997 Intelsat 801 Fuel Depletion Partial 27
22 1997 MSAT M1 Payload Partial 109
23 1997 JCSat 4 Payload Partial 21
24 1997 Tempo 2 Solar Array Partial 21.4
25 1997 B-SAT 1A Payload Partial 17
26 1997 Iridium 921 Unknown Total 18
27 1997 PAS 6 Solar Array Partial 37.5
28 1997 INSAT 2D Power System Total 62.1
29 1997 Hispasat 1A Payload Partial 17
30 1997 HGS-1 Wrong Orbit Total 215
31 1997 EarlyBird Power System Total 29 707
32 1998 TDF 2 Payload Partial 2
33 1998 Iridium 44 Unknown Total 29.5
34 1998 Skynet 4D Payload Partial 17
35 1998 UFO 8 Payload Partial 2
36 1998 Iridium 914 Unknown Total 29.5
37 1998 Iridium 911 Unknown Total 29.5
38 1998 Iridium 920 Unknown Total 29.5
39 1998 Iridium 48 Unknown Total 29.5
40 1998 Iridium 69 Unknown Total 29.5
41 1998 Iridium 24 Unknown Total 29.5
42 1998 Hispasat 1B Payload Partial 2.5
43 1998 COMETS Wrong Orbit Partial 8
44 1998 Indostar 1 Battery Partial 25
45 1998 Iridium 71 Unknown Total 29.5
46 1998 Echostar 4 Solar Array Partial 219.3
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Year
Satellite Loss Claims Total
# Year Name Cause Level ($M) ($M)
47 1998 Galaxy 4 Control Processor Total 160
48 1998 Arabsat 2C Battery Partial 185
49 1998 JCSat 1 Fuel Depletion Partial 25.5
50 1998 Sirius 2 Power System Partial 23
51 1998 Afristar Payload Partial 5
52 1998 PAS 8 Antenna Partial 68 978
53 1999 INSAT 2E Payload Partial 23
54 1999 Orion 3 Wrong Orbit Total 265
55 1999 Galaxy 11 Solar Array Total 286 574
56 2000 Garuda 1 Antenna Partial 101.5
57 2000 INSAT 3B Unknown Partial 22
58 2000 Solidaridad 1 Control Processor Total 250
59 2000 PAS 1R Solar Array Total 343
60 2000 Galaxy 7 Control Processor Total 130
61 2000 TDRS 8 Payload Partial 98 945
62 2001 Artemis Wrong Orbit Partial 75
63 2001 PAS 7 Solar Array Partial 215
64 2001 Arabsat 3A Solar Array Partial 171 461
65 2002 Anik F1 Solar Array Total 136.2
66 2002 Astra 1K Wrong Orbit Total 217 353
67 2003 Nimiq 2 Power System Partial 49.8
68 2003 ADEOS 2 Solar Array Total 3 53
Table C.1: Insurance Payouts For On-Orbit Satellite
Failures
Year
Satellite Loss Value Total
# Year Name Cause Level ($M) ($M)
1 1988 Telecom 1B Attitude Control Total 66.2 66.2
2 1993 NOAA 13 Power System Total 148.4 148.4
3 1995 DFS 1 Unknown Total 53.1 53.1
4 1996 Navstar 20 Attitude Control Total 23.0
5 1996 TDF 1 Attitude Control Total 1.2 24.3
6 1997 Iridium 27 Unknown Total 15.0
7 1997 Navstar 25 Unknown Total 35.0
8 1997 ADEOS Solar array Total 463.4
9 1997 STEP M4 Solar array Total 66.0 579.4
10 1998 Iridium 79 Unknown Total 16.0 16.0
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Year
Satellite Loss Value Total
# Year Name Cause Level ($M) ($M)
11 1999 WIRE Payload Total 89.0
12 1999 DSP 19 Wrong Orbit Total 625.0
13 1999 USA 143 Wrong Orbit Total 1,233.0 1,947.0
14 2000 Globalstar M064 Unknown Total 34.5
15 2000 INSAT 2B Fuel Depletion Total 20.3 54.8
16 2001 GSAT 1 Fuel Depletion Total 35.0
17 2001 BSAT 2B Wrong Orbit Total 142.5 177.5
18 2003 Telstar 402R Power System Total 59.6 59.6
Table C.2: Estimated Losses For Uninsured On-Orbit
Satellite Failures
Satellite Failure Value
# Year Name Cause Level ($M)
1 1986 BS-2B Payload, Comm Major
2 1988 San Marco 5 Payload, Sensor Partial
3 1988 USA 031 Wrong Orbit Unknown
4 1989 HIPPARCOS Wrong Orbit Partial
5 1990 Intelsat 603 Wrong Orbit Repaired 260
6 1990 BS-3A Solar array, Deploy Partial 171
7 1990 DMSP 1O Wrong Orbit Minor
8 1990 Superbird A Fuel Depletion Lifetime 149
9 1991 CRRES Battery Total
10 1992 SPOT 2 Payload, Data Partial
11 1993 Eutelsat 104 Payload, Comm Partial 75
12 1993 Olympus 1 Fuel Depletion Lifetime
13 1994 Anik E1 Attitude, Wheel Redundancy 174
14 1994 Eutelsat 105 Payload, Comm Partial 75
15 1994 ETS 6 Wrong Orbit Major 668
16 1995 NOAA 14 Payload, Sensor Partial
17 1995 Skipper Solar array Total
18 1996 Turksat 1C Unknown Unknown 157
19 1997 Intelsat 709 Payload, Comm Partial 208
20 1997 SAX Attitude, Wheel Minor 431
21 1997 GOES 8 Attitude, Wheel Partial 195
22 1997 GOES 10 Solar array Major 290
23 1997 Agila 2 Wrong Orbit Minor 290
24 1997 IRS 1D Wrong Orbit Major
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Satellite Failure Value
# Year Name Cause Level ($M)
25 1998 Spacenet 4 Payload, Comm Partial 160
26 1998 Equator S Control Processor Total
27 1998 Echostar 3 Power Partial 202
28 1998 DirecTV 1 Control Processor Redundancy 247
29 1998 GOES 9 Attitude, Wheel Major 290
30 1998 Galaxy 7 Control Processor Redundancy 235
31 1998 PAS 4 Control Processor Redundancy 198
32 1998 Galaxy 8i Battery Minor 250
33 1998 Anatolia 1 Battery Partial 154
34 1998 TOMS EP Fuel Depletion Minor 56
35 1998 HGS-1 Battery Partial 170
36 1999 GE 3 Attitude, Wheel Minor 200
37 1999 Solidaridad 1 Control Processor Redundancy 152
38 1999 ABRIXAS Battery Total 38
39 1999 Arabsat 2D Solar array Partial 306
40 1999 Telkom 1 Solar array Minor 165
41 1999 Radarsat Attitude, Wheel Redundancy 526
42 2000 CBERS 1 Payload, Sensor Partial 180
43 2000 NOAA 15 Payload, Sensor Partial 135
44 2000 CHAMP Collision Minor
45 2000 Galaxy 8i Propulsion, Xenon Lifetime 250
46 2000 NOAA 16 Payload, Comm Partial
47 2001 EchoStar 6 Propulsion Partial 250
48 2001 GSAT 1 Wrong Orbit Lifetime
49 2001 Galaxy 3R Control Processor Redundancy 230
50 2001 Telstar 6 Control Processor Redundancy 220
51 2001 Echostar 5 Attitude, Wheel Redundancy 205
52 2001 FUSE 1 Attitude, Wheel Redundancy 150
53 2001 FUSE 1 Attitude, Wheel Minor 150
54 2002 TDRS 9 Propulsion Partial 298
55 2002 Telstar 6 Collision Minor 220
56 2002 DirecTV 3 Control Processor Redundancy 275
57 2002 Echostar 5 Solar array Partial 205
58 2002 EchoStar 6 Solar array Partial 250
59 2002 Echostar 8 Propulsion Partial 235
60 2002 DRTS Wrong Orbit Minor 311
61 2002 MSG 1 Payload, Comm Partial 233
62 2003 Thaicom 3 Solar array Partial 200
63 2003 AMSC 1 Payload, Comm Partial 262
64 2003 Landsat 7 Payload, Sensor Major 563
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Satellite Failure Value
# Year Name Cause Level ($M)
65 2003 ICESat Payload, Sensor Minor 202
66 2003 Galaxy 4R Propulsion, Xenon Lifetime 240
67 2003 PAS 6B Propulsion, Xenon Lifetime 240
68 2003 E-Bird Antenna Partial 140
69 2003 Echostar 5 Attitude, Wheel Partial 205
Table C.3: Additional Significant On-Orbit Satellite Fail-
ures
245
Appendix D
Spacecraft Self-Rescues
This appendix includes altitude and inclination histories for spacecraft that were de-
livered to incorrect initial orbits. Similar spacecraft launched on analogous launch
vehicles are shown for comparison. The horizontal “Days” axis is days since launch.
All of these histories generally show that it took days to reach the correct altitude and
that the spacecraft generally began inclined operations earlier than a similar space-
craft. Table D.1 shows the spacecraft that recovered and those used for comparison.
Orbital data was derived as described in Appendix E.
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Satellite Spacecraft Launch Similar Spacecraft Launch
Name Bus Vehicle Satellite Bus Vehicle
GStar 3 GE-3000 Ariane 3 GSTAR 2 GE-3000 Ariane 3
UFO 1 HS-601 Atlas 1 GOES 8 FS-1300 Atlas 1
Koreasat 1 GE-3000 Delta 7925 Koreasat 2 GE-3000 Delta 7925
Agila 2 FS-1300 Long
March
CZ-3B
Apstar 2R FS-1300 Long
March
CZ-3B
HGS-1 HS-601HP Proton
K/DM-2M
Used Lu-
nary Flyby
GSAT 1 GSAT GSLV GSAT 2 GSAT GSLV
Artemis Artemis Ariane 5 Eurobird Spacebus
3000B2
Ariane 5
DRTS DS-2000 H-2A None Simi-
lar
Table D.1: GEO Bound Spacecraft That Recovered From Incorrect Initial Orbits
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Figure D.1: GSTAR 3 Altitude History
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Figure D.2: GSTAR 3 Inclination History
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Figure D.3: UFO 1 Altitude History
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Figure D.4: UFO 1 Inclination History
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Figure D.5: Koreasat 1 Altitude History
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Figure D.6: Koreasat 1 Inclination History
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Figure D.7: Agila 2 Altitude History
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Figure D.8: Agila 2 Inclination History
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Figure D.9: ARTEMIS Altitude History, First 2 Weeks
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Figure D.10: ARTEMIS Inclination History, First 2 Years
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Appendix E
Satellite Orbital Information
For the orbital analysis of this dissertation, information was obtained from the NASA
GSFC Orbital Information Group [26]. The information is transmitted as Two Line
Element (TLE) sets. The TLE format is shown in Section E.1. This information
was filtered, parsed, and converted into a more useable form. It was then analyzed
and converted to plots of daily orbital information by satellite. These processes are
listed in Section E.2. About 10,000 such plots were generated with an emphasis on
geosynchronous satellites.
E.1 NORAD Two-Line Element Set Format
The two line element format is shown below. A character ruler is shown above the
two sample lines. In Table E.1 and Table E.2, for signed values, only negative values
are flagged with a minus sign, positive values have a space. The first time derivative
of the mean motion is in revolution per day-squared. Ballistic coefficient is in meters-
squared per kilogram. All orbital elements are referred to the mean equator and
equinox of date.
0000000001111111111222222222233333333334444444444555555555566666666667
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
1 NNNNNU NNNNNAAA NNNNN.NNNNNNNN +.NNNNNNNN +NNNNN-N +NNNNN-N N NNNNN
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Column Description
1 Line Number of Element Data
03-07 Satellite Number
8 Classification (U=Unclassified)
10-11 International Designator (Last two digits of launch year)
12-14 International Designator (Launch number of the year)
15-17 International Designator (Piece of the launch)
19-20 Epoch Year (Last two digits of year)
21-32 Epoch (Day of the year and fractional portion of the day)
34-43 First Time Derivative of the Mean Motion
45-52 Second Time Derivative of Mean Motion (decimal point assumed)
54-61 BSTAR drag term (decimal point assumed)
63 Ephemeris type
65-68 Element number
69 Checksum (Modulo 10)
Table E.1: NORAD Two-Line Element Set Format [64], [26] - Line 1
Column Description
1 Line Number of Element Data
03-07 Satellite Number
09-16 Inclination [Degrees]
18-25 Right Ascension of the Ascending Node [Degrees]
27-33 Eccentricity (decimal point assumed)
35-42 Argument of Perigee [Degrees]
44-51 Mean Anomaly [Degrees]
53-63 Mean Motion [Revs per day]
64-68 Revolution number at epoch [Revs]
69 Checksum (Modulo 10)
Table E.2: NORAD Two-Line Element Set Format [64], [26] - Line 2
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E.2 Orbital Element Analysis Programs
In order to analyze satellite lifetime maneuvers, a number of programs were written
to convert the TLEs into more useable format.
# Program Description
1 ParseOIGdata Convert the TLEs to classical orbital elements (apogee,
perigee, etc.).
2 GEOlongs Analyze the longitude history of geosynchronous satel-
lites.
3 MakePlotSpec Create the gnuplot plot specification files for plotting the
history of satellites’ altitude (apogee and perigee), incli-
nation, period, and longitude (of geosynchronous satel-
lites).
4 PlotMania Create the makefile to allow the plotting of all the satel-
lite orbital elements history files.
5 MakeRelocPlots Combine the geostationary longitude histories into one
LaTex file.
6 SatSitRepConv Combine, clean up, and parse the NASA OIG Satellite
Situation Reports into an update of the orbital elements
for all published satellites.
7 NearGEO Calculate the closest approach of satellites to the geosyn-
chronous orbit. Results are shown in Section 7.5.2.
Table E.3: Orbital Element Manipulating Programs
E.2.1 ParseOIGdata
The ParseOIGdata program converts the TLEs to classical orbital elements (apogee,
perigee, etc.). Includes filtering of bad data, such as data from before the launch
date, data points that vary dramatically from the previous and next data points, and
other clearly erroneous data.
E.2.1.1 ParseOIGdata Input Sample
ParseOIGdata reads in data files from NASA OIG which includes satellite orbital
information the NORAD TLE format.
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1 11669U 80004 A 80018.29102798 .00005671 -39186-4 +00000-0 0 00026
2 11669 026.3598 327.9713 7322446 181.6344 173.0949 02.27193372000082
1 11669U 80004 A 80018.72488317 .00023323 -39277-4 +99999-4 0 00044
2 11669 026.3339 321.6514 7310914 181.8850 172.0127 02.28381042000009
E.2.1.2 ParseOIGdata Output Sample
IntID SatName NORAD Date Ecc Apogee Perigee Inclin rtAsc
EpochDayFrac GEOlong GEOnear Data
1980-004A FltSatCom3 11669 1980/01/18 0.7322446 35961.8
166.5 26.36 327.97 0.29102798 999.00 999.00 New 1
1980-004A FltSatCom3 11669 1980/01/19 0.7322446 35961.8
166.5 26.36 327.97 0.29102798 999.00 999.00 Dupe 0
ParseOIGdata also produces SatReport.txt and GEOlongs.txt.
E.2.2 GEOlongs
E.2.2.1 GEOlongs Input Sample
GEOlongs uses the output (GEOlongs.txt) from ParseOIGdata as input.
NORAD GEOloc Name From To
25546 56.00 Bonum 1 01/01/1958 11/29/2003
25558 -117.00 SAT MEX 5 01/01/1958 03/01/2004
25585 -43.50 PAS 6B 01/01/1958 03/01/2004
25626 -93.00 Telstar 6 01/01/1958 03/01/2004
25630 124.00 JCSat 6 01/01/1958 03/01/2004
25638 25.50 Arabsat 3A 01/01/1958 03/01/2004
E.2.2.2 GEOlongs Output Sample
This file shows how long a satellite stayed at a particular longitude.
IntID SatName NORAD From To MoveDays FromLong ToLong MoveDegs EOL
1982-097A Intelsat505 13595 1996/06/30 1996/08/02 33 65.5
33.0 32.5 1999/08/04
1982-097A Intelsat505 13595 1996/12/11 1997/03/04 83 33.0
72.0 39.0 1999/08/04
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E.2.3 MakePlotSpec
The MakePlotSpec program analyzes output (SatReport.txt) from ParseOIGdata,
combines manual spec with autogenerated text to make PlotSpec.txt for PlotMania
to drive GNUplot.
E.2.3.1 MakePlotSpec Input Sample
Uses SatReport.txt produced by ParseOIGdata.
E.2.3.2 MakePlotSpec Output Sample
Produces PlotSpecs.txt file for PlotMania.
E.2.4 PlotMania
E.2.4.1 PlotMania Input Sample
PlotSpecs.txt is a text file from an Excel list of files for processing. A sample is shown
below.
gnu file input plot output xrange yrange xlabel ylabel title
label1 label2
Gnu11669Alt.txt 11669.txt TRUE 11669Alt.pdf [ ] [ ] Date
(Launched: 01/18/1980, EOL: 01/01/1991) Altitude (km)
Altitude History of OPS 6393 (FLTSATCOM 3) (11669, 1980-004A)
Apogee Perigee
Gnu11669Inc.txt 11669.txt TRUE 11669Inc.pdf [ ] [ 0.00: 27.00]
Date (Launched: 01/18/1980, EOL: 01/01/1991) Inclination (deg)
Inclination History of OPS 6393 (FLTSATCOM 3) (11669, 1980-004A)
E.2.4.2 PlotMania Output Sample
The following charts are produced by gnuplot based on the makefile produced by the
previously described files.
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Figure E.1: Sample Satellite Geosynchronous Altitude History Plot
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Figure E.2: Sample Satellite Inclination History Plot
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Figure E.3: Sample Satellite Geosynchronous Longitude History Plot
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Figure E.4: Sample Satellite Geosynchronous Longitude History Plot, Active Life
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Figure E.5: Sample Satellite Period History Plot
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Figure E.6: Sample Satellite Geosynchronous Period History Plot
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Appendix F
Launch Costs To GEO
The average cost of launching a kilogram to GEO can be found by consulting the
Satellite Information Database. The key fields are estimated launch cost and es-
timated mass on orbit. In Table F.1 below, the “Satellites” column indicates the
number of payloads successfully launched per year with launch and mass informa-
tion. “Total Mass” is a sum of the mass of all the payloads. “Total Launch Cost” is a
sum of the launch costs. Finally, the “GEO Cost” is the cost per kilogram delivered
to GEO in units of $1, 000 per kilogram.
Total Mass Total Launch GEO Cost
Year Satellites To GEO (kg) Cost ($M) ($K per kg)
1994 19 26, 607 1, 362 51
1995 23 38, 059 1, 763 46
1996 27 37, 650 1, 776 47
1997 32 52, 066 2, 340 45
1998 27 43, 574 1, 984 46
1999 20 39, 765 1, 630 41
2000 35 62, 889 2, 912 46
2001 16 31, 713 1, 378 43
2002 25 50, 150 2, 119 42
2003 14 30, 135 1, 154 38
Table F.1: GEO Cost Per kg
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Appendix G
Inflation Rates
This appendix includes annual inflation rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
[9]. Reported costs from a particular year can be translated to 2003 costs using the
conversion factors Table G.1.
Convert Inflation Convert Inflation
Year To 2003 Rate Year To 2003 Rate
2003 1.0000 1991 1.3510 3.0
2002 1.0228 2.3 1990 1.4078 4.2
2001 1.0390 1.6 1989 1.4839 5.4
2000 1.0685 2.8 1988 1.5554 4.8
1999 1.1044 3.4 1987 1.6197 4.1
1998 1.1288 2.2 1986 1.6788 3.6
1997 1.1464 1.6 1985 1.7100 1.9
1996 1.1727 2.3 1984 1.7709 3.6
1995 1.2073 3.0 1983 1.8474 4.3
1994 1.2416 2.8 1982 1.9067 3.2
1993 1.2734 2.6 1981 2.0242 6.2
1992 1.3115 3.0 1980 2.2330 10.3
Table G.1: Annual Inflation Rate [9]
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Appendix H
Database Sample Record
This appendix contains a sample data record from the satellite information database
in Table H.1 and a sample data record from the on-orbit failure database in Table H.2.
Both records reference satellite Astra 1K which is shown in Figure H.1. This space-
craft was intended to be a geosynchronous telecommunications satellite. A launch
anomaly left it in a low earth orbit with insufficient fuel to reach its operating or-
bit. After boosting it to a longer life parking orbit and considering the alternatives,
ground controllers eventually commanded it to re-enter after confirming that there
was no currently feasible way for it to go into service.
Figure H.1: Astra 1K [36]
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# Field Value
1 Joint IntID 2002-053A
2 Joint Name Astra 1K
3 Joint Launch Date 11/25/02
4 Joint NORAD 27557
5 SvcDB OK
6 GeoDB GeoComm
7 Launch Mass (kg) 5,250
8 Spacecraft Bus Spacebus 3000
9 Launch Vehicle Proton K/DM-3M
10 Payload Year 2002
11 Launch Year 2002
12 Manufacturer Alcatel Space
13 Program Astra
14 Block Europe
15 Mkt CML
16 Msn1 Com
17 Mission1 GEO Comm
18 Msn2
19 Mission2
20 FCO
21 Actual Duration
(days)
0.0
22 Actual Life (yrs) 0.00
23 Design Lifetime (yrs) 15
24 Est Design Lifetime
(yrs)
15
25 Est EOL 2002
26 Actual EOL Year 2002
27 Status Inactive
28 Status Date 11/25/02
29 Decay Date 12/10/02
30 Orbit Note DECAYED
31 Orbit Loc DEC
32 Intended Orbit GEO
33 Orbit LEO
34 Missed Orbit TRUE
35 Inc (deg) 51.6
36 Perigee (km) 244
37 Apogee (km) 317
38 Period (min) 90.1
39 Epoch 12/01/02
40 Orbit Info Source
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# Field Value
41 e 0.0054816
42 RAAN (deg)
43 ArgPer (deg)
44 Date in GEO
45 GEO Long (deg)
46 Drift (deg/day)
47 Human Space Flight
48 Crew (Up/Dn)
49 Crew at Launch
50 Satellite Name Astra 1K
51 AKA1
52 AKA2
53 AKA3
54 AKA4
55 Acronym
56 Operator, Owner,
Org.
SES
57 Country Luxembourg
58 Original Country
59 Launch Site Baikonur
60 Upper Stage
61 Xenon Propulsion
62 Dimensions
63 Est In Orbit Mass
(kg)
3,150
64 Est Dry Mass (kg) 2,205
65 Est Life Fuel Mass
(kg)
945
66 In Orbit Mass (kg)
67 Dry Mass (kg)
68 Fuel Mass (kg)
69 Payload Mass (kg)
70 DC Power (W) 13,000
71 DC Power BOL (W)
72 DC Power EOL (W)
73 Payload Power (W)
74 Solar Array Config
75 Stabilization 3-axis
76 Stabilization Note
77 SS/L Prog Cost ($M)
FY95
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# Field Value
78 SS/L Prog Cost ($M)
FY02
79 SS/L Prog Cost ($M)
80 Est Sat Cost ($M) 150
81 Est Launch Cost
($M)
82.5
82 Total Cost ($M)
83 Sat Cost ($M)
84 Launch Cost ($M) 82.5
85 Insurance Cost ($M) 47
86 Insured Amount
($M)
290
87 Low Insurance Pay-
out ($M)
275
88 High Insurance Pay-
out ($M)
290
89 Total Xpndr 54
90 C-band Xpndr
91 C-band BW
92 Ka-band Xpndr 2
93 Ka-band BW
94 Ku-band Xpndr 52
95 Ku-band BW
96 L-band Xpndr
97 L-band BW
98 S-band Xpndr
99 S-band BW
100 X-band Xpndr
101 X-band BW
102 UHF-band Xpndr
103 UHF-band BW
104 Coverage
105 Sources 3
106 Source ASTX Astx
107 Source AWST
108 Source Celestrak Celestrak
109 Source CLS2
110 Source Hibbard
111 Source Hughes
112 Source Intelsat
113 Source Isak
114 Source JSR
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# Field Value
115 Source JSR2
116 Source JSR3
117 Source MSL
118 Source NSSDC
119 Source NSSDC2
120 Source PAS
121 Source SatToday
122 Source STK
123 Source TSE TSE
124 Source SatND
125 Payload Launch ID 2002-053
126 Deployed by / Re-
leased
127 Firsts / Lasts
128 Short Mission De-
scription
Luxembourg geostationary communications space-
craft was prematurely commanded to separate from
upper stage, resulting in the spacecraft orbiting at a
very low orbit.
129 Long Mission De-
scription
ASTRA 1K was to be a European (Luxembourg-
based) geostationary communications spacecraft. It
was launched by a Proton-K rocket from Baikonur
at 23:04 UT on 2002 November 25. The 5.0-ton, 13-
kW spacecraft was reported to be the most massive
of civilian communications spacecraft, with 52 Ku-
band and two Ka-band transponders to cover 1,100
channels. It was prematurely commanded to sepa-
rate from the DM-3 booster, resulting in a very low
orbit. In an effort to prevent imminent re-entry, the
spacecraft was raised to a circular orbit at an alti-
tude of 290 km. Three options were considered: (a)
to force its re-entry over the Pacific Ocean; (b) to re-
trieve it by a US shuttle; or, (c) to use up all the fuel
onboard the satellite to move it to a geostationary
orbit at 19.2 degrees East longitude. It was com-
manded to re-enter.
130 Anomalies The Block DM upper stage failed to ignite for its
second burn, leaving the satellite in parking orbit.
131 More Failure Info
132 FailDB FOI
133 Fail Type
134 BRS Notes
135 NukeDB
136 Nuclear Status
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# Field Value
137 Geo Xp / Kg 0.010
138 Geo Xp Yr / Kg 0.154
139 OIG TLEs 02/19/04 0
Table H.1: Satellite Database Sample Record
# Field Value
1 Failure ID 2002-053A#1
2 # 1
3 Joint IntID 2002-053A
4 Vers DB
5 Joint Name Astra 1K
6 Joint Launch Date 11/25/02
7 Joint NORAD 27557
8 FailDB OK
9 Design Lifetime (yrs) 15
10 Failure Year 2002
11 Prefail Life (days) 0
12 Prefail Life (yrs) 0.0
13 Actual Life (yrs)
14 Beyond EOL (yrs)
15 Era BOL
16 Status Inactive
17 Status Date 11/25/02
18 Simple Failure Level Total
19 Failure Level Total
20 Failure Type Wrong Orbit
21 Brief Failure Descrip-
tion
Upper stage failure
22 Failure Description The Block DM upper stage failed to ignite for its
second burn, leaving the satellite in parking orbit.
23 Failure Date 11/25/02
24 Failure Source L/V
25 Standard Brief Fail-
ure Description
26 salvage note Commanded Reentry
27 Could Be Serviced Yes
28 Generic Service Re-
quired
Boost
29 Probable State Stable
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# Field Value
30 Service Required Boost to GEO
31 Total Cost ($M)
32 Sat Cost ($M)
33 Launch Cost ($M)
34 Low Insurance Claim
($M)
277.5
35 High Insurance
Claim ($M)
36 Source ASTX ASTX
37 Source AWST2
38 Source Dowa
39 Source GTF
40 Source INTEC
41 Source Isak2
42 Source ISIR
43 Source SatND
44 Source Stock
45 Source Waltz
46 Source MSL
47 Source STK
48 Source TSE TSE
49 Source JSR
50 Source NSSDC
51 Source Morgan
Table H.2: On-Orbit Failure Database Sample Record
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